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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. CV-2010-519C 
v. AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNA SCHNIDER 
CITY OF MCCALL, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
.ss 
County of Valley. ) 
I, Deanna Schnider, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge and with the 
understanding that it will be submitted in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNA SCHNIDER - PAGE I 
OR\G\NAL 402 
2. I am a Paralegal at the law firm Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & 
Pemberton, attorney of record representing Alpine Village Company in this action. 
3. True and correct copies of two spreadsheets provided by the City of 
\1cCall in Defendant's Response to PlaintitT's First Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents, are attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 (bates no. 
COMOO]] 96-COMl199 and COM1203-COM1208). 
4. I have taken the information on those spreadsheets and combined them in 
order to create one spreadsheet that identifies the following information: 
a) Building Permit Number 
b) Amount of Community Housing Fee Paid 
c) Date Community HOllsing Fee Paid 
d) Date Refund Request was made to City 
e) Amount of Refund 
f) Date Community Housing Fees Paid were Refunded 
A eopy of the spreadsheet I created is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
5. Based on my analysis of the spreadsheets, a total of fifty-eight refund 
requests were made to the City of McCall and a total of $92,820.00 was refunded. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this th day ofOetober, 2011. 
//'\. (/\ (\ 4-\ 'I J 
!" )~ 4 ,'" I ill llu a ?Lit i(;J \--j ~. C ,(I t;hj 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i h day of October, 2011. ............ , ..... ,~ 
~FA' ~o FJJ:#~ lIi!......&..."....."._ ••••• b-..,t #" • -" • .j\ ... ~ 
NOTAR PUBII :1I!)f\IfIO'" If ';. . . ~ .. 
My Commissio! ~i>ires;..42./l2iAl .. . .~. 
\~~~"8Y J> ~.'9: ~ : 
.. 0...1. .*.,!".o 
.... 'Yj ...... 'V' 
# .. ,,~ol,J.ld .:> ~ ............. , 
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$42 S""""""'Y Lane SF R .. 
-~~ 07, ; • = .. BI':iuuw. lQJOS107 WilI<in>on 2&9 Morg"" Dr. SFR"" ':<', <! ~.', HotS~,Prop. 






SZl1,ooa.oo $1,659.25 $1,07&51 $1,146.00 rx;IC6IQT 
$500.000.00 i3Z)3,7S S2.101.93 $1.337.00 07KI5IfJ7 
$375.000..00 $2.5OG.25 $1,$29.06 $'1=.00 07/031fJl 
$5OO.00a.OO i3.1Oa.75 $2.410,&9 $'I ,GallO 07I06I07 
S37,(X)().OO $2.022.25 $1.3,.,<46 51,337.00 07l'l6/fJ7 
$273.<400.00 S1.945.25 S1.2Il4.41 $1.146.00 071Z3K11 
S2G8,4OQ00 $l.470Jla $1.605.07 $1."'6.00 07102J07 
5197,000.00 51.so7.25 S979.71 51,146.00 07124JW 
$525.000.00 =2.50 $2.114.13 $1,623..00 07fZ3J07 
$245,875.00 51.791:2.5 $1,164.31 SI.337.00 ,,,,,'107 
SG3S.000.00 $3.875.00 1:2,518.75 51.337.00 07f31107 
S4OO.ooo.oo 1:2,781.25 51,007.51 51.337.00 07f25107 
SI.558.ooo.00 $7.561.75 64.915.14 $2.96a00 091t1107 
$300.000.00 $2.09:l.7S $1.300.94 $1.1~OO 0Mrl107 
nss.400.00 Sl.033.2S $1.321.61 51,1<16.00 09117107 
SAZ!.1SO.OO S2.764.75 $1.797.09 $1.337.00 W3Q107 
t'J!'j ... 
$411.soo.oo S1,604.2S $1,042.7& $1.1<16.00 09I2J!I07 =' 
=' ~.OOO.OO S2.lIOa.75 $1,1125.69 ",337.00 l11Oi107 ;;; 
5160.000.00 $'.323.75 $>l6O.44 $1.146.00 09121/07 .... 
$1.627,000.00 $7.960.75 SS.'74.4~ $7.161.00 l1i02107 
$249.750.00 $,At,3.25 :11.178.6' $1.146.00 10/10/07 
$800.000.00 l'3Zl3.75 $2.101.93 $1.623.00 11lJtl!l107 
:1134.500.00 $1.180.75 S7STA9 :11.146.00 10117107 
. I 1 ,.,queots .... 











" ~ IOIQ' 




1116t2OOB Vol<>. LLC 
111&12OOB Vole. LLC 
2l2Ol2OO8 Call1<eev<< 
2f.22I2llQa John wa",ms 
=008 Jason Clay 
41712\lOO Lany Hultman 
ROtvl. 
4IZl/2OO8 $andmeyor 
Cctbet Inc. lor 
4I3OI2OOIl Rld< Eagles'on 
MaIltng AddntSZ 
10060 W. Rolling Hllis 
Dr.Star 10 836159 
lD060 W. RoIli1g Hills 
Dr.Star ID !l3669 
1037 wei< Creel< Rd. 
Phol'laNo. 
Project name or 
add ...... & BPI! 
Lot 24 Bik 11 (LanJo) 
208-2a& 7:l44 #3426 
1.01 23 Blk 11 (LarOo) 
203.265-7:l44 #3427 
030-485Il 342 Wl1ltet.' Dr. #3310 
P.O. Sox 28:J2 McCall ~4 
204 Fox Faitway CL 
#3428 
P.O. Sox 100000McCail 
Blue canyon QJstom 
1225 N Aut\lm1I Wrm 
74SS W I<e<Ty Or 
_83714 
1719 Woodside Rd. 
RedWood Coly CA 
630-J647 308 Camp R<" #351:)7 
1440 Min M<>a<k>N Dr 
208-941-5474 #3667 
1310 Aspen Ridge I.n. 
ZOJl-ll53-54a3 #3S99 
14<.0 MajesUc Vi<NI Dr. 
~#34139 
5!212000 Ja.on Caurleld P.O. Box 244< McCall 271.S39i 93!> HyM l". #3370 
Sand,.,. & David 
elIgIble t'Or refund 
Ordinance 620- ALL REQUEST ARE 
eligible (or ELIGIBle per 














515i2OOB MiUer P. O. Sox 1757 McCall 034-0503 287 R,o Vista 9r.o. #3260 x 
3Q5!lS WoJIow a~ 1 ~ Majesuc Vi"", Dr. 
511412008 Dra;\e Darden PI""" Canyon Lake CA 951-326-5228 #1300 ~J;~. 
WS89 WlIJow BrOOk 1060 Cedar Lan~ 
511412008 Diane Dattlen Place CanyQI1 Lake CA 951-326-5228 #J066 N:.', 
125 Commerce SL 
5/1&12008 Oavid ArmS110tlS McCall ',0 83S:lIl G:;4.55S6 
5l2Ol2OO8 PII'leIQP B .. 1deni P.O. Sox 41 10. McCall 315-0090 
5r.I;Oi2OO8 P'r"elop 9\lilderS P.O. Box 4110. McCall 315-0090 
5/::01.2008 P","op Buiders p.O. Box "110. McCall 31!>-0090 
=2.006 P"""DP Builde", P.O. Sox 4110, McCall 315-0090 
1947$. R"""",,,i 
5I22l2OO8 Rir::har<:l Ems Baosc837OS 
6151ZOOll 8<r!1arU Smith P.O. Sox 2190 McCaU 634-$419 
"25 Commerce St#3135 l"wA 
1465 Bltterrool #3:J,54 
1415 Majes1ic Vit!w 
~6 
1490 Majestic View 
113533 
1030 MeadOWS R~. 
=os 










349 Wh'r,elail Dr. 11326<' X 
Gr.3O/2007 Randy AP.et 
71212007 James Sor;l< 





P.O. Box 2887 eo .... 
83701 208-440-4663 1042 Frewcea #36C:2 
Not 
Let'terscot 
Submitted to l«Au .... t 
~1Ig1bl. Dati> Pald Ck1I Amount Paid flnance: not ehgib.le 
912112OO6~ $1.146.00 412512008 
912112000 #2589 51.146.00 4I25i2OOll 
Bi9I2OO6 #2254 S2.483.oo 412812008 
SV"~#12S SI.623.oo 412812008 
2J9I2OO7 #1709 51.337.00 717fl.fXl8 5I2l2OO6 
BI3tJI2OO7 #11190 $1.337.00 7nl"l.J)08 5I2l2OO6 
&11212007 #1798 $1.337.00 7171"l.J)08 5I2l2OO6 
1117.112008 #1665 $1.623.00 71912008 5I2I2tOll 
a'3I2OOO lI1005 $1.337.00 51Sf2008 
9/512006 112175 $1.146.00 61712008 
Mar2005 
pnor to Fa:u.d 
Oro. NIA NlA N1A 'NA 512112008 
Al.rg.2OO5 
ptlorto Faxed 
Oro Nil< NlA N1A NJA 512112008 
OCl2005 
poor 10 Faxed 
00:1. N/A N/A NIA N/A 512012008 
7l2512OO6 1<5539 $1.337.00 5I2mrXJB 
111612fXJ1 #3Qa6 $1.337.00 71712008 5/2:lI2OO8 
6115iZOO7 #2028 $1.623.00 7rr!'}f.X)lj ~ 
impac< 
area no 
(ee paid NlA NlA NJA N/A 5/21/2008 
711012007 #3219 S2.483.00 71712008 5I22l2OO8 
5I3J2006 #254 $2.483.00 6I12f2D(J8 NJA 
4I'2:>J2fX)7 t:-5OOO '>1.146.00 7T1fl.fXl8 N/A 
















Name-1eepald Project name or 
o.te by •.• MaWng AddrQSS Phone No. address &. BP# 
ml200fJ T O<l '-"l<ecatt P.O. a"" 2:l35 McCall 6;)4..0007 1195 Majest!e #J446 
136 Rob\ak Ave 
71!!aOO8 KrisU MiI<hem HiIIsl>oroughGa 94010 41S·215-ll5B:'. 653 MlgTalOry way #3002 
Gould Custom 
BviIC«s for Max 291 Ashloi1l.G1le 
711412008 Sdell M<.C311 634-9898 313 W. lal<.1I:l622 
C()l"1len'".bJne 
Custom Homes. p.O. Box 32.1 Na.mpa 1117311675 Ginrl\!Y Way 
7I101200a Inc. 1083636 201\-.71:?>00504 #3252 
Cornerstone 
Cus[orn Homes, t'l.O. Sox 321 Nampa 16.591'1661 GU'm1J)' Way 
711= Joe. 10 !!3636 20S-71:?>00504 #3253 
Cornerstone 
Custom Hom.... P.O. Box 321 Nampa 
711012008 '''''- 10 B:l68B 20&-713-0504 1681 GiMey W1fy #3335 
r~one 
CUStom Homes. P.O. Uex JZ1 Nampa 
7/1012008 Inc 1083686 208-713-0504 1683GImeyWay#33:l6 
COfl'oIlrst011e 
Custom Homes, P ,0. Box 321 Nampa 
711012008 Inc. 10 B:l686 200-713-0504 1677 Ginney way #3S68 
Comecstooe 
Custom Ho""",. PO Box 321 Nampa 
7/HlI'2006 Inc. 10_ 208-713-<JSQ4 1579 Ginner Way /:3569 
Cot11tlrl;tone 
Custom Mom.... P.O. S<>. 32, Nampa 
711012uoa Inc. 10 B:l6ll6 20S-71:l-0504 1683 GlmeyWay 113593 
Comen;l0n0 
ClJ$lcm Hom .... P.O. 60<321 Nampa 
7/1012008 Inc. ID l!3686 208--713-0504 1~ GlfIluty Way 113594 
40e Osprey View Or. 
7/ls/200i:1 Anlhony Gal>rlefl! P.O. Box 2S"l!4 McCall 634-2409 #3355 
Eve!1l$l 
Col"J$IrudiOn for PO Box867DO<"II1eIIy 
711712.008 TraviS Hlggils 10836"15 325-4600 325 Whltelall Dr. tl343C 
Everest 
Construction for P.O. Box B67Domel!y 
7/1712.008 Travis HI9!1i1s 1083615 325-4600 3n wrnteta.1 Dr. #3431 
201 Counlly Cr.ll'Isman 
71211= J~ Smilll P.O. Box 987 McCall 315-3732 LoopilJ.51S 
518 E. Fuj' Onve 4605 WiUiams Creel< 
7/2S12OO8 Troy Summers NamP3B3~ 466--3J12 #3342 
HaNey Meyer for 
811212008 Russ<oil V_ P.O. Box = McCall 630-31194 931 Conifer ~ 3ti13 
--- --------un:nJl1lJl1:~i).__-- - --------.----.--
etigJbt& for rerund 
oroinan"" lila.. AU. REQUEST ARE Letter sent 
eligible for EUGISLE_ No. Submitted to ROGue,,, 
rotund CouncU &126108 eligible Date Paid C .... AmountPaia ":;;inanc.e: not eliglOle 
)()O( IJIlPl"O'I<Id 
&'26108 1011612006 #1~ S2.4ll3OO 7/8J2fXJ1j NlA 
)()O(~ 
612Q1\l8 111Z12OO7 #3lQ2 $7.161-00 71811JY:13 NlA -xxx app""""" 
6126108 x 7== :f10121 SI.6Zl.oo 711512008 NJA 
XXXappr()V\l(j 
~oa ~I-4f.2O()Q #4990 $1.331.00 7t1S1200B N;A 
XXX approved 
6120108 x 411412006 #4990 SI.337.00 7115J1OO8 NI,A. 
XXX approved 
\io'26IQa 715f)J)OS 1114794 S1.146.00 7/15/2008 N/A 
t-r:1 
XXX ,approved i><i 




6I25ioa 51112007 _'2 $1.146.00 1I1b12OO8 NJA -~ 
)()O( appl'OVl!<! 
6126108 5f1f2007 #4812 51.146.00 7I1b12OO8 NlA 
XXX approved 
6126108 6J6I2007 "6822 51,146.00 711512008 "/A 
XXJ( approved 
6120108 6JfI2007 _22 51.146.00 1I15i2008 NJ,\ 
)()O( apPl<Ml<i 
&'26108 712412006 #1641 $2.483.00 711512008 NJA e XXX approved 
6120108 1011l/2Q06 #4667 $1.623.00 711712006 NJA 
XXXappr()V\l(j 
612&08 1011;)121)06 #4S68 $1.623.00 711712008 Nil>-. 
XXXi3Pproved 
6!lllI1l6 31911007 #1128 $1.148.00 7121f2.008 NJI>-. 
XXX approved 
61261()8 14-JuI #4500 $2.900.00 7=008 NJA 
xxx approved 











O;no by ... Io\>ojUn, AddtcsS 
le_ Mou1Ilin 
ReInIabi for 12934 G"lJef Creel< 
8113!21lO6 Todd_ ease 10 83113 
741 Mal1iliIg Sun O""e 
811912008 Riel< GriIfith TWIll FaIlS ,0 83&)1 
1704 N. ~ Sl S .... 
lI/2tV2OOIiI Larry_ 10837112 
1704 N. 2$n SL _ 
~ Larry- 1083702 
6351 TunWTy Cr. 
SanQr.l H~IDn_CA 
IlI22I2OOL\ W,",,,,,,,,,, 92848 
Werner P.O. Box 1511 lI.lcCaD 
11111:0'2008 scnatmad< 10 Il3S3Il 
0_& Rich P.O. Sox 2f,64 MoCaI! 
101112008 Holsm., ID 8383S 
IB1OW.SlateS!. 
101112008 Nate Hauder _10q702 
L.AM\IEY l.l.C for 
Hugn & Bat!laIa 2914 Grover Streel 
101112008 Quist Scose 10 ~705 
827 S 6oi<1geway 
Place ::110 Eagle 10 
lDr.r.l12OOtl c.s.C CapUall.l.C a3616 
827S.Snd_ 
Place #110EagJe 10 
10123121105 C&C CaP .... u.c 83616 
827S.~nd_ 
Pmce#110 E.a;le to 
101Zl1200S C&C Capital LLC 83616 
-_ ...... _ ... _ .. -
ProJttel: name or 
PhooaNo. ood""", & BP# 
942 SIraw!lerTy Lena 
94'.1709 -109 R""" Ranct\ Ra 
2Oa.724-<lOO8 tI3Il34 
!..ol2 8locI< 1 a w. Hays 
~ 51.#3512 
~ 1045 Potts Or <132&5 
626-327-8888 259 Morgan Onve #3702 
2025 Fox FalMIIy COUrt 
ZOII-6JO.8874 #3280 
SlU90-4538 361 vmtetai Onve #3281 
2Q8..51~94 1102. Alpine SI 1I3Zti4 
~701 , 016 K31Iyn I.OOP #3246 
0rninance= 
TalaloI19req_ls (Of 
reIlJI'ods as 011012.4108 
totaltng S:I1.5'''.00 
s<l2.W2.00 Total 




LOll1 61k ZO Oawson 
~ Ave_ 
lot 12 Blk 20 Dawson 
206-323-6600 Ave~7 
Lo!1JaJI<2CD_ 




Ordinance 8iO- AU. REQUEST ARE Loner_ 
eligible for EUGlBlE per Not Submiuedto ~-I'lttund Council 612$108 eligible 0aIII Paid Cl<# Amount~id FiflOilnCO not lIligib.le 
XXXapplQWd 
llI2fl/08 1011012007 #1418 $1.146.00 8I1412!Xla NlA 
XXX appItMICI e 6126108 x 7i311<W7 =12 $1.337.00 BI1 !lI2OOtI Nti< XXX app<tMld 
6I2tlI08 x zrt:JI7OO7 #1484 $1.146.00 812!>'2000 NlA 
xxx applOliGa 
6I2tlI08 x 5ISI2OO6 #1404 SI.1"".00 8I25l2OO8 "',:, 
:t:JO( OiIpproVild 
6I2tlI08 1<)'9(2001 #1025 SI.6Z3.oo 8I25l2OO8 NlA 
XXX approved 
6/26/08 ~1512OO6 #8106 S2.4<I3.oo 9flO/21X18 NlA 
XXX approved 
6126/08 511512006 S40J S2.~.00 10I2l2008 "'<-
XXX appcove<l ~ 
6I2tlI08 x 5ISI2OO6 #1018 $1.14&.00 10I2r.I008 NIA l><! 
:: 
XXXapplOlied C" 




Total of 24 nIqIJeSIs 




Ccmmllli!y~ e feesP;i<I S41l.201.oo ReIIItde<l 
537.531.00 BaI;rca 
no fee 
NIt. pai<I NiA NlA NfA NjA 11.~~~ 
Fee plliO was for 
bUldM1g pennIl 
NJA ranking X ;j!A N!A NIA lilA 11;S,-:iOOS 
Fee pad was ior 
IluiIdIOg pennIl 








~ ....... .... 
Name-fee pakl 
Oat. by ..• ~hngAddra:ls 
827 S. BIldgeway 
P*e '110 Eagle 10 
,Q/ZlI2008 C&C ~ U.C 83616 
827 S. Bridg_ 
PI_ .110 Eagte 10 
11l1Z:11'.llXl6 C&C C:IpitaI U.C 83816 
827 S. Sridgeway 
Place #IIQ Eagle 10 
10I22l200II CoToC Gapo;olllC 836'6 
827 S. BIldgeway 
Place *110 Eagle 10 
10/2312006 C&C Capital U.C 83816 
8Z7S.Bndgeway 
Place il' 10 Eagle 10 
'0/2312006 C&C Capolal U.C 836'6 
BZ7 S. Bridglwlay 
"!.ace #, 10 Eagle 10 
10I23l2008 C&C CapllaIllC 636,6 
BZ7S.e~_ 
P"",,,,""0EagleIO 
1012:l1Z008 C&C (;ap!talllC 83815 
827 S. 8JidgoNr.-y 
Place"" 10 £.,g'.IO 
1012:l1200a C&C Capital LLC 83616 
827 S. Bndijlfflill' 
Place '" 10 Eagle 10 
10/2312008 C&C Capil8l LLC 836,6 
827S.6riOg_ 
p~ 11'110 Eagle 10 
'0/2312008 C&C Capital LtC 83616 
T",,&Amy P.O. e",,2466 McCall 
111612009 Myers 10 S3638 
P.O. Box 596 W!li1ef1Oh 
101::\12Q01j JIllOm\' Tripoli MT59937 
ProjfrCl n.oune or 
Phone-No. adttf"8$1l & SPIt 
l.Ql1161k,Z10aYr-iQf\ 
:oo6-~6600 lWe#J01l9 
Lot ,2 Blk 21 Dawson 
~ti600 Ave 13090 
Lot ,3 sUe 21 Dawson 
:006-~ Ave 113091 
LOI14 elk 21 Dawson 
21J8.32:l.66OO Ave*1092 
Lor,5 SIl< 2, Dawson 
2IJ8.32:l.66OO Ave #3093 
\.Qt 16 81k 21 Dawson 
~ Ave#3Q94 
Let 17 Bik 21 Dawson 
2!J8..323..66() Ave. ::3095 
Lot 18 elk 21 oawson 
2Q3.323-6600 Ave_ 
lo( 19 SIk 21 Od\"olSOfl 
:006-323-6600 Ave#3Q97 
LOI20 Bik 2, Dawson 
:006-323-6600 AvellG098 
1115_Gate 
2011-315-5166 Court IIt3535 
$$2.602.00 Total 




620 l«lora Street 
<<If).25().1)717 a3383 
as 011 OIOJ1tlS 
$82.602.00 Total 
eom""""ty HCU$/ng Fees 
Paid 
l.J11IIn:m~'[ 
~i9ib'" tor rofImd 
Onll""""" 320.. AU. REOU!;;ST ARE LetteTam: 
lIiglblo for EUGIBl..E per Not Submltte4to Raqu .. , 
refund CouncJl 6l26IOI eligible Data Paid Ck# AmQuntPoilid Finance noteJlglble 
F8$ paid was lor 
~pa1tIII 
MA r.wII<ing X N:A NfA NiA ,~/;" 11,i3l'2OCO 
Fee paid was lor 
l>uiI<1iI1g- e Nil'. t1Mng X NJA NlA NI" 'if A l1Ci'ZOCa F.., paid was lor 
DUlldingpe!Tlli! 
NJA l'lIIIiIIDg X NJA Nit. Nj';' NI.A 11t:?:OZCOS 
Fee paid was for 
boiIcfong pemIiI 
No''':'' r.riing X ~~ Nit.. Ni"::'. NlA '14>1200<! 
Fee jl.QId was for 
~permiI 
Nii\. ranking X Wi<- NJA NfA N:A 11~·2'OC.IH 
Fee paid was for 
• ..,fding pem1lt 
N;J'\ <1ItIking X NtA "Ii< NJA N,;" 110~ ~ 
Fee paid_lor ~ 
building_ =. 
Nh\ ranldtJg X Ni". N'~. N!A ~,;:, l1r~.:OC;:, r:r 
Fee paid was 10( ::;: 
l>uIIQlng perm. 
N N/A ranking X NJA NlA NIA N/A 1113.r~ 
F., paid was for 
bUidm91"1"l"1 
N,A ~ X :oJ(':" N/"':' N," r-JA l1J:i.'2C~ 
Feep&dwaslOr 
bLil4lng perm. 
N.Jj., !Wing X NtA NJA I\L';" NiA l1MOCJ 
X 3I22I2IKl1 2017 $1,337.00 1/2llll1lO9 
$71.=OOT""" e Communil¥ HalSilg F_Paid 
$41.538.00 R_ 
S36,194.00 Balance 
8/1512flO1> 2512 52.196.00 101S/2tlO9 N/A 













N.ame.l ... PlIi41 
Date by .. Mailing AddrHS 
934 Chipmunk Lane 
1111012009 SarbaraKlJUete( McC.;iiID83638 
JOr'gQfl$cn' 
0;Md CONlIUcIIOI1 
11113r.!00!l Famswortll p.O. e"" 1:7111.AcCo1l 
2900 E. Parkmor Or 
11116i2009 Pall1"" u.g.nboll 60,se 10 ~706 
1111712009 Dave c..rter PO. 8o~$!6 McCall 
7524 S. L"""", Grove 
11119:2009 Nicole 8<own Merid ... 10 113642 
3670 E TI1IiI BMf Lone 
1113012009 Greg Jollnoon BOIse 10 !tpl S 
423 E. Carlor SI. 80< ... 
12I3l2009 HCIly r13Mtef 8370S 
823 W Brae...,. Rd 
1211412C09 Brr""' Fouester BoisalO 8:)702 
7250 RedWccd Blvd 
SI.iIle 218 II/Ova\c CA 
1;za,12OO9 I!~Moa LLC 9494S 
7250 Redv«lod Blvd 
MeCalRiver Suhe218 l'I4ovatoCA 
1212112009 Ranch 94~ 
MK:hacl 215 W. P3l1iament 
1212912Q09 Goldman &lise 10 a:rro&4.3CO 
MietIae) 275 W. Parliament 
'V29IZOO9 Goi4man 6010<; 10 83706-4:300 
Mk:hae! 275 W. Paioment 
1212912Q09 GOklm.., Soia 10 !l311l6.43OO 
Michael 275 W. Partamanl 
lV291ZOO9 Goldman Boise 10 s:l706-4:300 
P.O. Bo.21SO Eagle. 
'213112009 Vole LLC 108a616 
P.O. Box 2150 EaQle. 
'2I31J:1W9 VOk> LLC 108a616 
P.O. Sex 2150 Eagle. 
1213112009 Vol<> LLC 108a616 
urG'ln&nc..-~ 
1111911>1e for nofund 
Or<!lna"<;8 lS20- AU. REQueST ARE 
PtojKt name or eligible tOf eUGIBLEper 
Pf\one No. address & BP# nohAnd Council 6/26I0Il 
S31.S14.00 Refunlled S43.734JXl ReIurded 
551.DlIB.00 Babnce $33._.00 BaIan:e 
934 Cn.pmunll Lane 
2OB-S34-OO6O #3596 
1018 Pensteman ?lace 
208-547-4a04 #32S3 X 
lVO Aspen Ridge Lane 
2QIl.-a07 -0052 #1807 NlA NlA 
315-2472 1 J09 Hlmbanl X 
2~1010 5,,3 KOSkl #3517 X 
145 Deer F()I"esl Onve 
~39S9 #3S66 X 
719 Deer Fore:n Dnve 
208-<lil-,5;/S9 #3565 X 
208-856-755' 325 For.,.. S"""I J:J.5e2 X 
126 !<we< Ranch R_ 
4,5-89!J.4802 #3271 X 
101 Headq""" ... RO. 
4,5-898-4&12 #3632 X 
748 Deer Forest Dr. 
206-283-'415 #339ll X 
740 Deer Forest Dr. 
206-283-'415 1/:3302 X 
7S2 D_ Forest Dr. 
208-283-1415 #3304 X 
700 & 704 Deer Forest 
208-283-1415 Dr. (duplex) 113301 X 
208-S7Q.820, ,346 Par Lane #3334 X 
2O&--57G-8:!01 P,neda!e StreaJ lI3426 
208-570-8201 PiIledaJe Sir"'" #3427 
Lettflrsent 
No' Submtuedto- Aequ_ 
eligibl. ~ta Paid Cidl Amo.untPaid Financ.& _eligible 
612112007 1192 51.1'10.00 1111012009 
.... 
:il4IZ006 1068;1 $1.337.00 11/1612009 N/" 
Jan,20Q5 t c.;:;;ikiJ ~ .. Is. 
ptIOrlQ 1..4.;'lr~1 
Ortl. NlA NlA No 'ee pald NlA 11-1&<)9 
1 0i17 J2IXl9 Z73 $1.146.00 1111712009 N.fA 
31612007 #1178 S1.146.OO 1111912009 "'A 
tr:I 0l30l2007 3S12 SI.337.00 1211= i'V~ ;.c 
::r 
-<J:lOI2007 3220 S'.3J7,OO 12141Z009 :-4: ...... 
2: 
911012007 3230 S1.337 00 12/141= NIP. -N 
511112005 92 S2:.483.00 1212,12009 N . .';" 
I .... from 
"W'OIdedBP 
#3338 & "-3357 
Clt<IilO<ll(l 
101111= 3304 $1.331.00 12J2112OO9 NlA IlPl'J6l2 
8I3OJ2()I)S 2009 51.148.00 12I29l2009 NlA 
61712005 3786 $1.146.00 lZ12912OO9 Nil< 
61712005 3788 S1.1.o16.00 ,2129/2009 NfA 
6I712Q1Jfi, 3788 51.337.00 12I29IZIlO9 N;A 
OR_oI 
51.286.11 
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12131121lO1l Volo U.C 
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eHgibl. for refund 
Ordl"""",, B2I).. ALL REQUEST ARE 
oIlglbl. fOr EUG/8LE pet 
refund Council6lliilOa 
HoI 















BP# CH Fee Paid Date CH Fee Paid Date Refund Request Amount Refund Date Refunded 
3246 $ 1,146.00 4/5/2006 10/7/2008 $ 1,146.00 10/8/2008 
3249 $ 1,337.00 4/20/2006 
3252 $ 1,337.00 4/14/2006 7/10/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/15/2008 
3253 $ 1,337.00 4/14/2006 7/10/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/15/2008 
3254 $ 1,623.00 4/14/2006 
3260 $ 1,146.00 5/2/2006 5/5/2008 $ 1,146.00 5/7/2008 
3262 $ 2,483.00 5/3/2006 6/5/2008 $ 2,483.00 6/12/2008 
3263 $ 1,337.00 5/4/2006 11/13/2009 $ 1,337.00 11/16/2009 
3264 $ 1,146.00 5/5/2006 10/1/2008 $ 1,146.00 10/2/2008 
3265 $ 1,146.00 5/5/2006 8/20/2008 $ 1,146.00 8/25/2008 
3266 $ 859.00 5/5/2006 
3271 $ 2,483.00 5/12/2006 12/21/2009 $ 2,483.00 12/21/2009 
3280 $ 2,483.00 5/15/2006 9/10/2008 $ 2,483.00 9/10/2008 
I 3281 $ 2,483.00 5/15/2006 10/1/2008 $ 2,483.00 10/2/2008 
3294 $ 1,146.00 5/30/2006 
3301 $ 1,337.00 6/7/2006 12/29/2009 $ 1,337.00 12/29/2009 
3302 $ 1,146.00 6/7/2006 12/29/2009 $ 1,146.00 12/29/2009 
3303 $ 1,146.00 6/7/2006 
3304 $ 1,146.00 6/7/2006 12/29/2009 $ 1,146.00 12/29/2009 
3305 $ 1,337.00 6/7/2006 
3310 $ 2,483.00 6/9/2006 2/20/2008 $ 2,483.00 4/28/2008 
3311 $ 2,960.00 6/9/2006 
3324 $ 1/146.00 6/30/2006 
3334 $ 1,337.00 7/6/2006 12/31/2009 $ 1,337.00 1/4/2010 
3335 $ 668.50 7/5/2006 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3336 $ 668.50 7/6/2006 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3337 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2006 
3342 $ 2,960.00 7/14/2006 7/25/2008 $ 2,960.00 7/29/2008 
3347 $ 2,960.00 7/24/2006 
3350 $ 1,146.00 7/21/2006 
3354 $ 1,337.00 7/25/2006 5/20/2008 $ 1,337.00 5/27/2008 
3356 $ 2,483.00 7/24/2006 7/15/2008 $ 2,483.00 7/15/2008 
3358 $ 1,337.00 7/25/2006 
3364 $ 1,337.00 8/1/2006 
3365 $ 1,337.00 8/3/2006 
3370 $ 1,337.00 8/3/2006 5/2/2008 $ 1,337.00 5/5/2008 
3377 $ 1,337.00 8/7/2006 
3383 $ 2,196.00 8/15/2006 10/3/2009 $ 2,196.00 10/5/2009 
3388 $ 1,337.00 8/15/2006 
3390 $ 2,483.00 8/18/2006 
3395 $ 1,623.00 8/25/2006 
3397 $ 1,337.00 8/29/2006 
3399 $ 1,146.00 8/30/2006 12/29/2009 $ 1,146.00 12/29/2009 
3417 $ 1,146.00 9/14/2006 
3418 $ 1,146.00 9/14/2006 
3419 $ 1,146.00 9/14/2006 
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3423 $ 1,146.00 9/20/2006 
3426 $ 1,146.00 9/21/2006 1/16/2008 $ 1,146.00 4/25/2008 
3427 $ 1,146.00 9/21/2006 1/16/2008 $ 1,146.00 4/25/2008 
3428 $ 1,623.00 9/25/2006 2/22/2008 $ 1,623.00 4/28/2008 
3429 $ 1,623.00 9/22/2006 
3430 $ 1,623.00 10/13/2006 7/17/2008 $ 1,623.00 7/17/2008 
3431 $ l,623.()() I 10/13/2006 7/17/2008 $ 1,623.00 7/17/2008 
3446 $ 2,483.00 10/16/2006 7/7/2008 $ 2,483.00 7/8/2008 
3469 $ 1,623.00 11/21/2006 4/30/2008 $ 1,623.00 7/9/2008 
3507 $ 1,337,00 2/9/2007 3/26/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2008 
3512 $ 1,146.00 2/23/2007 8/20/2008 $ 1,146.00 8/25/2008 
3517 $ 1,146.00 3/6/2007 11/19/2009 $ 1,146.00 11/19/2009 
3518 $ 1,146.00 3/9/2007 7/21/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/21/2008 
3519 $ 1,146.00 3/9/2007 
3521 $ 11,460.00 3/23/2007 
3533 $ 1,623.00 6/15/2007 5/20/2008 $ 1,623.00 7/7/2008 
3535 $ 1,337.00 3/23/2007 1/16/2009 $ 1,337.00 1/20/2009 
3560 $ 1,146.00 4/25/2007 6/30/2007 $ 1,146.00 7/7/2008 
3562 $ 1,146.00 4/27/2007 
3563 $ 1,146.00 4/27/2007 
3565 $ 1,337.00 4/30/2007 12/3/2009 $ 1,337.00 12/4/2009 
3566 $ 1,337.00 4/30/2007 11/30/2009 $ 1,337.00 12/1/2009 
3568 $ 1,146.00 5/1/2007 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3569 $ 1,146.00 5/1/2007 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3580 $ 1,623.00 6/4/2007 
3582 $ 1,337.00 9/10/2007 12/14/2009 $ 1,337.00 12/14/2009 
3583 $ 2,483.00 7/10/2007 5/22/2008 $ 2,483.00 7/7/2008 
3593 $ 1,146.00 6/6/2007 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3594 $ 1,146.00 6/6/2007 7/10/2008 $ 1,146.00 7/15/2008 
3596 $ 1,146.00 6/21/2007 11/10/2009 $ 1,146.00 11/10/2009 
3599 $ 1,337.00 7/5/2007 4/23/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2008 
t§U 1,337.00 7/3/2007 7/2/2007 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2008 
3608 $ 1,623.00 7/6/2007 
3609 $ 1,337.00 7/16/2007 
3613 $ 1,146.00 7/23/2007 8/12/2008 $ 1,146.00 8/13/2008 
3617 $ 1,146.00 7/2/2007 
3619 $ 1,146.00 7/24/2007 
3622 $ 1,623.00 7/23/2007 7/14/2008 $ 1,623.00 7/15/2008 
3632 $ 1,337.00 10/11/2007 12/21/2009 $ 1,337.00 12/21/2009 
3634 $ 1,337.00 7/31/2007 8/19/2008 $ 1,337.00 8/19/2008 
3635 $ 1,337.00 7/25/2007 
3637 $ 2,960.00 9/11/2007 
3642 $ 1,146.00 8/7/2007 
3661 $ 1,146.00 9/17/2007 
3667 $ 1,337.00 8/30/2007 4/7/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2008 
3671 $ 1,146.00 9/28/2007 
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3686 $ 1,337.00 11/6/2007 5/20/2008 $ 1,337.00 7/7/2008 
3688 $ 1,146.00 9/21/2007 
3692 $ 7,161.00 11/2/2007 7/8/2008 $ 7,161.00 7/8/2008 
3694 $ 1,146.00 10/10/2007 8/13/2008 $ 1,146.00 8/14/2008 
3702 $ 1,623.00 10/9/2007 8/22/2008 $ 1,623.00 8/25/2008 
3703 $ 1,146.00 10/17/2007 
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Attorneys for Defendant City of McCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
Case No. CV -20 I 0-S19C 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM F. NICHOLS IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I, WILLIAM F. NICHOLS, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
t. I am a shareholder in the law firm of White, Peterson, Gigray. Rossman, Nye & 
Nichols, P.A. 
AFFIDAVIT 0.' WILLIAM F. NICHOLS 
11Oll4I) ..... ll-4 
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2. J serve as counsel to the City of McCall. I have sel'Ved in this capacity since 
August, 2005, 
]. The statements in this Affidavit are based lIpon my personal knowledge or upon 
information contained in the City's official records that set forth the City's regularly conducted 
and reglilurly recorded activities or both. 
4, J am familiar with the land lise applications tiled by Alpine Viilage in 2006, us 
well as the Development Agreement associated with that project, and the different Amendments 
to the same. 
5. The Development Agreement was executed by the parties on December 13,2007. 
Tha( Development Agreement noted pending litigation challenging Ordinances 819 and 820, 
6, The Development Agreement provided that in the event those ordinances were 
declared unconstitutional: "The Plun will be reviewed and modified. as necessary, to compJy 
with the final disposition of the litigation as to any Community Housing Units which have not 
been sold prior to the final disposition of the litigation," 
7. On February 19,2008, the District Court declared Ordinances 8 t 9 and 820 to be 
unconstitutional. 
8. Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 2008, I was copied on an email from Steven 
Millemann, who was and is counsel to Alpine Village, to Lindley Kirkpatrick, who was and is 
McCall's City Manager. A true and correct copy of the email is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
9. The April 26, 2008 email stated: "I am assuming that. given the Mountain 
Centrnl Uoard of Realtors Decision and the subsequent repeal of Ordinance No.8 I 9, the City is 
prepared to release Alpine Village from its Community Housing Plan. Toward that end, I have 
allached a 'First AI11el1dment to Development Agreement', which does so. Please review the 
AWIOAVITO,,· WILLI/\M 17, NrUtOtS Page 2 
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Amendment and let me know if it is acceptable, r will then secure my client's signlllure and 
return it to you for approval and execution by thc COLlncil. For YOllr reference, r have also 
attached the current Devc!opment Agreement which. at Article VII. addresses this issue. 
Thanks." 
10. A true and correct copy of the referenced draft First Amendment to Development 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
II. The amendment to the Development Agreement proposed by Alpine Village 
stated in relevant part: "Article VB of tile Agreement shall be deleted in its entirety and Alpine 
Village shall be and hereby is released from any requirement to provide Community Housing for 
or related to the PUD. Exhibit 'D' to the Agreement is deleted in its entirety." 
12. Ultimately, the City agreed to the openllivc language quoted above. 
13, The tlbove-described correspondence doclll11ents that Alpine Village expected and 
requested to be released from the resl!ictive Innguage contained in the inltial Development 
Agreement, but that it did not express any expectation nor make any request for any further 
relief. Specifically. Alpine Village did not assert that it had suffered any damages. NOI'did 
Alpine Village demand Or request compensation for any damage until submitting its demand 
]etLer and fi ling this lawsuit in 20: O. 
14. This correspondence, and my description above, is consistent with my 
recollection of the events during this lime period. I recall no other communications with Alpine 
Village or any other person or entity that are inconsistent with the conclusions expressed in 
paragraph 13 above. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that thc forcgoing is true and correct. 
Mfl\)i\VITOVWILI,I.<\iH F. NIOIOLS 
'h:ih,li, ,i~hill· ... 1 :.dJ·H •.. ,<cU·6 
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DATED this 25 th day of October, 20 It. 
A FFlDAVIT OF WII.,UAM F. NICHOLS 
J ~M.I"ld""'llid'~'II\a'~41 1.4",]2·' 
l" '--Z)" '/) ~ , G ?D rw, i -L-J-. L.1J.i.£..' f.A j \ ) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
R.:,;ding at Ntk" .. _.._ 
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CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25 1h day of October. 2011, the foregoing was tIled, 
survcd. and copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT fiLED: 
FOllrth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County C0U11house 
219 Main Street 
Cascade. 10 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Steven J Millemann, Esq. 
Gregory C. Pittenger. Esq. 
SERVICE COPIES TO: 
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton, 
LLP 
706 North First Street 
POSt Office Box. 1066 
McCall. 10 83638 
C s U .. Mail o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile 
DE-mail 
C8J u. S. Mail o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile 
r81 E·mail 
COURTESY COPTES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise,lO 83702 
Jason Gray 
Law Cieri< to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
FOllrth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Email: jmgray@adaweb.nct 
A I:r:-UM \lIT (W WILLIAM F. NICHOLS 
I ' .. · ... 1:. \1~;dll.HI :1'I!JfI t. ,.·U~·b 
C8J U. S. Mail o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o U. S. Mail 





........ __ ..... ___ ..,_ "'W. J~ 401ft.A .,,\01 ..JUU .~VV "".a..veu.» lIu.s.ey r.«!007/011 






Wlltlam F.Nichols [wfn@whitepeterson.comJ 
Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:30 PM 
ChrisMeyer@; mgroooevelt@ 
FWD: Alpine Village Community Housing 
Developm.pdf; FirstAme.doc 
Here is an email I received from Steve Millemann after the appeal time ran on the MCBR decision. 
Confidentiality Notice: This email message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute this message. Thank you. 
William F. Nichols 
Admitted to practice in Idaho and Oregon 
White, Peterson, Gigray, Rossman, Nye & Nichols, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
5700 East Franklin, Suite 200 




---- Original Message ~.--~ 
From: Steve Millemann 
Received: 04/26/2008 04: 15 PM 
To: lkirkpatrick@mccall.id.us 
Ce: wfn@WHlTEPETERSON.com, michael@rmhcompany.com, msdavidl@gmail.com 
Subjeet: Alpine Village Community Housing 
Lindley. 
I am assuming that, given the Mountain Central Board of Realtors DeciSion and the subsequent repeal of Ordinance No. 
819. the City is prepared to release Alpine Village from its Community Housing Plan. Toward that end, 1 have attached a 
"First Amendment to Development Agreemenf, which does so. Please review the Amendment and let me know if it Is 
acceptable. I will then secure my client's signature and return it to you for approval and execution by the Council. For your 
reference, I have also attached the current Development Agreement which, at Article VII, addresses this issue. Thanks. 
SteJve,yvJ. M~ 
MiHemann Pittenger McMahan & Pemberton LLP 
P. O. Box 1066 
706 N. 1 st Street 
McCall, 10 83638 
Office: (208) 634-7641 
Fax: (208) 634-4516 
Email: 
Steven J. Millemann: 
Gregory C. Pittenger: 
Brian L. McMahan: 
Amy N. Pemberton: 
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Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
City Clerk 
City of McCall 
216 East Park Street 
McCall. Idaho 83638 
For Recording Purposes Do 
Not Write Above This Line 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
ALPINE VILLAGE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
This First Amendment to Development Agreement (the "First Amendment") is entered 
into effective this _ day of ,2008, by and between the City of McCall, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, hereinafter referred to as the "City". and Alpine Village 
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Alpine Village", whose address is 1101 W. River Street, 
Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, 83702, and who is the owner of the Alpine Village Planned Unit 
Development (the "PUD',), as the same is platted of record with Valley County, Idaho. 
WHEREAS, the City and Alpine Village entered into that certain Development 
Agreement, dated December 13, 2001, which was filed of record with the Office of Recorder of 
Valley County. Idaho on January 28, 2008, as Instrument No. 328801 (the "Agreement"). 
WHEREAS, the Agreement included a Community Housing Plan and contained 
provisions requiring Alpine Viltage to provide Community Housing pursuant to McCall City 
Ordinance No. 819 (the "Ordinance"). 
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been declared void by means of that cettain 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment, which 
was rendered by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in, Valley 
County Case No. CV 2006-490-C. 
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been repealed by the City. 
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that the Agreement should be amended to eliminate 
the Community Housing Plan and any requirements that Alpine Village provide Community 
Housing Units. 
First Amendment to Development Agreement r:'v'....!181T' '. ,; .. 1 I.. , B Page t of4 
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WHEREFORE, the City of McCall and the Alpine Village do agree to amend and 
modify the Agreement, as follows: 
1. Community Housine. 
Article VII of the Agreement shall be deleted in its entirety and Alpine Village 
shall be and hereby is released from any requirement to provided Community 
Housing for or related to the PUD. Exhibit "B" to the Agreement is deleted in its 
entirety. 
2. Continuing Effect of the Agreement. 
Except as expressly modified by the terms of this First Amendment, the 
Agreement shall remain fully in force and binding on the parties according to its 
tenns. 
3. MisceUaneou5. 
After its execution, this First Amendment shall be recorded in the office of the 
Valley County Recorder, at the expense of Alpine Village. Each commitment and 
covenant contained in this First Amendment shall constitute a burden on, shall be 
appurtenant to, and shall run with the PUD Property. This First Amendment shall 
be binding on the City and Alpine Village and their respective heirs, 
administrators, ex.ecutors, agents, legal representatives, successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto caused this First Amendment to 
be ex.ecuted, effective on the day and year tirst above written. 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY CITY OF MCCALL 
By: ______________________ __ By: ______________________ __ 
Michael B. Hormaechea, President Norbert Kulesza, Mayor 
ATTEST: 
By: ____________________ _ 
Brenna Chaloupka, Acting City Clerk 
First Amendment to Development Agreement Page 2 of4 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 




On this day of , 2008, before me, , a 
Notary Public in and for said State, personalJy appeared -:-:--::--:---:---:-___ -:--___ _ 
known or identified to me to be the Mayor of the City of McCall, who executed the said 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that said municipality executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: ________ _ 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
(55. 
County of Valley. ) 
On this day of ) 2008, before me, , a 
Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared , 
known or identified to me to be the Acting City Clerk of the City of McCall, who executed the 
said instrument, and acknowledged to me that said municipality executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affix.ed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate tirst above written. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: ________ _ 
First Amendment to Development Agreement Page 3 of4 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
(ss 
County of Valley. ) 
On this day of • 2008, before me, , a 
Notary Public in and tor said State, personally appeared Michael B. Hormaechea, President of 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY. known or identified to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for and on 
behalf of said Limited Liability Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: _____ _ 
First Amendment to Development Agreement Page 4 of4 
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Christopher H. Meyer [lSB No. 4461] 
Martin C. Hendrickson {ISB No. 5876] 
GIVENS PURSLEY lLP 
r\H"~BURY. CLERk 
qv Oepu~ 
OCT 2 7 2011 
601 West Bannock Street 
Case NO. __ ~lnst.No 
Filed A.M. ,4; 4-~1=---P.M-. 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: (208) 388-1200 




Attorneys for Defendant City of McCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-20to-519C 
CITY'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO ALPINE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITY'S REPL Y BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REsPONSE BRIEF IN 
OpPOsmON TO ALPINE'S MOTION rOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
130IOSU2 I 44J2-6 
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INTRODUCTION 
This combined brief contains Defendant City of McCall's ("City") reply in support of 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 16, 2011 as well as its response to 
Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment dated October 7, 2011. This brief follows City's 
Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 16, 2011 ("City's 
Opening Brief') and responds to Alpine's Memorandum in Support of Alpine's Motionfor 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
October 7,2011 ("Alpine's Opening Brief'). 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALPINE STILL HOLDS THE PROPERTY AND HAS NOT PLED A TEMPORARY TAKING. 
It its opening brief, the City began by noting that Alpine still owns the subject property 
and that all restrictions relating to community housing have been removed. City's Opening Brief 
at 13. Alpine responds by raising the possibility of there being a temporary taking. Alpine's 
Opening Brief at 17. Alpine has not pled a temporary taking claim and should not be allowed to 
pursue it now. 
As for the merits, the cases cited by Alpine are out of date. In recent years, the courts 
have largely eviscerated this theory. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court held in 2004: 
As noted above, the destruction of access and deprivation of the 
use of property may be compensable, but the mere interruption of 
the use of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) 
deprivation. does not mandate compensation. This Idaho authority 
relied upon by the district court has since been overruled by the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of a taking. 
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Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536,542,96 P.3d 637. 643 (2004).' 
But none of this matters. Temporary takings are subject to the same notice requirements, 
statutes of limitations, and other defenses applicable to any other taking claim. Thus, even if 
Alpine were allowed to expand this lawsuit to include a temporary taking, the claim is barred for 
aU the same reasons discussed below. 
II. ALPINE'S STATE CLAIM IS BARRED FOR THREE REASONS. 
A. Alpine failed to provide notice within 180 days. 
It is undisputed that Alpine failed to file timely notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA"), Idaho Code §§ 6·901 to 6·929. In the case of litigation against a city, this requirement 
is applicable not just to tort claims but to all damage claims. Idaho Code § 50-219. This 
includes claims for takings/inverse condemnation. BHA Investments. Inc. v. City 0/ Boise 
("BRA II'), 141 Idaho 168, 174-76. 108 P.3d 315, 321-23 (2004). 
(1) CompHance with the l8O-day requirement is not optional. 
Alpine responds that, while Idaho Code § 50-219 requires it to file a notice of claim 
within 180 days, there are no consequences for its failure to do so. In other words, the notice 
requirement is optional. According to Alpine, section 50·219 applies only to § 6·906 (the] 80-
day notice requirement) and not to section 6·908 (which prohibits claims not filed in accordance 
with the 18O-day rule). Alpine's Opening Brie/at 22. 
This reading confounds the Court's instruction in Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 
798 P.2d 27,31 (1990). Speaking about section 50-219, the Court said: "It is incumbent upoft 
I Moreover, Alpine's suggestion that this is a physical taking does not withstand scrutiny. Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States. 444 U.S. 164 (1979), cited by Alpine, was a classic physical invasion. involving a requirement 
imposed by the government that the landowner physically open a marina to the public. Likewise, Hodel v. Irving. 
481 U.S. 704 (1987) involved the complete abrogation of rights of tribal members to bequeath certain real property. 
the result of which is that another entity (the tribe) became the owner of the property. These cases bear no 
resemblance to the regulatory taking effected by Ordinance 819. 
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this Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullifY it .... " Sweitzer, 118 Idaho at 
512, 798 P .2d at 31. Making notice optional would render the statute pointless. 
Alpine's interpretation is also impossible to reconcile with the straightforward language 
of the section 50-219. The provision states in full: "AU claims for damages against a city must 
be filed as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code." There is no reference to section 6-906 
or to any other specific section of the ITCA. Instead, it simply says that all claims for damages 
must be filed as prescribed in the ITCA. Logically, this would include the provisions saying how 
to provide notice and the immediately adjacent provision barring lawsuits by those who fail to 
provide notice. How Alpine reads section 50-219 as an instruction to "file a notice within 180 
days, but only if you feel like it" is difficult to fathom. 
Alpine's observation that ITCA's definition section defines "claim" as a tort claim 
ignores the fact that section 50-219 converts the ITCA' s tort claim notice requirement to one 
applicable to all damage c1aims. Indeed, that is the whole point of the statute. Alpine's 
argument that section 50-219 did not broaden the applicability ofthe ITCA is the same argument 
that the Idaho Supreme Court rejected over two decades ago in Sweitzer. "To construe the 
language to mean that the Tort Claims Act is substituted for I.C. § 50-219 would render I.C. 
§ 50-219 meaningless and essentially null." [d. Instead, the Court concluded: "Applying the 
plain meaning of the language contained in I.C. § 50-219 clearly demonstrates that the 
legislature's intent was to incorporate the notice requirements contained in chapter 9, title 6 so as 
to make the filing procedures for aU claims against a municipality uniform, standard and 
consistent." [d. Incorporating the requirement to file a notice (section 6-906) but not the 
adjacent provision setting out the consequences (section 6-908) would hardly result in ''uniform, 
standard and consistent" filing procedures. 
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In any event, Alpine cites no authority for its proposition that compliance with section 
6-906 is optional. Nor does Alpine attempt to explain away those cases which have imposed 
harsh consequences for failure to comply with the ISO-day rule in the context of non-tort damage 
claims against cities. E.g., Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568,571-73,798 P.2d 27,30-32 (1990); 
BHA Investments. Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA 11'), 141 Idaho 168, 174-76, 108 P.3d 315, 321-23 
(2004). 
(2) Compliance with the ISO-day requirement is jurisdictional. 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987) and Madsen v. Idaho 
Dept. o/Health and Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 779 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989) held that failure to 
comply with the 18O-day rule is ajurisdictional defect. Alpine's effort to sidestep these clear 
precedents hinges on its argument that section 50-219 does not sweep in section 6-908. We have 
pointed out why that argument fails. 
In addition, Alpine complains that McQuillen and Madsen were tort cases. Of course, 
they were tort cases. But section 50-219 makes them and al1 the other cases interpreting the 
notice requirement equally applicable to other damage claims. 
The best Alpine offers is Cox v. City o/Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127,90 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 
2003), which found-in a single paragraph-that a contract between the City of Sandpoint and 
the plaintiff did not waive the 18O-day rule. Alpine wonders why the Court of Appeals even 
discussed waiver of a jurisdictional requirement, and so does the City. Be that as it may, the Cox 
Court found it unnecessary to reach the jurisdictional question because nothing in the contract 
even purported to waive the requirement. This failure to address a question (which may not even 
have been briefed) hardly overcomes the clear precedent in McQuillen and Madsen. 
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Finally, Alpine relies on authorities from other states holding that notice requirements in 
those jurisdictions are not jurisdictional. Alpine's Opening Brief at 24-25, There is no need to 
respond to these. If Idaho precedent conflicts with the interpretation of other statutes in other 
states, that simply shows that Idaho has followed a different path. Idaho law controls. 
Alpine is right about one thing. The ISO-day notice requirement in the ITCA is not a 
statute oflimitations.2 But this does not help Alpine. It cuts in the other direction. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has made quite clear that the notice requirement is a different and additional 
requirement.3 Alpine flunks both the 180-day notice requirement and the four-year statute of 
limitations requirement. Either one. however. provides a sufficient basis to dismiss Alpine's 
state law claims. 
(3) ID aDY eveDt, applicatioD of the ISO-day rule to Alpine does not 
violate Equal Protection principles. 
Alpine points out, correctly, that the City went the extra mile in allowing refunds of fees 
paid to it by various other developers after the housing ordinances were declared 
unconstitutional. The City did not have to do so, because many of those claims were also barred 
by the statute of limitations andlor the 180-day rule. However, given the District Court's ruling 
in Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006·490-C (Idaho, 
2 As we noted in City's Opening Briefat 18 n.14, the (TCA contains its own two-year statute of 
limitations. The City believes there is a credible argument that this is applicable to the Alpine's state law claims. 
Alpine correctly notes that no reported decision has applied this two-year statute of limitations in the context of a 
lawsuit against a city. Then again, no appellate court. appmently, has been called upon to address the subject. But 
this is a separate issue. Whether the ITCA' s shorter statute of limitations applies here has no bearing on whether the 
180-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 
3 In Harlcness v. City of Burley. 110 Idaho 353, 359-60. 715 P.2d 1283, 1289-90 (1986). the plaintiff 
argued that be was not subject to what was then a 6O-day notice requirement in Idaho Code § 50-219, because a 
four-year statute of limitations contained in another part of the statute was more specific. The Idaho Supreme Court 
rejected this argument saying that the notice requirement is different from and in addition to the statute of 
limitations. 
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Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008), the City detennined that returning money received under 
the housing ordinances was the right thing to do. 
Consistent with that spirit and with the Development Agreement, the City released 
Alpine from any restrictions or obligations arising under Ordinance 819. Alpine had not yet paid 
the City any money under that Agreement, so there was nothing to refund. Indeed. as explained 
in the September 16, 2011 Ajftdavit of Michelle Groenevelt. no money had been collected from 
any other developer under Ordinance 819, so there was no need for a resolution addressing 
refunds under that ordinance. 
The release provision in the Development Agreement expressly provided that if Alpine 
sold any units subject to income restrictions prior to the decision in Mountain Central, the City 
would not be responsible for any damages based on those below-market sales. (None were sold, 
as it turns out.) Having given this release, Alpine cannot complain about the restrictions during 
that time. After Mountain Central was decided, the City promptly released Alpine from all 
restrictions, allowing units to be sold at full market value. 
The City reasonably concluded that it had done an it was required to do in good faith and 
fair dealing. It treated the various developers fairly and equitably. It did not offer to reimburse 
other developers who paid fees under Ordinance 820 for their lost opportunities while their 
money was in the City's hands. It simply returned their property or, in Alpine's case, released 
the property restrictions. Alpine' s suggestion that the Constitution requires the City to also 
protect Alpine from market fluctuations during a time when Alpine had released the City from 
claims for below-market sales stretches the "equal protection" principle beyond any reasonable 
construct. Far from being "irrational" or "class based," the City's treatment of developers in 
response to the decision in Mountain Central was fair, even-handed, and exemplary. 
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( 
(4) Alpine's estoppel argument does not hold water. 
Alpine presses the same quasi-estoppel argument that this Court rejected in Hehr v. City 
o/McCall, Case No. CV-2010-276-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., June 6,2011). Alpine 
mentions this case in a footnote. Alpine's Opening Brie/at 28 n.50. Alpine says that the cases 
this Court relied on there (Harrell v. The City o/Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973) 
and Sprenger. Grubb & Associates. Inc. v. City o/Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995» 
are not applicable here because they were zoning cases. Yet the Janguage quoted by Alpine 
notes that zoning is merely an example of "a governmental function which is not usually subject 
to estoppel." Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 583,903 P.2d at 748. Because the City was plainly 
performing a governmental function when it imposed housing requirements, Harrell and 
Sprenger are equally applicable here. 
Those cases make clear that equitable estoppel does not apply to the City absent a 
showing of "exigent circumstances." Alpine's perception that the City was too protective of 
developers who paid fees in cash falls far short of the Supreme Court's standard for exigeilt 
circumstances. 
Alpine's theory also falters out of the gate because estoppel cannot operate to grant 
subject matter jurisdiction, which, as we have noted above, is Jacking here. "Estoppel is not 
appropriate where jurisdiction is at issue." City 0/ Eagle v. Idaho Dept. 0/ Water Resources, ) 50 
Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2011). 
Even if Alpine could overcome those obstacles, it has failed to prove the basic elements 
of quasi-estoppel. Quasi-estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to permit a party to 
maintain a position that is inconsistent with one in which the party acquiesced or pursuant to 
which the party accepted a benefit. Mitchel'v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 
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526 (1994); Willig v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969,971 
(1995). 
The City has consistently taken the position that Alpine's claims are barred by its failure 
to timely file a notice of claim. [fthe City had initially offered to waive Alpine's deadlines and 
then changed its mind, that might be different. But no refund resolution ever applied to Alpine. 
As a result, there is no inconsistency in the City's position. Indeed, as shown in the Affidavit of 
William F. Nichols. Alpine asked the City to be released from the restrictive conditions on the 
Timbers, and the City did exactly what Alpine asked. The City never promised more than that, 
and it has never changed its position. 
Nor can Alpine show that it relied to its detriment on a reasonable assumption that the 
City would waive the 18O-day rule. In sum, Alpine has not been disadvantaged or induced to 
change its position as a result of any action by the City. 
Alpine concedes that the quasi-estoppel argument is based on "[t]he identical set of facts 
which form the basis for the equal protection analysis." Alpine's Opening Briefat 28. Thus, 
even if quasi-estoppel were applicable, it would fail for the same reasons discussed above in 
section II.A(3) at page 5. In short, the City acted rationally and fairly in refunding fees and 
releasing developers from all restrictions on their property. To suggest that the City's action is 
unconscionable does not pass the straight face test. 
(5) At best, Alpine's estoppel argument only buys it another 180 
days. 
Even if Alpine's estoppel argument worked, it would only give Alpine another 180-day 
shot at providing the proper notice. Resolution 08-11 (providing refunds to other developers 
who paid fees under Ordinance 820) was adopted on April 24, 2008. Alpine' s notice was not 
filed within 180 days of that date. 
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8. Alpine's state claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitadoDs. 
The statute of limitations argument is simple enough. The key facts triggering the statute 
of limitations are undisputed. As Alpine notes: " ... Ordinance 819 was in effect when Alpine 
submitted its development applications and was applied to Alpine as a mandatory condition of 
approval of Alpine's Applications." Alpine's Opening Briefat 1 n.1. And again: "At the time 
Alpine filed its development applications, the community housing ordinance was in effect and 
Alpine's compliance with that ordinance was mandatory." A/pine's Opening Briefat 11. Thus, 
Alpine knew on the day that it filed its applications that it would be required to provide 
community housing. 
The mere existence of the statutory requirement at the time of the application suffices to 
ripen the cause of action. Here, however, the record is even more complete. Alpine prepared 
and submitted in conjunction with its application a document entitled "Community Housing Plan 
- Alpine Village Planned Unit Development" dated June 4, 2006. (A copy is attached as 
Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Steven J. Millemann, which confirms that the plan was submitted to the 
City on that date.) This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that Alpine knew of the housing 
requirement, and was acting on it, on or before the time of its application on June 20, 2006. 
That should be the end of the story. Yet Alpine endeavors to tum a simple matter into a 
complex one. It explains at great length that it was not known until sometime later exactly what 
mixture of housing measures would be provided. A/pine's Opening Brief at 20. But this makes 
no difference, because it is undisputed that Alpine knew that it would have to provide something 
of value on the day it applied. Whether that would be 20 percent of the units on site, a larger 
amount off-site units, land, or cash is beside the point. As the District Court ruled in Mountain 
Central Bd. of Realtors. Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial 
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Dist., Feb. 19,2008), each of the four constituted an illegal tax in excess of the police power 
(Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2) and the taxation power (Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6): 
Such ordinances contemplate that in exchange for approval and 
issuance of a building pennit a landowner or developer must give 
over something of value, whether it be an agreement to provide 
deed-restricted inclusionary housing, the conveyance of land, or a 
fee under Ordinance Nos. 819 or 820. Therefore, this Court must 
determine whether the City of McCall has authority for exacting 
such "fee," 
Mountain Central at 21 (emphasis original). Given this ruling against the City, it is unclear why 
Alpine devotes so many pages of its brief to the law of unconstitutional takings. The City does 
not and cannot dispute that Ordinances 819 and 820 are unconstitutional. 
For these reasons, it is apparent that the statute of limitations began to run on or before 
the day Alpine filed its applications. This is not complicated. But Alpine would have this Court 
believe there is more to it. Alpine admits that it faced an unconstitutional tax on day one, but it 
argues: "What did not become clear until months later is how Alpine would comply and what 
the ramifications of that compliance would ultimately be." Alpine's Opening Briefat 11 
(emphasis original). But it makes no difference how Alpine would comply with the 
unconstitutional ordinance. Alpine was required to give something of value in any event. As 
soon as it decided to proceed with the development, Alpine could have challenged the ordinance 
as facially invalid, just as the plaintiffs did in Mountain Central. (There is no exhaustion 
requirement for such a challenge.) 
Alpine counters, citing City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P .3d 
310, 317 (2006), which held that "a regulatory takings claim does not become ripe upon 
enactment of the regulation." A/pine's Opening Brief at 18. That certainly was true in Simpson, 
which was an as-applied challenge. In an as-applied taking, the taking does not occur (rather 
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obviously) until the ordinance is applied. In a facial challenge like this one, the invalid 
ordinance may be challenged at any time someone has standing to challenge it. In Mountain 
Central, the cause of action accrued and the challenge was ripe when an organization of realtors 
showed that they represented persons who would be adversely affected by the ordinance. In 
Mountain Central, the Court did not wait to see "how the developers would comply and what the 
ramifications of that compliance would ultimately be" (paraphrasing Alpine 's Opening Briefat 
II). 
Alpine contends that McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs ("McCuskey 11'), 128 Idaho 
213, 912 P .2d 100 (1996) supports Alpine's position that its cause of action did not arise until it 
signed the Development Agreement or the City approved its use of the Timbers. Alpine's 
Opening Brief at 19. Not so. In McCuskey 11, the taking was traceable to an ordinance 
downzoning parts of the county to rural residential. Like virtually all downzones, this was an as-
applied challenge. Mere enactment of a downzone ordinance affecting a broad swath of1and 
does not instantly create a cause of action, because a downzone does not impair any existing use. 
Thus, the Court found that the cause of action arose at the time Canyon County first interfered 
with McCuskey's development of the property. In other words, the landowner must show that he 
or she wishes to do something with the land that is not allowed. A downzone, in itself, does no 
such thing. Exactly what is prohibited under a downzone ordinance is sometimes unclear. But 
even if the ordinance is clear, there is always the possibility of a nonconforming use, conditional 
use, or a variance. Indeed, in McCuskey ll, the County initially granted the building permit. 
McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 215-16, 912 P .2d at 102-03. It was not until the County reversed 
course and issued a stop work order that there was any interference with McCuskey's property. 
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And it was at that point, said the Co~ that the cause of action arose. McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 
217,912 P.2d at 104. 
As the Court noted: "Contrary to McCuskey's assertion, there was nothing to prevent 
him from including his inverse condemnation claim with his petition for declaratory judgment 
and writ of mandamus." McCuskey 11, 128 Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105. The fact that 
McCuskey did not realize he had a cause of action was irrelevant. He had a cause of action-
whether he knew it or not-so the clock was running. 
Similarly, Alpine could have initiated a challenge to Ordinance 819 on the day it filed its 
applications (or earlier, as did the plaintiffs in Mountain Central). Alpine's contention that it is 
excused from the statute of limitations because it was not then known "how Alpine would 
comply and what the ramifications of that compliance would ultimately be" cannot be reconciled 
with McCuskey 11. Alpine knew on or before June 20, 2006 that it would have to dedicate at 
least 20 percent of its units to affordable housing or pay a comparable fee. 
Indeed, Alpine proposed use of its mobile home property as early as June 4, 2006. The 
fact that its initial housing plan was later modified is not relevant to whether a cause of action 
arose in June of 2006. Alpine's certain knowledge that it would have to provide something to 
comply with Ordinance 819 is sufficient to create a cause of action. Quantification of the 
damages based on the final housing plan is not necessary to ripen the claim. "Moreover, it is 
wen settled that uncertainty as to the amount of damages cannot bar recovery so long as the 
underlying cause of action is determined." McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P .2d at 105. 
In its brief, Alpine attempts to confuse this simple point by setting up straw men that 
have nothing to do with the City's statute of limitations defense: 
Consistent with McCuskey, Alpine is arguing that its inverse 
condemnation action accrued nol on the date that Ordinance 819 
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was adopted and not on the date on which the Mountain Central 
decision was issued, but, rather, when the full extent of Alpine's 
loss of use and enjoyment of its constitutionally protected property 
rights became apparent. 
Alpine's Opening Brief at 19 (emphasis original). The City agrees with this statement. Indeed, 
no one is arguing that the cause of action accrued on the date of enactment or on the date of the 
Mountain Central decision.4 As Alpine says, the cause of action accrued "when the full extent of 
Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment of its constitutionally protected property rights became 
apparent" and that interference was fully apparent in June of 2006. 
Alpine goes on for pages about its preference for satisfYing the unconstitutional 
ordinance with its mobile home property and how the City found mobile homes to be 
inconsistent with the ordinance, thus essentially forcing Alpine to acquire the Timbers. Alpine's 
Opening Briefat 20. This is entirely irrelevant. This goes to the measure of damages, not the 
existence of a cause of action. As Mountain Central made clear, the ordinance was 
unconstitutional from the beginning. The unconstitutional interference with Alpine's property 
was apparent in June of2006 and would have been just as unconstitutional even if Alpine had 
never acquired the Timbers. Alpine's statement (Alpine's Opening Brief at 21) that "Alpine's 
cause of action accrued ... when it became clear that the Timbers would be dedicated as 
community housing" is simply wrong. 
Alpine contends that Harris v. State. ex rei. Kempthome, 147 Idaho 401,405,210 P.3d 
86, 90 (2009), helps its cause. It does not. In Harris. the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the 
statute of limitations on inverse condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to 
• Depending on the plaintiff, a cause of action might occur as early as the date of enactment, but whether 
the case is ripe depends on whether the plaintiff can show that it is affected by the ordinance at that time. The 
Court's decision in Mountain Central may have bearing on other defenses, but it is irrelevant to the accruaJ of the 
cause of action. 
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enter into a mineral lease with the state, not the time they made payments to the state under that 
lease. But this decision simply reinforces the point made by the Court in McCuskey II that the 
cause of action accrues when the impairment to plaintiff's property becomes "apparent." As the 
Court said, "We affirm the district court's determination that the fuJI extent of the Harrises' loss 
of use and enjoyment ofthe property became apparent when they entered into the Mineral 
Lease." Harris, 147 Idaho 405,210 P.3d 90 (emphasis supplied). It may be that the Harrises 
became aware of the interference even before the signing of the lease. The Court did not address 
this, because it did not need to. The Court found that the Harrises were certainly aware of the 
impairment when they signed the lease, and that was more than four years before they broUght 
their inverse condemnation action. This case is also important because it reinforces the 
conclusion drawn in McCuskey II that a plaintiff's ignorance of its cause of action-even in the 
face of affirmative, incorrect statements of the law by the governmental entity-is no defense to 
the statute of limitations. 
Alpine also makes a weak attempt to distinguish Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996). But Wadsworth only reinforces the 
consistent case law on this point. In Wadsworth, the Court ruled, as it has in so many others, that 
the statute began to run when the interference with the property "became apparent." 
There was a single event, and that event triggered the running of 
the limitation period in I.C. § 5-224 when the impairment was of 
such a degree and kind that substantial interference with 
Wadsworth's property interest became apparent. Tibbs v. City of 
Sandpoint, 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d at 1005; Rueth v. Slate, 103 
Idaho at 79,644 P.2d at 1338. 
Wadsworth was aware of some effect the excavation had 
on his property at least as early as 1976 when he filed the first tort 
claim. Certainly, the substantial interference was apparent when 
he submitted the second tort claim in 1983 .... 
Wadsworth, 128 Idaho at 443,915 P.2d at 5 (emphasis supplied). 
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Alpine does not even attempt to distinguish Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 
603 P.2d 1001 (1979» or Rueth v. Slate, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
Here is the bottom line. In June of 2006 it submitted an application and a housing plan 
that called for encumbering its property. Thus, it was "apparent" at that time that it was required 
to provide community housing to the City. 
C. Alpine's decision to enter into a Development Agreement based on its 
purchase of the Timbers was voluntary, and Alpine received exactly 
what it was promised. 
Alpine contends because that the housing requirement imposed by Ordinance 819 was 
mandatory, its actions to comply with the ordinance were not voluntary in the sense of KMST, 
UC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003). The City, of course, does not dispute 
that Ordinance 819 was mandatory. Nor does the City dispute that it informed Alpine that use of 
mobile home lots might not satisfy the ordinance's requirements. 
While the ordinance may have been mandatory, Alpine chose not to fight the ordinance 
but, instead, to enter into a Development Agreement with the City. That agreement expressly 
identified the then-pending litigation in Mountain Central. It then provided: 
. .. The Plan will be reviewed and modified, as necessary. to 
comply with the final disposition ofthe litigation as to any 
Community Housing Units which have not been sold prior to the 
final disposition of the litigation. 
Article VI of the Development Agreement, set out as Exhibit 16 to Affidavit of Steven 1. 
Millemann. As discussed in section II.A(4) beginning on page 7 and in the AffidaVit o/William 
F. Nichols, Alpine got exactly what this agreement provided. After Mountain Central was 
decided, the City reviewed the Housing Plan and modified it by releasing the developer from aU 
of its requirements. The Development Agreement said nothing about protecting Alpine from a 
decline in market conditions pending the outcome of Mountain Central. 
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These facts are not identical to those in KMST, but the spirit and teaching of KMST calls 
for the same result. Alpine could have objected, appealed, or litigated Ordinance 819. Instead, it 
entered into a deal. The City fulfilled its promise under that deal. As a result of these choices, 
Alpine cannot now claim a "taking" of its property. 
III. ALPINE'S FEDERAL CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED. 
A. Alpine's federal claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 
Alpine initially pled its federal taking claim "directly" under the Fifth Amendment. That 
is clearly impennissible in the Ninth Circuit. S Alpine later amended its complaint to plead its 
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the alternative. 
Alpine recognizes that the § 1983 claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 
However, it clings to the idea that its "direct" claim may be subject to the four-year statute of 
limitations. "The two causes of action mayor may not be subject to the same statute of 
limitations." Alpine's Opening Brief at 29. 
This is a false hope. Even if Alpine could bring its taking claim directly under the Fifth 
Amendment, it cannot escape the two-year statute of limitations. Those federal courts that have 
recognized the possibility of a direct federal claim have held that such claims are nonetheless 
subject to the same statute of limitations as actions brought under § 1983. Bieneman v. City of 
Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1988) (direct takings claim subject to two-year statute). 
Indeed, even the Ninth Circuit so held in a non-takings case. Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F .2d 406 
, "Plaintiffbas no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution. We have previously held 
that a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Azul-Pacifico. Inc. 
v. City o/1.os Angeles, 973 F.2d 704. 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993). "For these reasons, 
we have held that a plaintiff may not sue a state defendant directly under the Constitution where section 1983 
provides a remedy, even if that remedy is not available to the plaintiff" Martinez v. City o/1.os Angeles. 141 F.3d 
1373, 1382 (9th Cit 1998). "Taking claims must be brought under § 1983." Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City 
o/Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003), cerr. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 (2004 and 2005). 
CITY'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO ALPINE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1301054_12/4432-6 Page 16 
447 
(9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman). Alpine has no credible argument that its federal taking 
claim can escape the two-year statute of limitations, no matter how it is pled.6 
B. Alpine's federal claim has accrued and the statute is running. 
No one disputes that, if the two-year statute applies and the statute is running, Alpine's 
federal claim comes too late. Alpine's only defense is that its federal cause of action "has not 
even accrued for statute of limitations purposes." Alpine's Opening Briefat 30 (emphasis 
original). This is a curious position to take, because if it has not accrued, how can it be before 
the Court today? 
Alpine cites Leva/d, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993), a 1993 case 
applying the statute of limitations to a federal takings claim brought in federal court.7 But this 
case does not help Alpine. 
The Court began by explaining the obvious, and the key point here-that a cause of 
action accrues when the case is ripe: "To determine when the statute oflimitations period begins 
to run, we first must determine when the cause of action accrued. Determining when the cause 
of action accrues is merely the corollary to the ripeness inquiry." Levald, 998 F.2d at 687. The 
Court continued noting that in the case of a facial challenge, a case may be ripe as soon as the 
unconstitutional ordinance is enacted (assuming the plaintiff can show it wishes to do something 
that it is affected by the ordinance). "A plaintiff asserting a facial challenge contends that the 
6 In brief: Alpine says it has two federal claims under the Fifth Amendment (one direct and one under 
§ 1983). In fact, it is one claim. pled 1WO ways. 
1 In Levald. the Court of Appeals first detennined that the two Williamson County ripeness tests were 
inapplicable. (The first prong was inapplicable. because this was a facial challenge. The second prong was 
inapplicable, because, at the time. California did now allow inverse condemnation actions on regulatory takings, 
thus making resort to state court futile. Levald, 998 F.2d at 686.) With Williamson County out of the way, the Court 
then turned to the statute oflimitations. 
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passage of the ordinance effects a taking:' /d. The Court then observed that in federal takings 
cases, there is a preliminary obligation to seek relief in state court: 
However, "[tJhe Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of 
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation." "So 
long as the state provides' an adequate process for obtaining 
compensation,' no constitutional violation can occur" until just 
compensation is denied. Thus, a plaintiff cannot bring a section 
1983 action in federal court until the state denies just 
compensation. A claim under section 1983 is not ripe-and a 
cause of action under section 1983 does not accrue--until that 
point. 
/d. (emphasis supplied) (citing to Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985) and Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass 'n v. City of 
Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (91h Cir. 1989». The Court went on to explain that this 
requirement, just like the second prong of the Williamson County test, is not applicable where 
compliance would be futile--as it was here. "As our ripeness cases teach, there is an exception 
to this general rule. ... In this small class of cases, the cause of action accrues and the 
limitations period begins to run upon the enactment of the statute." Id. 
Thus, Levald held that the cause of action has not accrued and the statute of limitations is 
tolled only when the case is not ripe. Where the case is ripe, the statute is running. 
Levald, of course, was decided before San Remo Hotel. L.P. v. City and County of San 
FranciSCO, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) at a time when it was generally believed that the state action 
must be brought in state court first, not simultaneously with the federal cause of action. 
AppJying the teaching of Levald in a post-San Remo world leads to an inescapable and perfectly 
obvious conclusion: If the federal cause of action is ripe in state court, then the statute of 
limitations is running. 
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Alpine brought its federal claim simultaneously with its state claim. This is exactly what 
San Remo says a plaintiff is permitted to do: 
With respect to those federal claims that did require 
ripening, we reject petitioners' contention that Williamson County 
prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state 
courts. The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek 
"compensation through the procedures the State has provided for 
doing so," 473 U.S., at 194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, does not preclude 
state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff's request for 
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, 
the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to preclude 
plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would 
erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to 
"resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures." 
San Remo. 545 U.S. at 346 (emphasis supplied). Thus, under San Remo, if the federal claim can 
be brought simultaneously, it follows that the federal cause of action has accrued in state court. 
The federal claim might be pled in the alternative, and the state court might find it unnecessary to 
reach the federal claim, but under San Remo there can be no doubt that the federal claim is ripe 
for presentation to the court and, hence, has accrued. 
San Remo resolved a conundrum created by Williamson County: Litigants were obligated 
to litigate their state law claim first, but if that claim were rejected by the state court, the federal 
claim might be barred by res judicata. 8 San Remo eliminated this Catch-22 and provided a path 
forward for simultaneous state court litigation of state and federal claims. Nothing in the 
decision, however, hints at a free pass from applicable timeliness requirements. Yet that is 
exactly what Alpine seems to believe it has. Under Alpine's analysis, it could wait 20 or, for that 
matter, 100 years before filing its state and federal claims. Then, according to Alpine's theory, 
8 Prior to San Remo. the courts struggled with how to implement the ripening process mandated by 
Williamson County. See, e.g., Palomar Mobilellome Park Association v. City o/San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 365-66 
(91l1 Cir. 1993); Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F .3d 852 (91l1 Cir. ) 995). 
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when the tardy state claims are thrown out, the federal claims miraculously spring to life because 
they had never "accrued" until then. This defies logic and does not follow from San Remo. San 
Remo gives plaintiffs a way to pursue their federal claims by litigating them simultaneously. but 
they must still he litigated within the statute oflimitations.9 
C. In any even~ Alpine can never ripen its federal claim because it filed 
its state claim too late. 
It is elemental that Williamson County and San Remo require a takings plaintiff to ripen 
its state claim before filing its federal claim. As discussed in City's Opening Brie/at 29-30, a 
plaintiff that is precluded from bringing its state claim by the statute of limitations or the ISO-day 
notice requirement is thus unable to ripen its federal claim. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode 
Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1 51 Cir 2003). If the federal claim cannot be ripened, it, too, is forfeited. 
Alpine does not quarrel with this principle. Indeed, it describes Pascoag as "no more 
than an extension of the Williamson County ruling." Alpine's Opening Brie/at 33. Its response 
is simply that its state claim is not late. Id. This is circular. If Alpine's state claim is timely, 
then, obviously, it has not forfeited its federal claim. But if the Court agrees that Alpine's state 
claim is untimely (either under section 50-219 or the statute of limitations), then Alpine has 
forfeited its federal claim. Alpine implicitly concedes this. 
9 The City believes it is inescapable that if a case is ripe. then the cause of action bas accrued and the 
statute oflimitations is running. The federal court, however, did not find this to be so obvious. "This Court, 
although it does oot rule on the City'S statute of limitations claims at this time, finds they are not so decisive as to 
justify dispensing with prudential ripeness requirements." Memorandum Decision and Order at 6 (reproduced as 
Exhibit 30 to Affidavit o/Sleven J. Millemann). The federal court went on to offer some gratuitous observations that 
were quoted by Alpine in its brief. The City respectfully suggests that the federal court's parting remarks in 
declining to exercise jurisdiction failed to grapple with the underlying issue (ignoring, for example, that Hacienda 
was decided before San Remo). In short, this dictum is wrong, and this Court is oot compelled to follow it. 
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IV. THE RELEASE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE READ BROADLY 
TO BAR ALPINE'S CLAIMS. 
The City acknowledged in its City '3 Opening Brief at 31 that a strict reading of the 
Development Agreement provides only a release as to units that are sold at a discount. The 
City's argument is that the language of the agreement should be read in context and the Court 
should look to the obvious intent of the agreement. It is simply not credible that the parties 
intended to protect the City from claims based on units sold below market, but intended to hold 
the City accountable for losses associated with units sold at full market value. Alpine has not 
responded to this argument, other than to insist on a literal interpretation-irrespective of 
common sense. 
below: 
The City also urges the Court to consider the last sentence of the agreement, underlined 
Alpine Village's approved Community Housing Plan is 
attached hereto as Exhibit ·'B". Alpine ViIJage waives and releases 
the City from any claims whatsoever regarding or stemming from 
the pending litigation between the Mountain Central Board of 
Realtors and the City (ie. Mountain Central Board of Realtors, et al 
v. City of McCall, et al, Valley County Case Number CV·2006-
49()...C) as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to 
this Plan prior to the final disposition of such litigation. The Plan 
will be reviewed and modified, as necessary, to comply with the 
final disposition of the litigation as to any Community Housing 
Units which have not been sold prior to the final disposition of the 
litigation. 
Article VI of the Development Agreement, set out as Exhibit 16 to Affidavit of Steven J. 
Millemann (emphasis supplied); This provision makes clear that, if Ordinance 819 was 
invalidated, the City was obligated to review and modify the housing requirement. That is all it 
was obligated to do. The City did what was required of it, completely releasing Alpine from its 
obligations. By clear implication, Alpine agreed to and was entitled to no more than this. 
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V. ALPINE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY LACHES. 
The City's point about laches is simple. If Alpine wanted to challenge the City's housing 
ordinances before it acquired the Timbers, it could have. Instead, Alpine waited until the end of 
2010 to demand payment and file suit against the City. If the Court were to find that the City's 
lawsuit is timely under the applicable statutes of limitation, it should nonetheless take into 
account the long delay in bringing this lawsuit. 
The City has acted in good faith throughout this process. It sincerely believed that it had 
the authority to enact the housing ordinances. It was wrong, of course. But absent a showing (or 
even an allegation) that the City knew its ordinances were unconstitutional, it is unfair to suggest 
that its hands are unclean. The City is not responsible for the housing bubble or the losses that 
have fallen on those who invested during that bubble. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of the reasons discussed above, the City urges that its motion be granted and 
Alpine's motion denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY lLP 
By 
By 
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I. Introduction 
The City's Reply Briefin Support 0/ Its Marion/or Summary Judgment and 
Response Brie/in Opposition to Alpine's Motion/or Summary Judgment ("City's Reply 
Brief') does little to advance the discussion of the real issues which are presented by this 
case. At work in the City's Reply brief is the art of; (i) misstating an opponent's position 
in the interest of then offering arguments to defeat the misstated position; (ii) 
mischaracterizing the applicable legal standard governing an issue in the interest of 
appearing to satisfy that standard; and, (iii) stating that legal conclusions which would be 
critical to the success of the City's case are "obvious" in the face of precedent to the 
contrary and without any citation oflegal authority to support the "obvious" conclusion. 
An example of the first technique is the City's repeated assertion that Plaintiff's 
("Alpine") position regarding the application of Idaho Code §50-219 and the associated 
180 day Notice of Claim Statute contained in Idaho Code §6-906 is that compliance with 
the statute is "optional".' This is, of course, not Alpine's position. To the contrary, 
Alpine's position is that: 
• Idaho Code §50-219 applies Idaho Code §6-906 to claims against municipalities 
for damages. 
• Tort claims are also subject to the balance of the provisions of the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act ("ITCA"). 
• Alpine's claim is not a tort claim and is not subject to the balance of the 
provisions of the ITCA. 
• The City is, therefore, entitled to assert non-compliance with Idaho Code §50-219 
as a defense to Alpine's state constitutional claim (there being no dispute that 
Idaho Code §50-219 is inapplicable to the federal takings claims). 
• The Idaho Supreme Court and the courts of numerous other jurisdictions have 
held that, absent a clear legislative intent to make a statutory requirement 
"jurisdictional" or to preclude the assertion of equitable defenses to the 
1 See City's Reply Brieht 2, "Alpine responds that, while ldaho Code §S()"219 requires it to file a notice of 
claim within 180 days. there are no consequences for its failure to do so. III other words, the notice 
requirement is optional"; See also City'S Reply Briefat 3, "How Alpine reads section 50-219 as an 
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application of the statutory requirement, the requirement should not be found to 
be "jurisdictional". 
• Under the judicial precedent cited by Alpine (and consistent with the history of 
the amendments to Idaho Code §50-219 itself), this Court should find that the 
City certainly may assert Idaho Code §50-219 as a defense to Alpine's state 
constitutional claim, but that Alpine is entitled to offer equitable and 
constitutional defenses to the City's assertion of Idaho Code §50-219 as a 
defense. 
• Alpine has done so, arguing that the City should be estopped from asserting Idaho 
Code §50-219 as a bar to Alpine's state constitutional claim and that allowing the 
City to do so would also deny Alpine equal protection of the law. 
• If this Court finds that Alpine's arguments have merit, then Alpine should be 
excused from compliance with Idaho Code §50·219. If not, then the City would 
have successfully defended the state constitutional claim; but, in such case, this 
Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication of Alpine's 
federal takings claims and is, in fact, specifically instructed by the decisions of the 
u.s. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to then adjudicate the 
federal claims. 
In its arguments regarding the date on which Alpine's state takings claim accrued. 
the City both miscbaracterizes Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation claim and 
invents a legal standard for determining the date of accrual of the claim which is 
unsupported by judicial precedent. First, despite Alpine's consistent position to the 
contrary in the federal briefing and in Alpine's Memorandum in Support of Alpine 
Village's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendanl's Motion for 
Summary JUdgment ("Alpine's Opening Brief"), the City continues to characterize 
Alpine's takings claim as a "facial chaJlenge" as opposed to an "as applied" challenge. 
The City appears to be inviting this Court to reach the ill advised conclusion that, because 
the Mountain Central Board of Realtors successfully pursued a facial challenge to 
Ordinances 819 and 820, then it follows that Alpine's takings claim is somehow a facial 
instruction to 'tile a notice within 180 days, but only if you feel like it' is difficult to fathom" and at 4, "In 
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challenge to Ordinance 819. The City's motivation is its hope that if it can convince this 
Court to characterize Alpine's takings claim as a facial challenge then it can also 
convince this Court to attach an earlier (and improper) accrual date to the state 
constitutional claim for purposes of detennining the timeliness of the claim under the 
applicable 4 year statute oflimitation (Le., Idaho Code §5-224). 
The City's characterization of Alpine's takings claim as a "facial challenge" is 
incorrect and misleading. To begin with, the terms "facial challenge" and "as applied 
challenge" refer to challenges to ordinances, statutes, or regulations. A facial challenge 
argues that the statute could not possibly be applied in a constitutional manner and 
typically seeks only to invalidate the ordinance. An as applied challenge argues that, as 
applied to the particular plaintiff, the statute is unconstitutional, for which the plaintiff 
seeks compensation (i.e., damages). If Mountain Central Board of Realtors v. City of 
McCaIP, had never occurred and Alpine werc pursuing its takings claim, then Alpine 
would be challenging Ordinance 819, and it would, indeed, be appropriate to characterize 
the nature of the challenge. In such case. Alpine's chaJ1enge would clearly be to the 
Ordinance as it was applied to Alpine. However, as was noted in Alpine's Opening 
Brief, Alpine does not need to challenge the Ordinance. It has already been challenged 
and declared void and unconstitutional. Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation 
claim is that the City's application of a void and unconstitutional ordinance to Alpine 
resulted in a per se taking oftwo of Alpine's constitutionally recognized property rights, 
namely the right to freely exclude people from and dispose of its property and the right to 
not be dispossessed of the money which Alpine was required to expend to acquire the 
Timbers complex. Alpine's state takings claim is dearly that the application of this 
indisputably void and constitutional ordinance to Alpine, in the manner in which it was 
imposed by the City, effectuated a compensable taking. This claim has nothing to do with 
a "facial challenge" to Ordinance 819. The City concedes that in such case, the claim 
any event, Alpine cites no authority for its proposition that compliance with section 6-906 is optional." 
2 Case No. CV2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008) 
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accrues when the ordinance is actually applied to Alpine, not when Alpine filed its 
Application.3 
In addition to mischaracterizing Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation 
claim the City also argues to this Court that the mere existence of an Ordinance which 
could be applied in a manner which would constitute a taking triggers the accrual of the 
takings cause of action at the time of the filing of the Application. Thus, the City offers 
this Court a self serving standard which is unsupported by the applicable judicial 
precedent. When Alpine filed its application with the City, there were a number of 
ordinances in place which, depending on whether and how the City elected to apply them, 
could have produced takings claims. For example, when Alpine filed its applications 
with the City, the City had an ordinance which required developers of residential 
subdivisions to provide new parks of a size to be determined by the number of units being 
developed or to pay an in lieu fee. Had the City required Alpine to acquire property and 
dedicate it for parks in order to satisfy the ordinance, which might well have been a 
compensable taking. However, it did not. Instead, the City agreed that a plaza being 
designed as part of Alpine Village would be deemed to satisfy the parks requirement. 
Thus, it was not until the parks ordinance was applied to Alpine that Alpine could be said 
to know whether or not it had a takings cause of action relative to the ordinance. 
The same is true of Ordinance 819. This case provides a graphic example of why 
courts like the Idaho Supreme Court in City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 
136 P.3d 310. (2006) have held that a takings/inverse condemnation cause of action does 
not accrue until the ordinance in question has been applied to the property owner. The 
mere existence of the ordinance is not enough. When Alpine filed its applications with 
the City, there was no way for Alpine to know whether and how the City would 
ultimately apply Ordinance 819 to Alpine's applications. The ordinance was newly 
enacted and had not been previously applied by the City Councilor its staff. There was 
additionally no way for Alpine to know at that time that the Mountain Central litigation 
would be initiated, or how the City would react to the litigation. It was not until the City 
Council elected to actually apply the ordinance to Alpine's project, despite the pending 
l See City's Reply Briefat 10-11, "'n an as-applied taking, the taking does not occur (rather obviOUSly) 
until the ordinance is applied." 
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Mountain Central litigation, that it can be said that the full extent ofthe impainnent of 
Alpine's use and enjoyment of its property became apparent. The community housing 
plan which was ultimately required and approved by the City bore no resemblance to the 
plan which was submitted with the applications. Consistent with both the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Idaho Supreme Court decisions which were cited by Alpine in its Opening 
Briefand which are referenced below, Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation claim 
accrued when the ordinance was applied to Alpine's applications, not when the 
applications were filed. If, as is suggested by the City, the mere possibility that an 
Ordinance will be applied in a manner which gives rise to a takings/inverse 
condemnation claim triggers the accrual of the claim, the City's arguments would be well 
founded. However, this is not the law and this Court should decline to subscribe to the 
City's position. 
In its Reply brief, the City also employs the tactic of stating as "obvious" 
conclusions or propositions which are contrary to judicial precedent This tactic is 
employed by the City in support of its argument that Alpine's federal takings claims must 
have already accrued. In its Reply Brief, the City states that 
Applying the teaching of Levald in a post-San Remo world leads to an 
inescapable and perfectly obvious conclusion: If the federal cause of 
action is ripe in state court. then the statute of limitations is running 
Thus, under San Remo, if the federal claim can be brought simultaneously, 
it foUows that the federal cause of action has accrued in state court. 
City's Reply Brief at 18-19. 
The City offers no authority for this "inescapable and perfectly obvious 
conc1usion". Alpine would submit that this omission recognizes that the conclusion is 
contrary to the precedential Ninth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court decisions on point, 
which provide that, although the federal claims do not ripen or accrue until and unless 
relief has been denied on the state c1aim, the federal claims must be pled in the state court 
proceeding and can be considered by this Court in conjunction with its review of the state 
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claim.4 To do otherwise creates the piecemeal litigation which the decision in San Remo 
expressly condemns. 
The City's Reply Brief does. however, significantly narrow the issues which are 
in dispute in the pending motions, namely, whether a compensable taking has occurred. 
In its discussion of Judge Neville's decision in Mountain Central, the City states that 
"Given this ruling against the City, it is unclear why Alpine devotes so many pages of its 
brief to the law of unconstitutional takings. The City does not and cannot dispute that 
Ordinances 819 and 820 are unconstitutional."s Consistent with this concession, the City 
does not dispute or rebut Alpine's arguments in Alpine's Opening Brief that the City'S 
application of Ordinance 819 to Alpine's project effectuated a compensable taking of two 
constitutionally protected property interests, namely the right to freely exclude people 
from and dispose of its property and the right to not be dispossessed of the money which 
Alpine was required to expend to acquire the Timbers complex. Specifically, the City 
does not dispute or rebut Alpine's assertion in its Opening brief at page 15 that: 
Money is property in the constitutional sense. "Money is clearly property 
that may not be taken for public use without the payment of just 
compensation. Brown v. Legal Found of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 
1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003)." BHA Investments, Inc. 11. City of Boise, 
141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P Jd 315, 319 (2004). In BHA the Idaho 
Supreme Court found that the payment of money to the City of Boise 
pursuant to a city ordinance that the Court had earlier ruled void6 was an 
unconstitutional taking. "Since the City had no authority to charge the 
liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of the fee constituted a taking of 
property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA 
Investments, Inc. 14] Idaho 168, 172, 108 P Jd 315, 319 (2004). The clear 
and unambiguous holding of BHA is that the exaction of money pursuant 
to a void ordinance is a per se unconstitutional taking of property. 
There is no constitutionally relevant distinction between BHA's payment 
of money directly to the City of Boise and Alpine's payment of money to 
a third party to purchase property as required by the Ordinance. It is the 
taking of property for a public use, vvithout compensation that constitutes 
the taking. In both instances, the exactions were mandated by an 
ordinance later declared to be invalid. 
4 See discussion at Section IV below. 
, City's Reply Briefat 10. 
6 In the earlier case, the Supreme Court held that "The state legislature has not granted <:ities the authority 
to impose Ii transfer fee. The City exceeded its power in collecting the transfer fee ... BHA Investments, Inc. 
v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482, 484 (2003). 
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It would, thus, appear that the only defenses to Alpine's claims which are being 
offered by the City are the arguments that the claims are time barred. 
II. Temporary takings are clearly eompensabJe. 
In its Reply Brief the City repeats the argument that. since Alpine still owns the 
Timbers property, no taking can have occurred. This argument continues to be 
unsupported by any prevailing case law. Alpine has presented State and Federal case law 
that clearly holds that a temporary taking, such as is the case before this court. is a 
compensatory taking.7 In response, the City asserts that the cases cited by Alpine are out 
of date and that in recent years the courts have Jargely "eviscerated" this theory 
[temporary taking]. In support of this remarkable statement the City cites no federal 
caselaw and one Idaho case, Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 PJd 
637 (2004).8 
In Moon. landowners were contesting a state statute which conferred immunity on 
grass seed growers who created smoke by burning stalks after harvest in compliance with 
Smoke Management and Crop Residue Disposal Act. The court held that the statute was 
not an unconstitutional taking of the property of area residents who complained about the 
smoke. Here, Alpine is asserting that the City affected a per se physical taking of its 
property. Moon has no application to the case at hand. The McCuskey and First English 
cases (both of which recognized that "temporary takings can be compensable takings) 
were not even discussed in Moon and remain clear precedent for this Court. 
III. Alpine's state constitutional claim is not time barred. 
A. Failure to comply with the 180 day notiee requirement of tbe Idaho 
Tort Claims Act is not a jurisdictional bar to Alpine's state claim. 
As is noted above, the City misrepresents Alpine's position with regard to the 180 
day notice requirements of the ITCA. Alpine has never stated, as the City would have the 
court believe, that compliance with the ITCA notice requirements is "optional". City 
Reply Brief at 1, 3, 4. The requirement imposed by Idaho Code §50-219 has never been 
1 McCus/cey l'. Canyon County Com'rs. J28ldaho 213.216,912 P.2d 100, 103 (1996) citing First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County .• 482 U.S. 304, 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 L.Ed.2d 
250 (1987). See also Alpine's Opening Briefat 17. 
8 City's Reply Briefa1 I. 
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disputed by Alpine. What is in dispute is whether Alpine is entitled to assert defenses to 
the application of Idaho Code § 50-219 and whether non compliance with the statute 
deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider Alpine's federal claims. 
It is City's position that the 180 day notice requirement is jurisdictional and, as a 
result, this Court is divested of any jurisdiction to even hear Alpine's state takings claim 
or its equitable and constitutional defenses to the application of Idaho Code §50-219 to its 
state claim. Alpine argues that in all non-tort claims for damages against a city, the 180 
day notice is procedural, not jurisdictional, and as such, Alpine is permitted to raise 
equitable and constitutional reasons as to why compliance with the notice of claim 
provisions was not required in this case. 
The issue presented is one of statutory construction. The language of Idaho Code 
§50~219 requires that all claims for damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by 
chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code. There are twenty nine (29) statutory sections of the ITCA. 
Only two sections prescribe when and how claims must be filed. These are Idaho Code 
§6-906- Time forfiling claims and Idaho Code §6-907- Contents Q( claim. The City and 
Alpine agree that the §50-2l9 has the effect of applying these two sections to non-tort 
claims for damages against a municipality. However the City argues that "logically" 
Idaho Code §50-219 should also be interpreted as applying to such non-tort claims the 
provisions of Idaho Code §6-908. which purports to bar lawsuits by those who fail to 
provide notice. This assertion by the City is neither logical nor consistent with the rules 
of statutory construction. 
Idaho Code §50-219 is a short and simple statute. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990) had the opportunity to 
apply the rules of statutory construction to the mearung of the words "all claims must be 
filed as prescribed" in §50-219. Sweitzer argued that Idaho Code §50-219, as amended 
in 1983, acted to incorporated the entire ITCA. In rejecting that argument, the Court held 
Applying the plain meaning of the words "all" and "filed" in conjunction 
with that of the word "prescribe," may clearly be construed to mean that 
aU damage claims are to be filed as directed by or in the manner set forth 
in the ITCA. Applying the plain meaning of the language contained in 
I.e. §50-219 clearly demonstrates that the legislature's intent was to 
incorporate the notice requirements contained in chapter 9, title 6 so as to 
make the filing procedures for all claims against a municipality uniform, 
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standard and consistent. To construe the language to mean that the Tort 
Claims Act is substituted for I.C. § 50-219 would render I.e. § 50-219 
meaningless and essentially null. We therefore construe the language 
contained in I.e. § 50-219 to require that a claimant must file a notice of 
claim for all damage claims. tort or otherwise. as directed by the filing 
procedure set forth in I.e. § 6-906 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, chap. 9, 
tit. 6. 
Sweitzer v. Dean, ] 181daho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27,31 (1990). 
Thus, the Sweitzer court limited the application of Idaho Code §50-219 to the 
filing procedures of the ITCA and nothing more. 
Further evidence ofthe legislative intent to limit the scope of Idaho Code §50-219 
can be found in the history of that code section. Prior to the amendment in 1983 of Idaho 
Code §50-219 to its present language that section read. 
All claims for damages against a city must be filed with the city clerk 
within sixty (60) days after the time when such claim for damages shall 
have occurred; specifying the time, place and probable cause of said 
damage. No action shall be maintained against the city for any claim for 
damages until the same has been presented to the city council, and until 
sixty (60) days shall have elapsed after such presentation. The payment of 
any and aU damage claims by the city shall be by resolution, and not 
otherwise (emphasis added). 
Thus, like the civil rule which the Supreme Court relied on in City of Eagle v. 
Idaho Department of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449,247 P.3d 1037 (2011), the prior 
version of Idaho Code §50-219 contained language from which the Court could find a 
legislative intent to make compliance with the statute jurisdictional. However, in its 1983 
amendment to §50·219 the legislature deleted all ofthe language which would suggest a 
legislative intent that compliance with §50-2J9 be found to be jurisdictional. 
This entire issue is framed in the context of the Supreme Court's ho1dings which 
were cited at page 23 of Alpine's Opening Brief that, absent express language in the 
subject statute evidencing a legislative intent to bar equitable defenses, such defenses to 
the application of even a statute oflimitations may be asserted. The City'S only 
foundation for its position that the failure to comply with the 180 day notice requirements 
is jurisdictional is its own unsupported argument. The City has failed to cite any case law 
that would support its position that Idaho Code §6-908 appJies to non-tort claims. because 
there is none. The only holdings that §6-908 creates a jurisdictional bar arise in two tort 
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cases.9 Likewise, the City cannot cite any case law that supports its claim that Idaho 
Code §50·219 sweeps in the provisions ofldaho Code §6~908 to non-tort claims for 
damages against municipalities. because there is none. It elects to not respond to the 
significant body of case law from other jurisdictions which hold that the requirements of 
comparable notice of claim statutes are procedural. not jurisdictional, in nature and are 
thus subject to equitable and constitutional defenses. 1o To the contrary. the legislative 
history and the Sweitzer court's statutory interpretation of the language ofIdaho Code 
§50-219 make it clear that §50~219 is a statute dealing with when a claim for damages 
must be filed against a dty and nothing more. 
The conclusion to be drawn from all of this is that, as applied to Alpine's case, 
Idaho Code §50-219 is a procedural statute to whicb equitable and constitutional defenses 
may be asserted. In the event that the Court finds that Alpine's equitable and 
constitutional defenses are not persuasive and dismisses Alpine's state claim, the Court 
should then proceed to hear Alpine's federal claim. This is the procedure prescribed by 
San Remo Hotel. L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, et a1., 545 U.S. 323. 125 S. 
Ct. 2491, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005) and followed by the Supreme Court in BHA 
Investments. Inc. v. City of BOise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). In BRA, the court 
found that the state claims against the City of Boise were barred by Idaho Code §6-907, 
since BHA failed to state the names and addresses of the claimants. the amounts of 
claimed damages and the nature ofthe injury clai med. I I However, the Court's resultant 
dismissal of the BHA state claims for failure to comply with the tort claim notice 
requirements did not prevent the court from hearing the federaL takings claim. The court 
held "Bravo and Splitting Kings' complaint also included, however. a claim that the City 
had taken their property for pubJic use without the payment of just compensation in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States. The notice of claim requirement set 
forth in Idaho Code §50-219 does not apply to a claim based upon federal law." Id. 
9 See McQuillen v. City of Ammon. 1131daho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741,744 (1987); Harkness v. City of 
Burley, 110 Idaho 353. 360, 715 P.2d 1283, 1290 (1986). 
10 See Alpine's Opening Brief at 24·25; City's Reply Brief at 5. 
II BHA Investments, 141 Idaho at 175. 108 P.3d at 322. 
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B. The City has not offered any rational basis for its disparate treatment 
of Alpine, as opposed to the other members of the class of people 
impacted by Ordinances 819 and 829. 
The essence of Alpine's contention that the application of Idaho Code §50-219 to 
Alpine's state constitutional claim in this case would constitute a denial of Alpine's right 
to equal protection of the law is that: 
• There have been 59 persons who were financially impacted by Ordinance 
819 or 820 identified. 
• The City allowed, in fact invited, requests for refunds to be submitted by 
58 of those persons. 
• The refund requests were accepted by the City as long as 43 months after 
the date on which the fee was paid. 
• The City did not assert Idaho Code §50-2l9 as a bar to any of the requests. 
• Depending on which date this Court ultimately holds Alpine's state 
constitutional c1aim accrued, Alpine submitted its demand for 
compensation 35-43 months after its claim accrued. 12 
• Alpine is the only member of the class of persons who were financially 
impacted by Ordinance 819 andlor 820 against whom the City is asserting 
Idaho Code §50-219 as a bar to recovery. 
In its Reply Brief, the City acknowledges that it could have asserted Idaho Code 
§50-219 as a bar to the other 58 refund requests, but elected not to do so. Referring to the 
refund requests which the City paid. the City concedes that: 
The City did not have to do so, because many of those claims were also 
barred by the statute of ]imitations or the I80-day rule. However, given 
the District Court's ruling in Mountain Central Board of Realtors, Inc. v. 
City of McCall . .. the City determined that returnin~ money received 
under the housing ordinances was the right thing to dO.,,1 
12 Alpine's claim was presented to the City in a letter dated and delivered on November 15, 20) O. The 
letter is attached hereto as Attachment) . The Development Agreement for Alpine Village, which dedicated 
the Timbers Units as Community Housing Units, was executed on December 13,2007. The City Council's 
first approval oflhe proposal to utilize the Timbers units as community housing units was on March 22, 
2007. 
13 City's Reply Briefat 5-6. 
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Alpine should have been given the same opportunity to request compensation as 
was afforded the other members of the class of persons who were financially impacted by 
Ordinances 8 J 9/820. Having not been afforded that opportunity and having submitted its 
claim within the same time frame as was allowed by the City to the other members of the 
class, the City should not be allowed to assert Idaho Code §50-219 as a bar to Alpine's 
state constitutional claim. The City has offered no rational basis or reasoned decision for 
not allowing persons impacted by Ordinance 819 to request refunds, other then stating 
that Alpine did not pay any fee to the City. Yet, in its arguments regarding the date on 
which Alpine's state inverse condemnationltakings claim accrued (starting at page 9 of its 
Reply Brief), the City argues that all four of the alternative compliance methods provided 
in Ordinance 819 (i.e., providing units on site, providing units off-site, providing land, 
and/or paying an in lieu fee) are equally compensable as takings. Moreover, the question 
of how the City would have responded (or in fact has responded) to a request from Alpine 
for compensation is irrelevant to Alpine's equal protection claim. The issue is whether 
the City had any rational basis for the disparate treatment of Alpine (i.e. that the disparate 
treatment of Alpine was reasonably in furtherance of a legitimate public purpose). None 
has been offered. 
C. Alpine's estoppel argument is meritorious. 
The City initially contends that Alpine's estoppel argument is the same argument 
which was rejected by the Court in Hehr v. City of McCall. U That is most certainly not 
the case. The facts of Alpine's case are distinctly different than those presented by the 
Hehr case, not the least of which is that Alpine was unquestionably subjected to 
mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819 and Alpine's estoppel argument is premised 
on the City's disparate treatment of others who were also subjected to Ordinance 819 or 
its companion, Ordinance 820. Moreover, a review of the briefing in Hehr reveals that 
the legal arguments presented regarding the issue of whether Idaho Code §50-219 should 
be found to be jurisdictional were not presented in Hehr. 
The City next offers three arguments in response to Alpine's contention that the 
City should be estopped from asserting Idaho Code §50-219 as a bar to Alpine's state 
14 City'S Reply Brief at 7. 
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inverse constitutional claim: (i) that estoppel should not be applied against a municipality 
absent "exigent circumstances"; (ii) that estoppel cannot operate to grant subject matter 
jurisdiction; and, (iii) that Alpine has not been "disadvantaged or induced to change its 
position as a result of any action by the City.,,15 As to the first argument, the undisputed 
facts of record in this case certainly establish the kind of exigent circumstances to which 
the courts have referred. It is also indisputable that Alpine has been disadvantaged by the 
City's change of position. Had Alpine been treated the same as others similarly situated, 
its state constitutional claim for compensation would not be subject to Idaho Code §50-
219 and would have to be evaluated on its merits, which have been conceded by the City. 
The issue of whether the statute is ''jurisdictional'' has been addressed above. 
The City also suggests that, even jf Alpine's estoppel claim is found to have 
merit, then the remedy is simply to extend the period for Alpine to file its claim for a 
period of 180 days foHowing the City's adoption of Resolution 08-1], which invited 
refund requests from those financially impacted by Ordinance 820.16 This makes no 
sense. Resolution 08-11 was adopted by the City on April 24, 2008. The period to file 
refund requests was not closed by the City until December 31, 2009, some 20 months 
later. Moreover, requests for compensationlrefunds were accepted and paid by the City 
as long as 43 months after the date on which the community housing fee had been paid. 
The remedy for Alpine's estoppel claim is to declare the City estopped from asserting 
Idaho Code §50-219 as a bar to Alpine's state claim, thereby treating Alpine exactly the 
same as the others who were financially impacted by Ordinances 819/820. 
D. Alpine's Complaint was timely under Idaho Code §5-224. 
As is explained above, in order to support its argument that Alpine's state 
constitutional claim accrued on the date of Alpine's filing of its development 
applications, the City both mischaracterizes Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation 
claim and invents a legal standard for determining the date of accrual of the claim which 
is unsupported by judicial precedent. First, the City incorrectly characterizes the claim as 
a "facial challenge" to Ordinance 819. Then the City argues that the mere existence of an 
Ordinance which could be applied in a manner which would constitute a taking triggers 
IS City's Reply Brief at 7-8. 
16 City's Reply Brief at 8. 
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the accrual of the talcings cause of action at the time of the filing of the Application. 17 For 
the reasons explained below and at pages 17-21 of Alpine's Opening Brief. the Court 
should reject the City's mischaracterization and flawed analysis. The law ofIdaho is that: 
A c1aim for inverse condemnation action 'accrues after the full extent of 
the impairment of the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of [the property] 
becomes apparent.' Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 
P.2d lOOt, 1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. United States, 160 et.CI. 295, 
311 F.2d 798, 802 (1963)). 
City a/Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 P.3d at 317. 
The "full impairment becomes apparent" standard of Tibbs was also cited in 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996). 
[T]his Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation should be 
assessed at the time the taking occurs. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 
Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) citation omitted The time of 
taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the 
full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property 
becomes apparent. Intermountain West, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769 
(citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d at 1005). 
To understand the impact ofthe "full impairment becomes apparent" language of 
Tibbs it is important to remember that in Tibbs, the Court was also deciding when 
damages in an inverse condemnation case accrued ("both the extent and the measure of 
damages, are inextricab1y fixed by a finding of the time of taking" Tibbs. 100 Idaho at 
670). The Tibbs court concluded that the time of the taking, the accrual of the taking 
claim, and the time from which to measure a plaintiffs damages, although not readily 
susceptible to exact determination, must all be fixed at the point in time at which the 
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with 
plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent. The City's entire argument on this issue 
extracts the word "apparent" but attaches it to a completely different concept, arguing 
that, when Alpine filed its application, it was "apparent" that it might somehow be 
impacted by Ordinance 819. That is simply not the standard in Idaho for determining the 
accrual date of a takings claim such as the claim being asserted by Alpine. 
17 See discussion in the Introduction, at 2·5 above. 
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Alpine knew the Community Housing Ordinance applied to its project at the time 
it first submitted its development application to the City just as it knew that countless 
other city ordinances would apply to its development. However, the first community 
housing plan submitted by Alpine was far different in scope and impact from the 
community housing plan which was ultimately required by the City.IS Only when the 
final components of the community housing plan were established and approved by the 
McCaH City Council, and incorporated into a Development Agreement did the full extent 
of Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment of its property became apparent. Under Idaho law, 
that is when Alpine's state constitutional takings claim accrued. 
IV. Alpine's federal takings claims are timely. 
The City takes issue with Alpine's contention that its federal takings claims have 
not accrued for statute of limitations purposes, stating that: "This is a curious position to 
take, because if it has not accrued, how can it be before the court today?,,19 At the outset, 
it is worthy of note that this same "curious" position was taken by U.S. District Judge 
Winmill in his decision remanding this case: 
The accruaJ of a federal takings claim turns on the exhaustion of state 
remedies: "[T]he date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is 
denied in state courts, or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to 
state courts is futile." Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan 
Hill, 353 F.3d 65) (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (l993). There is no contention that the 
exhaustion requirement is futile here. Therefore, Alpine Village's federal 
claim does not accrue until compensation is denied in state court, and it 
appears that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run. 
(continuing at footnote 2): 
The City argues that Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates and Levald apply 
only "with respect to a federal claim brought first in federal court." 
(citation omitted). But the Ninth Circuit's rationale is at least as strong 
with respect to a state claim removed to federal court. 
"[T]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; 
it proscribes taking without jusl compensation. " ... Thus, a plaintiff 
cannot bring a section 1983 action in federal court until the state 
denies just compensation. A claim under section 1983 is not ripe-
II See Introduction above and Statement of Facts, at 3-7 of Alpine's Opening Brief. 
19 City's Reply Brief at 17. This is the same argument which was [resented by the City in its Opening Brief 
and which was discussed at some length by Alpine at 29-33 of Alpine's Opening Brief. 
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and a cause of action under section 1983 does not accrue-until that 
point. 
Levald, 998 F. 2d at 687 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194).20 
The City cites no authority for its dismissal of this proposition, instead relying on 
its reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and 
County a/San Francisco. et at., 545 U.S. 323,125 S. Ct. 2491,162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005) 
and the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993). In fact, the City's argument (i.e., that ifthe 
federal claims have been brought in state court, then they must be ripe and the claims 
must have already accrued) was expressly addressed and rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in San Remo. Therein, one of the arguments being made by the appellants was 
that, as to federal claims which required ripening by first being brought in state court 
under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank q{ Johnson City. 
473 U.S. 172 (1985), the appellants were not required to present those federal claims in 
the state court action, for the reason that they were not yet ripe. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, balding specifically that such federal claims must be pled "in the 
alternative" in the state court action: 
With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening, we reject 
petitioners' contention that Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from 
advancing their federal claims in state courts. The requirement that 
aggrieved property owners must seek "compensation through the 
procedures the State has provided for doing so," 473 U.S. at 194, 105 
S.Ct. 3108, does not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a 
plaintiffs request for compensation under state law and the claim that, in 
the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to 
preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would 
erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to "resort to 
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures." MacDonald, Sommer 
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350, n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 
L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) .21 
The City also erroneously cites Levald in support of its argument that Alpine's 
resort to state court should be found to be "futile", and that, therefore, Alpine's federal 
20 See Memorandum Decision and Order. filed August 25. 2011, at 6, (Exhibit 29 to Affidavit olSteven J. 
Millemann. filed with and in support of Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
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claim should be found to have accrued when Ordinance 819 was adopted.22 This 
argument is surprising and is flawed in a number of respects. The argument is surprising 
because in its Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss in federal court, the City 
specifically argued that Alpine was required to resort to state court to ripen its federal 
takings claim because resort to state court would not be futile. 23 In his decision 
remanding this case, Judge Winmill recognized that in this case, "There is no contention 
that the exhaustion requirement is futile here.,,24 The City'S acknowledgement in federal 
court recognized that the post-Williamson decisions which have held that resort to the 
state courts prior to adjudication of a federal takings claim is not required if it would be 
"futile" have consistently, without exception, defined "futility" as the state not 
recognizing an inverse condemnation/taking cause of action. The state court's u1timate 
decision on the merits of the state claim is irrelevant to the issue of futility. This narrow 
definition of futility was recognized by the Ninth Cireuit in Levald: 
Here, the taking at issue in the facial challenge allegedly occurred at the 
time the ordinance was enacted-in 1986. California did not recognize 
actions for inverse condemnation based on regulatory takings until after 
the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). Therefore, even though Levald did not seek remedies 
in state court, it was not required to do so because it would have been 
futile to seek state court relief at the time the alleged taking occurred. The 
I · . . 2S C aIm IS rtpe. 
The additional flaw in the City's citation of Levald in this context is that, as the 
above cited language of the decision confirms, Levald involved afacTa] challenge to a 
statute at a time when California did not recognize or allow inverse condemnation claims. 
Thus, the "small c1ass of cases" to which the Levald court was referring does not include 
this case. 
Lastly, on the issue of the timeliness of Alpine's federal takings claims, the City 
21 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346, 125 S.Ct. at 2506. 
22 City's Reply Brief at 17-18. 
23 City's Opening Briefin Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 16-17 (Exhibit 24 to the Affidavil o/SlevenJ. 
Mi/lemann, tiled with and in support of Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
24 See Memorandum Decision and Order, filed August 25, 2011, at 6, (Exhibit 29 to Affidavit of Steven J. 
Millemann, filed with and in support of Alpine's MOlion for Summary Judgment). 
25 Leva/d, 998 F.2d at 686. 
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suggests that "Under Alpine's analysis, it could wait 20, or for that matter, 100 years 
before filing the state and federal claims.,,26 First, that is not Alpine's position. Second, 
that did not occur here. Alpine has timely filed its state claim within tbe 4 years allowed 
by Idaho Code §5-224, thus unquestionably giving this Court jurisdiction to consider the 
state claim and the City's alleged defenses thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in Alpine's Opening Brief. Alpine respectfully 
requests that its Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be denied. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 201 1. 
MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN 
& PEMBERTON, LLP 
BY:~~~~~~~ __________ __ 
26 City'S Reply Briefat 19. 
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ATTACHMENT I 
MILLEMANN, PITIENGER', McMAHAN & PEMBERTON, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
STEVEN J. MILLEMANN 
Email: sjm@mpmpfaw.com 
POST OFFICE BOX 1066 
706 NORTH fiRST 
MCCALL, IDAHO 83638 
November 15, 2010 
HAND DELIVERED AND MAILED 
Lindley Kirkpatrick 
McCall City Manager 
City of McCall 
216 E. Park 8t 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
Re: Alpine Village/Timbers Community Housing 
Dear Lindley, 
TELEPHONE: (208) 634-7641 
FACSIMILE: (208) 634-4516 
I am writing on behalf of Alpine Village Company, who is a client of this office. As you 
know, Alpine Village Company received P.D.D. approval from the City of McCall for the 
construction of a multi phase residential/commercial development on property it owns on Third 
St. The project is known as Alpine Village. To date, Phase 1 of Alpine VHlage has been built, 
which consists of commercial space and 27 residential units. 
As a condition of the P.U.D. approval, the City required Alpine Village to provide 17 
residential units to satisfy the then Community Housing provisions of the McCall City Code. To 
comply with these conditions and with the approval of the McCall City Council, Alpine Village 
Company purchased the Timbers, which was converted from an apartment complex to a 
condominium project, consisting of 17 individual condominium wtits, specifically to comply 
with the Ordinance. Following acquisition, Alpine Village Company completed an interior 
remodel of the units and offered them as Community Housing units. None sold. 
The Community Housing provisions of the McCall City Code were judicially declared to 
be invalid in February, 2008, by District Judge Neville in the case of Mountain Central Board of 
Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall. In July, 2009 the City released the Timbers from the 
community housing restrictions and Alpine Village Company has endeavored since that time to 
recover its investment in the Timbers by offering the units for sale free of any deed restrictions. 
To date, only two units have been sold, despite aggressive marketing efforts by Alpine Village 
Company. 
Alpine Village Company acquired, converted and improved the Timbers complex solely 




McCall City Manager 
November 14, 2010 
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of the City's later Res01utions which invited "voluntary" community housing programs. Alpine 
Village Company has incurred significant financial10ss as a result of its acquisition, remodel and 
continued ownership of the Timbers units. This loss amounts to $2,792,605 as of June, 2010. 
Despite efforts to mitigate its losses through rentals and sales, and after applying the current 
appraised market value of the Timbers of $415,000 to offset its losses, damages of$2,317,605 
still remain. 
The purpose of this letter is to provide notice to the City of McCall of Alpine Village 
Company's claim against the City for the aforesaid damages Alpine Village Company has 
incurred as a result of the City's invalid Community Housing Ordinance. This claim 1S 
actionable as a "taking" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that losses occasioned as a 
result of an invalid city ordinance constitute-an unconstitutional taking and that the City is Hable 
therefore. See BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBotse, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2005). In 
the event that this sum is not paid or other resolution of this claim satisfactory to Alpine Village 
is not reached by November 30, 2010, we will initiate litigation for these damages, as well as our 
client's costs and attorney's fees incurred in pursuit of this claim. 
The time remaining for the Alpine Village Company to commence litigation to recover 
its losses is very short. However, in light of the good relationship that we believe exists between 
our client and the City. which is certainly valued by Alpine Village Company, we would defer 
the filing of a lawsuit in order to explore the possibility of some other resolution, short of 
litigation. Should the City desire to explore alternative resolutions, we would suggest that a 
meeting be scheduled as soon as possible, but in any event prior to the end of November. We 
would propose that such a meeting be held pursuant to Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
which protects such discussions from later being admissible in a court proceeding. If the City is 
interested in scheduling a meeting, please call me to discuss timing and participants. 
Finally. I should note that, as you will recall, both this firm and Mike Hormaechea 
testified before the McCall City Council during the public hearing process on the Community 
Housing Ordinance that the Ordinance was ill advised. inequitable and would likely not survive 
judicial scrutiny. The Council and the County Commissioners were encouraged at the time by 
Mr. Millar to disregard that testimony, and they did so. I offer tbis fact for the reason that the 
judicial challenge to the Ordinance brought cries of "where were they during the public hearings 
on the Ordinance"? The answer in this instance is that both we end our client were there and 
made our best efforts to avoid this very scenario. 
If you have any questions regarding the Alpine ViUage Companies position, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. . 
Sincerely, 
J~ __ _ 
s EN 1. MILLEMANN 
i 
~77 
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: (208) 388-1200 
Case ~o. 'O? Inst. No 
Filed.10. A.M ---:=:~;P.M-. 




Attorneys for Defendant City of McCaJl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORUTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-2010-519C 
N' onCE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
VS. 
CI1Y OF McCALL, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its attorneys of record, Givens Pursley 
LLP, and hereby provides notice to the Court and to Plaintiff of its intent to rely upon the 
following supplemental authorities at the hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment 
that is scheduled for November 17,2011, at 3:00 p.m. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the legislative history of the 
amendment to Idaho Code § 50-219 that occurred in 1983. These materials are being provided 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
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to the Court in response to the argument made by Plaintiff in its Reply Brief, p. 9, that the 
Legis1ature deliberately removed the language that would make non-compliance a jurisdictional 
defect. As the Court can see from these materials (re: RS 9018 and SB 1148), there was no such 
intent - the amendment was only intended remove conflicts between section 50-219 and the tort 
claims act as to whether the notice deadline should be 60 days or 180 days. Thus, section 50-219 
has required notice as a mandatory condition both before and after its amendment in ] 983. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Magnuson Properties 
Partnership v. City o/Coeur D'Alene, 59 P.3d 971, 138 Idaho 166 (2002), in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that compliance with § 50-2l9 was a mandatory condition precedent to the 
filing of plaintiff's lawsuit that included tort. contract, and equitable claims. This case is being 
submitted to the Court in response to Plaintiffs argument in its Reply Brief, p. 10, that there is 
no case law in Idaho holding that compliance with Idaho Code § 50-219 is a mandatory 
condition precedent tor a non-tort damage claim against a municipality. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Brown v. City of Caldwell, 769 
F.Supp.2d 1256 (D.Idaho 2011), in which the court observed that the notice requirement in § 50-
219 is a "mandatory condition precedent"" to bringing suit which deprives the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The court in Brown held that the plaintiff's contract claim was barred by his 
failure to give notice, but that his claim under the Idaho Whistleblower Act was not barred 
because that Act has its own timeliness requirements that are not consistent with § 50-219. As 
with Magnuson Properties Partnership, this case is being provided to the Court specifically to 
rebut Plaintiffs assertion that there is no case law that supports the application of Idaho Code § 
6-908 as a jurisdictional bar to a non-tort damage claim against a city. 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENT At AUTHORITY 
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Both Magnuson Properties Partnership and Brown were decided prior to the service of 
the City's Reply Brief in this matter, and counsel for the City acknowledges that these cases 
should have been cited in that Reply Brief. However, these cases were discovered during the 
course of analyzing Plaintiffs Reply Brief and preparing for oral argument and are believed to 
be directly applicable to the issues at hand. 
DATED this ISth day of November, 2011. 
NonCE OF SuPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
1324163_1/4432-6 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of October, 2011, the foregoing was filed, 
served, and copied as foUows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ill 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Steven I. Millernann, Esq. 
Gregol)' C. Pittenger, Esq. 
SERVICE COPIES TO: 
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton, 
LLP 
706 North First Street 
Post Office Box 1066 
McCal1, ID 83638 
~ o o 
o o 
o o o 
r:gJ 
k81 
COURTESY COPIES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. Mclaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ill 83702 
Jason Gray 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 

















U. S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 




~tM:ti4,....----.... ChriS~ Meyer 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
When the Idaho Tort Claims was enacted in 1971. it 
established the liability of government entities and established 
procedures to be followed in making tort claims against 
state and local government entities, superseding previous 
acts. Under the Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-906, tort 
claims must be filed with 120 days from the date , the claim 
arose. 
A 1967 statute, Idaho Code § 50-219, had established a 
60 days time limit for filing tort claims against cities. 
Although superseded, Idaho Code § 50-219 is still on the 
books and can create confusion for potential claimants and 
lawyers advising their clients. 
This bill would amend Idaho Code § 50-219 to remove the 
conflict with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
FISCAL NOTE 
This bill would have no fiscal impact on the state 
general account. 




SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
February 28, 19B3 1:30 p.m. 
PRESENT: Senators Fairchild (Chairman), Barker, Rydalch, 
Darrington, Marley, Sweeney, Wetherell and Bray. 
by Senator Marley, second by Senator Sweeney that the minutes 
the meeting of February 25th be accepted as presented. On a voice 
, the motion passed. 
E~traditions. Deputy Attorney General Ken McClure said 
this legislation corrects a defect in existing extra-
dition law. Currently, extradition is allowed only for 
state to state. If a person living in California, 
commits a crime via telephone to Idaho and is apprehended 
in Oregon, Idaho cannot extradite hLm from Oregon. 
Moved by Senator Barker, Second by Senator Rydalch, 
that S 1128 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS recom-
mendation. On a voice vote, the motion passed. Barker sponsor 
RS 9237 
MOTION: 
Senator Risch present. 
Pardons and paroles, violations, time limit for warrants. 
Steve Coles, Pardons and Paroles Commission said that 
the current 15 day time limit was too constricting and 
this legislation would change the 15 day time limit to 
start at the completion of the investigatory work. 
Moved by Senator Risch, second by Senator Marley, to 
introduce RS 9208. On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
License suspended, minors, alcohol related. Senator 
Beitelspacher again reiterated this legislation would 
speak to the problem of the 14-18 year old driver. Sen-
ator Wetherell asked about the problem of the cost of 
acquiring a SR22, after the suspension of a license. 
Senator Barker said he had some problems, also, with 
this legislation. Moved by Senator Bray, second by 
Senator Darrington that RS 9192 be introduced. On a 
voice vote, the motion passed. Senator Smyser present. 
Highway Districts, clarifying duties. Senator Risch 
said this legislation was brought by the highway district 
people. This would clarify the duties of the county-wide 
highway district I s function over ;: public rights-of-way 
as they are affected by proposed sub-divisions. Moved 
by Senator Marley, second by Senator Risch, that RS 9237 





Judiciary and Rules Committee 
ry 28, 1983 
2 
Amending Joint Rule 6. Senator Barker explained that 
this rule change allows that resoltuions and memorials 
be printed in full only in the house of origin. This 
will be a cost savings for the journal. Moved by Senator 
Risch, second by Senator Rydalch, that HCR 21 be sent 
to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. On a voice 
vote, the motion passed. Barker, sponsor. 
Tort Claims, removing conflict with Idaho Tort Claims 
Act. Senator Risch explained that when the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act was enacted, this section was not changed. 
This merely brings into conformance. Moved by Senator 
Risch, second by Senator Bray, to introduce RS 9018. 
On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
tor Barker said that he had an RS ·he would be bringing to the 
meeting for introduction. 





SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
March 9, 1983 1:30 p.m. 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Senators Fairchild (Chairman), Barker. Smyser, 
Darrington, Marley and Sweeney. 
Moved by Senator Sweeney, second by Senator Smyser. to accept the 
minutes of the meeting of March 7th as presented. On a voice vote 







Driving under the Influence. Senator Smyser went 
through the legislation pointing out the major 
issues. 
Senators Bray, Wetherell and Rydalch present 
Senators Fairchild and Smyser thanked the members of 
the sub-committee and the public who gave of their 
time and ideas in the preparation of this legislation. 
Senator Risch present. 
Senator Fairchild said that the legislative . intent 
written into this bill was unique and hoped that 
the judiciary would get the message that the legis-
lature wanted the law applied equally. 
Moved by Senator Barker. second my Senator Marley, that 
RS 9299 be sent to print. On a voice vote, the motion 
passed. 
Drivers license, suspended for minors in alcohol related 
offenses. Senator Beitelspacher, in response to a 
question raised at the last meeting, said that an amend-
ment to the bill. stating that these offenses would not 
be on the driving record would take care of the matter 
of increased insurance costs. Moved by Senator Risch, 
second by Senator Bray, that S. 1146 be sent to the 
14th order for amendment. On a voice vote, the motion 
passed. 
Tort Claims Act, removing conflicts. Carl Bianchi, 
Court Administration, said this was just a housekeeping 
measure to remove some conflicts in the Act. Moved by 
Senator Risch, second by Senator Marley. that S. 1148 
be sent to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. 




Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee 




Forceable rape. Ken McClure, Deputy Attorney General 
explained this legislation closes some loopholes in 
the law. Idaho Code does not define penetration with 
objects other than a penis. Trish Flannigan of the 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office gave a brief background 
on the need for this legislation. Moved by Senator 
Bray, seonc by Senator Darrington, to send S. 1164 
to the floor with a DO PASS recommendation. On a voice 
vote, the motion passed. 




















LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
MINUTES 
WEDNESDAY. MARCR 16. 1983 
ROOM 408, STATEHOUSE. 
Mr. J~ ~eatherby, Association of Idaho Cities; 
Mr. Bob Venn. Public Employees Retirement System. 
Bunting, Paxman, Sharp, Lucas, Strasser, Loveland, 
Deckard, Findlay, Stolcheff, Lacy, Kellogg. 
Bateman. 
Meeting called to order by Chairman Bunting at 2 p.m. 
Representative Findlay moved to accept the minutes 
of March 14, 1983 as written. 
No objection - Motion carried. 
Mr. Jim KeitherbY of the Aasociation of Idaho Cities 
testified n support of S8 1016 as amended. He SAid 
it is jointly sponsored by the cities. counties as well 
as highway systems. It was amended in the Senate ao 
that it includes cities, counties and highway dis-
trict.. This limitation was last raised in 1975 from 
$2,500 to $5,000. and due to inflation in the last 
couple of years this will raise it from $5,000 to 
S10,000, narrowing the scope of limitations. It 
relates to equipment purchases only. Prior to this 
leqislation the limitation was for all pUfchases. 
One Area of purchasing is for computor equipment. If 
after a purchase ia made through the bidding procels 
additional eqUipment is needed and it comes from the 
.~e company in which the initial bid was made, this 
would eliminate the necessity of "an additional bid. 
This would also be beneficial when buyir~ used equip-
ment, such AS used vehicles that can be purchased 
for less than SI0,000. 
Hr. Weatherby urged support of this leqislation. 
Representative Strasser moved to hold sa 1016 as amended 
in committee: seconded by Bunting. 
Strasser explained that he has a great fear that 
this will take it out of the market enterprise And put 
it in the hands of friends, etc. 
Motion to hold in committee failed. 
Representative Stoicheff moved to send SB 1016 AS amended 
to the floor with & Ndo pas.- recommen~ation; seconded 
by Representative Lacy. 
Repres~ntative Strasser made an amended motion to 
send SB 1016 a8 amended to the floor with a "do not pass" 
recommendation I seconded by Findlay. 
Hotion to send to floor "do not pas." failed. 
Motion to send to the floor with a "do pass" recol1lJllenda-
tion passed, Strasser and Findlay voting "no." 












Mr. Robert Venn of the Retirement System referred 
testimony of SB 1027 ~o Mr. Jim Weatherby of the 
Association of Idaho Cities. Mr. Weatherby stated this 
legislation is an attempt to resolve a dile~a that 
cities and fire districts are now in when they hire a 
fireman who are over the age of 34 years. He SAid 
the United States Supreme court states it 18 consti-
tutional for the Congress to prOhibit discrimination 
on the baais of age aa far as hiring employees is 
concerned. They aske4 the Attorney General where they 
stand and received an info~al opinion in July,1982 
that 72"1428 cannot be upheld because of the Federal 
Age and discrimination Aot. He said they can ignore 
this sectlon, or abide by 72-1428 and be ~n violation 
of the fe4eral law, or they can seek a solution by 
amendin9 the pre •• nt law to delete the portion under 
72-1428 which states "and has not reached the 8ge of 
thirty fo~r". Thl. ls the logioal way to go and they 
ask for repeal of this provision of the law. The amend-
ment 1s for the Fireman's Retirement Fund and there 
would be no effect on the Fund. 
Mr. Venn lIuted tha minimum requirement for retirement 
would be five years of accredited service. He would 
have to have five years before he would be eligible 
to retire. The impaot on the Fireman" fund would have 
no measurable effect whatsoever. 
YJ. weatherpy said hiring is on the basis of physical 
performance standards, and aqa i8 merely not a fActor. 
Representative Stoicheff movad to send sa 1021 to the 
floor with a *do pa •• - recommendation! seconded by 
Paxman. 
Motion to send to the floor "do pass" carried. 
(Puman to carry) 
Mr. Carl Bianchi, Administrator of the Courte, testified 
in favor of sa 1148. He stated this bill yo~ld 4mend 
Idaho Code 50-219 to remove the conflict with the Idaho 
Tort Claims ~ct. He urges support of this bill. 
Representative Relloqq moved to Bend S8 1148 to the 
floor with II. "do paas" recOlMlendlltion; seoonded by 
PAXlllAn. 
Motion c~rr1ed. (Lucas to carry) 
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Supreme Court ofIdaho, 
Coeur d'Alene, October 2002 Term. 
MAGNUSON PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP, an 
Idaho General Partnership, Plaintiff·Appellant-Cross 
Respondent, 
v. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, an Idaho Municipality, 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. 
No. 28392. 
Nov. 26. 2002. 
Commercial landowner brought a breach of con· 
tract action against city based on an agreement that 
city would reimburse landowner to extend sewer line 
to adjoining property. The District Court of the First 
Judicial District, Kootenai County, C,hj!rles W. Ho-
sack, J., granted default judgment in favor of lan-
downer, but subsequently granted city's motion to set 
aside the default judgment and granted city's motion 
for summary judgment. Landowner appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals affmned the set aside of the default 
judgment, but reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment. City appealed. The Supreme Court. K.idwell, 1., 
held that: (1) letter from city to landowner denying 
reimbursement claim began notice period of Idaho 
Tort Claims Act (ITCA), and (2) city wall not entitled 
to attorney's fees. 
District Court affirmed. 
Walters, J., concurred specially with opinion. 
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which city denied the existence of any agreement 
regarding the extension of city sewer system to land 
and rejected landowner's request for reimbursement, 
began lBO-day notice period in Idaho Tort Claims Act 
(!TCA) for landowner to bring action against city for 
reimbursement, and thus landowner's action, filed 
more than 180 days after the date he received the 
letter, was untimely. I.C. §§ 6-906, 50·2 19. 
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City failed to provide a basis for award of attorney 
fees in successfuJ defense under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act (ITCA) of commercial landowner's request for 
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was not entitled to fees. I.C. § 6-901; Rules Ciy.Proc" 
Rule S4(el(11. 
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Magnuson Properties Partnership (Magnuson) 
filed suit against the City of Coeur d'Alene (City). The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the City because Magnuson failed to file notice of its 
claim as required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (IT-
CA). This Court affinns the judgment of the district 
court. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Magnuson owned undeveloped property within 
the City tbat it wished to develop. In early 1995, 
Magnuson approached the City with a plan to subdi-
vide its property into three separate commercial lots. 
The plan called for installation of a sewer line. As a 
condition of approval, the City required Magnuson to 
extend the sewer line from its property to an adjoining 
parcel owned by a third party. Magnuson objected to 
this requirement because the extension increased the 
cost of the project but provided no benefit to Mag-
nuson. According to Magnuson, a city engineer stated 
that the City would reimburse Magnuson for the ad-
ditional cost associated with the extension. Magnuson 
asserts it acted in reliance on this representation in 
extending the sewer line as the City required. 
On May ro, 1996, at the direction of Magnuson, 
the general contractor, Shea Construction (Shea), 
submitted a statement of reimbursable costs to the 
City. Shea itemized the extra costs attributable to the 
extension, totaling $30.802, and requested the City 
pay Magnuson that amount. The City's Public Works 
Director responded to Shea's request on August 13, 
1996. The City denied the existence of any agreement 
between the City and Magnuson and denied the re-
quest for reimbursement. The City acknowledged its 
policy of requiring property owners to extend sewer 
lines to the farthest boundary of their property when 
installing a sewer tine. However, the City asserted it 
only reimburses property owners for costs associated 
with enlarging the size of sewer pipe and deeper ex-
cavation. The City maintained that Magnuson in-
curred no reimbursable costs in extending its sewer 
line. 
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Magnuson claims that after August 13, 1996. it 
repeatedly attempted to contact the City in order to 
discuss its request for rei.mbursement. The City met 
with Magnuson on November 7. 1996. City repre-
sentatives reiterated'**974 '*169 their denial of Mag-
nuson's claim for reimbursement at this meeting. On 
November 11.1996, Magnuson paid Shea the balance 
it owed on the project. $30,802. Magnuson filed notice 
of a claim against the City on February 18, 1997. 
Obtaining no response to this notice, Magnuson 
filed suit on October 16, 1998, alleging tort, contract, 
and equitable claims against the City. The district 
court entered default in favor of Magnuson against the 
City on November 24, 1998. On December 18, 1998, 
upon the City's motion, the district court set aside the 
entry of default and allowed the City to answer. The 
City then filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
ground Magnuson's claim was barred by ~ 
50-219 and 6-906, which require filing notice of a 
claim against a municipality within I gO days from 
when the claim arises. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the City. Magnuson 
appealed the district court's decision to set aside the 
entry of default and summary judgment and the Cily 
cross-appealed the district court's order denying the 
City's request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the district court's order to set aside entry of 
default but reversed the summary judgment and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. Magnuson 
Props. P'ship v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 2002 WL 
13783 (ClApp.2002). The Court of Appeals found its 
reversal of summary judgment rendered the City's 
cross-appeal moot. Id. The City now seeks, and this 
Court bas granted, review of the Court of Appeal's 
decision. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WI.2l When a case is on review from the Court of 
Appeals, this Court hears the matter as if it is on ap-
peal from tbe district court rather than review the 
Court of Appeal's deeision. [gavit( v. SWaI'n, 1.33 
Idaho 624. 627, 99l P.2d 349, 352 (1999). This Court 
gives due regard, but not deference, to the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. [d. 
QJIfl Summary judgment is proper when "the 
pleadings, depositions. and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits., if any, show that there is no 
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."l.R.C.P. 56(cl (2002). In a motion for summary 
judgment, this CQurt should liberally construe all facts 
in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reason-
abJe inferences from the facts in favor of the non-
moving party. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living 
Servs .. 136 Idaho 835, 838-39, 41 P.3d 263. 266-67 
(2002). Summary judgment must be denied if rea-
sonable persons could reach differing conclusions or 
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence pre-
sented.ld. 
ill On appeal, this Court exercises free review 
over questions of law, Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 
574. 516. 944 P.2d 709. 111 (1997). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Time For Filing Notice 01 A Claim Vnder 
I.C. §I 50-219 And 6-906 Began To Run When 
Magnuson Received The City's August 13, 1996 
Letter or Denial. 
LC, § 50-219 (2000) requires filing any claim for 
damages againsl a government entity as required by 
the [TCA. IDAHO CODE § 6-901 (20QQ) , A claimant 
has one hundred eighty (180) days from the day they 
knew, or should have known. of the claim to provide 
notice of the claim to the government entity. IDAHO 
CODE § 6-906 (2000). This notice requirement ap-
plies equally to tort claims and claims for breach of 
contract. Emerprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 
734. 737-38. 536 P.2d 729. 732-33 (}975); IDAHQ 
CODE §§ 50-219 and 6-906 (2002). 
[6][711S][9] The l80-day notice period begins to 
run at the occurrence of a wrongful act, even if the 
extent of damages is not known or is unpredictable at 
the time. Ralphs v. City ofSpjrit Lake, 98 Idaho 22~. 
227, 560 F,2d 1315. 1317 (1977). "Knowledge of 
facts which would put a reasorulbly prudent person on 
inquiry," triggers the ISO-day period. McQuillen v. 
Qlyof.Ammon, 1t3 Idaho 719,722.747 P,2d 741, 744 
(1987). Compliance **975 ·170 with the notice re-
quirement is a "mandatory condition precedent to 
bringing suit [against a city}, the failure of which is 
fatal to II claim, no matter how legitimate." ld. A 
claimant is not required to know all the facts and de-
tails of a claim because such a prerequisite would 
allow a claimant to delay completion of their investi-
gation before triggering the notice requirement. MiI-
PageS 
chell v. Bingham Mem'J. Hosp.! 130 Idllho 420. 443.. 
942 P.2d 544,547 (1997). 
UQl The record reflects that, at the very latest, 
Magnuson had knowledge of the City's August 13, 
1996 letter on August 1 S, 1996, which places Mag-
nuson's February 18, 1997 notice beyond the /80-day 
period. The City's letter denies the existence of any 
agreement between the City and Magnuson and rejects 
Magnuson's request for reimbursement. As of August 
15, 1996, a reasonable and prudent person would have 
knowledge of facts of a wrongful act, i,e., the City's 
denial of and/or breach of the alleged contract. 
Therefore, the 180-day notice period began on August 
15, 1996, and Magnuson tailed to provide timely 
notice of its claim. 
illJ Arguably, Magnuson's May 10, 1996 letter 
asking for reimbursement was a notice of a claim for 
purposes of the ]TeA. However, because this argu-
ment was raised for the first time on appeal, this Court 
will not consider it. Whirred v. Canyon CounlV Bd. of 
Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118. 121-22. 44 P.3d 1173, 
} 176-77 (2002). 
B, This Court Will Not Consider When The Time 
For FUing Notice or A Claim l.:nder tbe ITCA 
Begins To RIUI For A Claim Of Unjust Enricb-
ment. 
U11U11 Magnuson argues the lTCA's notice reo 
quirement does not apply to its equitable claims. To 
raise an issue on appeal, the record must contain an 
adverse ruling to fonn the basis for assignment of 
error and this Court will not consider or review an 
issue raised for the first time on appeal. Whitted, 137 
Idaho at l21-22. 44 P.3d at 1176-77. Magnuson failed 
to raise the issue of whether I.e. § 50-219 applied to 
its equitable claims in the dislric1 court. As a result. 
this Court declines to decide Magnuson's argument 
that its claim for unjust enrichment is not governed by 
the l80-day notice provision found in l.C. § 6-906. 
Even if Magnuson had properly raised the issue, 
this Court has construed I.C. § 50-219 10 require a 
claimant to file notice ()f all claims for damages 
against a government entity, tort or otherwise, as di-
rected oy the lTCA. Sweitzer v. Dean. 118 ldaho 56~. 
572,798 P.2d 27, 31 (l990). 
C. The City Is Not Entitled To An Award Of At-
torney Fees. 
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D..11LU1 A court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to a prevailing party when it is provided for by 
statute or by contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e}(I) (2Q02). A 
party must assert a specific statutory or common law 
rule upon which this Court may base an award of 
attorney fees. Binghpm y. Montane Res. ASSOCI.. 133 
Idaho 420. 424, 987 P .2d 103 S, 1039 (1999), The City 
has failed to provide II basis for this Court to award 
fees, Therefore, the City's request for fees is denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The City's August 13. 1996 letter triggered the 
ISO-day period to file notice of a claim against a city 
as required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act. As a result, 
the district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment 10 the City on the ground Magnuson failed 
to file notice of a claim with the City within 180 days 
from the date it gained knowledge of jts claim, 
Therefore, the district court is affirmed, The City is 
not entitled to an award of attorney fees because it 
failed to provide any basis for such an award. Costs to 
respondent. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SCHROEDER, 
WALTERS, and EISMA.lI,(N concur. 
W At TEKS, J., Specially Concurring. 
I write only 10 address a minor point thal may 
appear as an anomaly in this case. It relates to the steps 
taken by Magnuson to bring its damage claim to the 
courts. 
**976 "'171 The purpose of the notice require-
ment under the lTCA is to give a governmental enti-
ty-here, the City of Coeur d'Alene-an opportunity to 
investigate a potential claim so the City could decide 
whether it is responsible for the debt and should pay 
the clajm either in full or by Some agreeable amount in 
settlement, or to reject the claim and let the claimant 
proceed with a legal action for collection. The letter 
from Magnuson's agent, Shea, on May 10, 1996, 
served that purpose. If, after review, the City had paid 
or settled the claim, then this case would not have 
proceeded through the courts, Under I.C. § 6-909, the 
City had ninety days to notify the claimant in writing 
of its approval or denial of the claim. Pursuant to the 
statute, a claim shall be deemed denied if at the end of 
the ninety-<iay period the City has failed to approve or 
deny the claim. Here, the City denied the claim on 
August 13, 1996, some ninety. five days after ~ay 10. 
The City's reason for rejecting the claim is irrelevant. 
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At that point, in my opinion, Magnuson was free to 
file an action to collect on the rejected claim. Mag-
nuson did not need to later send in a second claim 
addressing the same dispute when that claim had al-
ready been denied by operation of the terms of the 
pertinent statute and by Ihe City's rejection in fact. 
However, Magnuson chose not to rely on the May 
10 letter as a notice of claim. Instead, Magnuson con-
tinued to pursue discussions with the City in an at-
tempt to receive reimbursement for its project's costs. 
When Magnuson's attempts proved futile. Magnuson 
sent another demand notice in February 1997, and 
then tiled suit when that demand was rejected, As it 
turned out, of course, the February 1997 notice of 
claim was held untimely by the district court upon the 
facts as presented and argued by the parties in this 
case. 
The Court's opinion in this case correcdy notes 
that Magnuson did not contend in the district court that 
the May 10 letter had the effect of a notice of claim 
under the ITCA. Indeed, even at oral argument on this 
appeal when the subject was broached. Magnuson 
took the position that the May 10 letter did not serve as 
a notice to the City of Magnuson's claim. 
Because Magnuson decided to proceed under its 
own interpretation of the steps to be followed without 
suggesting to the courts the correct alternative route, 
this Court is not required to reconstruct the case and 
put it on the proper track. Accordingly, 1 concur with 
the approach expressed in the CoUrt's opinion con-
cerning the role the May 10 letter legally played in this 
case. 
ElSMANN, 1. concurs. 
ldaho,2002, 
Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City of Coeur 
D'Alene 
138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d971 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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CITY OF CALDWELL, a subdivision of the state of 
Idaho, Mark Wendelsdorf, Garret Nancolas, Monica 
Jones, and John/Jane DQes 1 through X, whose true 
identities are presently unknown, Defendants. 
Case No. 1;IO-CV-536-BLW. 
Feb. 14,2011. 
Background: Former deputy fire chief brought action 
in state court against city, fire chief, mayor, and hu-
man resources director, alleging breach of contract, 
wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho Whistleb-
lower Act, and retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment. Following removal, defendants filed 
motion to dismiss. 
Holdings: The District Court, B. Lynn WinmiU. Chief 
Judge, held that: 
ill under Idaho Jaw, as predicted by the district court, 
180-day notice requirement for claims for damages 
against city did nol apply to claims under Idaho 
Whistleblower Act; 
ill requirement did apply to breach of contract claim; 
ill allegations were insufficient to state claims against 
fire chief, mayor, and human resources director in 
their personal capacities; 
ill demand letters did not satisfy notice requirement; 
and 
ill service of initial complaint did not satisfY notice 
requirement. 
Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
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Under Idaho Jaw, 180-day notice requirement for 
claims for damages against city applied to former 
deputy fire chiet's breach of contract claim against city 
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Deputy fire chiefs allegations that he was termi-
nated in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act 
were insufficient to state claims for violations of the 
Act and fOT breach of contract under Idaho law against 
fire chief, mayor, and human resources director in 
their personal capacities, absent allegations that they 
were acting outside the course and scope of their em-
ployment. West's I.C.A. §§ 6-903(e), 6-2105. 
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time therefor. Most Cited Cases 
Former deputy fire chiers service of demand let-
ters on city did not satisfy notice requirement for 
bringing claims for damages against city, as required 
for his breach of contract claims under Idaho taw, 
where letters did not contain chiefs address, amount 
of alleged damages or nature of damages, and letters 
were not addressed to or formally filed with city clerk. 
West's I.C;.A. § 50-219. 
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city did not satisfy notice of claim requirement for 
bringing claims for damages against city, as required 
for his breach of contract claims under Idaho law, 
where Idaho law required notice to be filed prior to 
and separate from a civil complaint West's I.C.A. .§§ 
6-906,50-219. 
*1257 Sam Johnson, Johnson & Monteleone, Boise, 
10, for Plaintiff. 
Bruce J. CastJetQ!l, Eric F. Nelson. Kirtlan G. Nilylor, 
Naylor and Hales, Boise, ID, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMIU, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss Plaintiff Douglas Brown's state law claims for 
damages against Defendants. (Dkt, 10). The Court 
heard oral argument on January 26th. For the reasons 
explained below, the Court will grant in part and deny 
in part Defendants' Motion. 
*tl58 BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Douglas Brown was tenninated from his 
position as Deputy Fire Chief and Fire Marshall for 
the City of Caldwell in November 2009. Seeking both 
damages and injunctive relief, Brown has sued the 
City of Caldwell and 1:hree City employees-Fire Chief 
Mark Wendelsdorf, Caldwell Mayor Garret Nanco\as, 
and Caldwell Human Resources Director Monica 
Jones. He alleges claims for wrongful discharge in 
violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act, breach of 
contract and the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and retaliation in violation of his First Amend-
ment rights to freedom of speech and association. 
Brown originally filed this lawsuit in state court 
on March 9, 2010. Before ils removal 10 this Court, the 
City ofCaldweJl moved to dismiss aU of Brown's state 
law claims for damages. De! Motion at 14, Dkl. 4-1. 
The City argued that Brown's failure to comply 'With 
the notice of claim requirement under Idaho Code § 
50-219 deprived the court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion over Brown's state law claims for damages. De! 
Resp. at 13-14, Dkl. 4-10. Brown responded byar-
guing that the notice of claim requirement does not 
appJy to the Idaho Whistleblower Act; but even if it 
did, he satisfied the notice requirement through his 
sending of two separate demand letters. PI. Resp. at 
1-4, Dkt. 4~. 
@ 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 496 
769 F.Supp.2d 1256 
(Cite as: 769 F .Supp.2d 1256) 
On October 21, 2010. the state court judge issued 
an oral order denying the city of Caldwell's Motion to 
Dismiss. Naylor AjJ. Exhibit A. Dkl. l0-3. The state 
judge found that (1) the notice of claim requirement 
applied to Brown's whistleblower claim, and (2) 
Brown's initial Complaint, not his demand letters, 
"adequately provided notice afthe claims" as required 
by Idaho Code § 50-2l2 and the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act.ld. at 34-37. On November 1,2010, Defendants 
removed this action to federal court. De! Removal. 
Dkt. 6-1. Simultaneous with its removal, Defendants 
filed the pending motion to dismiss and/or motion for 
reconsideration. Dkt 10. Defendants renew their ar-
guments to dismiss Brown's state law claims for 
damages.llil Bro",,'Il responds with the same argu-
ments he raised in state court. 
FNl. The parties have agreed that Idaho 
Code § 50-212 applies only to claims for 
damages and therefore does not apply to 
Brown's claims for injunctive relief. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Scope of Idaho Code § 50-219 Notice Require-
ment 
Idaho Code § 50--219 provides, "All claims for 
damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by 
[Idaho Code 9 6-906 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act]." 
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Code § S(}=219 and § 6-906 
of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, a notice of claim for 
damages against a city must be filed with the city clerk 
within 180 days from the date the claim arose or rea-
sonably should have been discovered. whichever is 
later. S,cott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City or 
Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 216rJd 141. 143 (2009).10 
the context of the Idaho Torts Claim Act OTCA), 
which is incorporated by reference into Idaho Code § 
50-219, the Idaho Supreme Court has deemed the 
notice re<l'lirement a "mandatory condition precedent" 
to bringing suit. See. e.g., Banks v. University of 
Idaho. 118 ldaho 601, 798 P.,d 452.453 (1990). 
Defendants argue that Brown's state Jaw claims 
for damages are barred because Brown failed to 
comply with the notice of claim requirement under 
Idaho Code § 50-219, and this failure deprives the 
Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear these 
c1aims.fm 
fN2. Because a court's lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction cannot be waived, United State~ 
v. COl/Oil, 535 U.S. 625.630.122 S.Ct. 1781, 
152 LEd.2d 860 (2002), "and the defense of 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time," United States v, Shaw, 
655 F.2d 168. 171 (9th Cir.\98n. the Court 
remains obligated to address whether subject 
matter jurisdiction exists even though the 
issue was previously decided by the state 
court. 
"1259 Idaho Supreme Court precedent would 
seem to answer this issue. In BeckstefJ.!i the Idaho 
Supreme Court construed the "aU claims" language 
contained in I.C. § 50-219 "to require a claimant to 
file a notice of claim for all damage claims, tort or 
otherwise, as directed by the filing procedure set forth 
in I.C. § 6-906 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act." ill 
P.3d at ]44 (emphasis added). It explained: " "All 
claims for damages" means just that; a1l claims for 
damages, regardless of the theory upon which the 
claim is based," Id. This language suggests that 
Brown's failure to provide notice to the city of his 
damages claims would preclude both his statutory 
whistleblower claim and his "pendent" contract 
claims. 
ill Despite this clear language, however, Brown 
argues that the Idaho Legislature did not intend for 
Idaho Code § 50-219 to apply to either the Whis-
t1eblower Act, or to contract claims brought pendent to 
statutory whistleblower claims. "There is a pro-
nounced line of demarcation between what is said in 
an opinion and what is decided by it," Hash v. U.S .. 
454 F.Su,pp.2d 1066. 1072 (D.ldaho 2006) (quoting 
Bashore v. Molt: 41 Idaho 84. 238 P. 534 (1925). 
Judicial opinions must be construed "in light of the 
rule that they are authoritative only on the facts on 
which they are founded." Idaho Schools (or Equal 
EducatiQnal Opportunill' v. EJ'ons. 1231daho 573. 850 
P.2d 724. 737 (993), Applying this directive, the 
Court agrees that Beckstead does not necessarily an-
swer all the questions at issue here; rather. it is sig-
nificant that Beckstead involved a common law unjust 
enrichment claim while this case involves a statutory 
whistleblower claim. Therefore. before deciding 
whether Beckstead applies, the Court must look to the 
language of the Whistleblower Act, in addition to 
what Idaho Code 50--219 says. 
Idaho's Whistleb10wer Act "seeks to protect the 
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integrity of government by providing a legal ()ause of 
action for public employees who experience adverse 
action from their employer as a result of reporting 
waste and violations of a law. rule or regulation." Van 
v, PortneHfMedical Center. 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 
982, 987 {2009) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). [t provides its own limitation period: 
.. An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter 
may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive 
relief or actuaJ damages, or both, within one hundred 
eighty (180) days after the occurrence of the alleged 
violation of this chapter." Idaho Code § 6-2105(2). 
When considering the meaning of a statute, the 
focus ofthe Court is to determine and give effect to the 
intent of Ihe legislature. Stale v. Yzaguirre. 144 Idaho 
471. 163 P.3d 1183. \187 (2007). The best guide to 
legislative intent is the words of the statute, and the 
language of the statute must be give its plain, obvious. 
and rational meaning. Slate v. Escobar. ) 34 Idaho 387, 
:3 P.3d 65, 67 (200Q2. Typically the plain meaning ora 
statute prevails unless that plain meaning leads to 
absurd results. Ytaguirre. 163 P.3d at 1187. 
ill Here, the Court is presented with two statutes, 
which appear to contain competing directives. IdahQ 
Code 50-219 provides that a notice of claim must be 
filed for all claims against a city within 180 days. 
Wben read alone, this language is clear: a claimant 
must comply with the notice requirement for all 
claims. including whistleblower claims. However, the 
Whistle blower Act, provides its own limitations 
*1160 period, which requires the filing of a civil ac-
tion under the Act within t 80 days. I.e. § 6-21QS{2). 
Both statutes read together would require one seeking 
to file a whistleblower claim against a city to file a 
notice of claim within the same period that the clai-
mant files a complaint. Yel, Defendants have argued, 
and the Court agrees. a claimant must file a notice of 
claim before filing a complaint. Butler v, Elle. 281 
F.3d 1014. 1029 (9th Cir.20021.m1 So while the 
Whistleblower Act says a claimant has 180 days to file 
suit, requiring a claimant to file notice before filing a 
civil action wvuld truncate the express 18(HJay !imi-
tations period contained in the Act. 
FN3. This issue will be covered in further 
detail below in the context of whether 
Brown's filing of a civil complaint satisfies 
the notice of claim provision. 
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This statutory interpretation, Defendants urge, 
serves to "harmonize and reconcile" the two statutes. 
Defendant argue that Brown could have complied 
with the notice requirement by filing a notice "with the 
Caldwell City Clerk within ninety days of his termi-
nation, which is the date his cause of action arose." W! 
Deft.' Reply at 4, Diet 19, Then, according to Defen-
dants, after filing his notice, Brown could have filed 
his whistleblower complaint ninety days later and still 
complied with the statutory lSO-day filing deadline. 
ld. However, this reading of the statutes suggest that 
when the Idaho legislature said that a claimant has 180 
days to file a notice of claim, they really meant 90 
days--at least if the claim is brought under the Whis-
tleblower's Act. 
FN4. Only Idaho Code § 6-906 of the ITCA 
is specifically refereoced in Idaho Code § 
50-219. However, Defendants take the posi-
tion that other sections of the ITCA are in-
corporated into Idaho Code 9 50-219, in-
cluding the requirement that the government 
notify the claimant in writing of its approval 
or denial of the claim within 90 days. L.C....§. 
6-909. If this 90 day period expires without 
notification of approval or denial from the 
government, the claim is assumed denied. Id. 
Only at that point maya claimant file a civil 
action. I.e. § 6=;91Q. The Court assumes. 
without deciding, that Defendants are cor· 
rect, and the Idaho legislature intended to 
incorporate other sections of the lTCA into 
Idaho Code § 50 219 even though they are 
not specifically referenced in the statute. 
The Court does not believe the Idaho legislature 
intended to deprive plaintiffs bringing claims against 
the city of the full 180-<iay limitation period under the 
Whistlehlower Act. [n answering this question, the 
Court is mindful that, when interpreting Idaho law, it 
is bound by decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Arizona Elec. Power CQQP .. Inc. v. Berkeley. 59 F.3g 
988.991 (9th Cir.1925). In the absence of a control-
ling decision, lhis Court must predict how the Idaho 
Supreme Court would decide the question. See id. 
Neither the parties nor the Court have located an 
Idaho case speaking directly to this issue, The chro-
nology of the statutes' enactment, however. supports 
Ihe conclusion that me legislature did not intend Idaho 
Code § 50-219 to apply the Whistleblower Act. The 
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legislature enacted the Whistleblower Act in 1994.27 
years after it enacted Idaho Code § 50-219 in 1967. In 
1967 the legislature could not have contemplated the 
inclusion of whistleblower claims within 9 50-2 J 9's 
scope. Conversely. in 1994 the Legislature was aware 
of Idaho Code §§ 50-J19 and 6-906; yet the Legis-
lature did not address those notice requirements and 
instead embedded the Whistleblower Act with its own 
lSO-day limitations period. Although the legislature 
specifically :included an express limitations period for 
filing whistleblower claims, Defendants essentially 
propose that the Court write out or ignore the express 
180-<18Y filing requirement for city employees. *1261 
The Court can discern no reason why the legislature 
would have intended such a result. 
Two additional factors suggest that the Idaho 
legislature did 001 intend for Idaho Code § 50-219 to 
apply to claims under the WbistlebJower Act: 
First, the Whistleblower Act, like Idaho Code § 
50-219, represents a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity from suit, VIm. 212 P.3d at 987, "and this 
waiver can be made on whatever terms and conditions 
the Idaho legislature chooses," Butler v. Elle, No. 
4;98-CV~46--BLW (D.ldaho March 24, 1999). Un-
der the Whistleblower Act, the legislature has chosen 
to require that public employees seeking to bring 
whistleblower claims against their government em-
ployers file any claim under the Whistleblower Act 
within 180 da~. The legislature did not include any 
additional notice requirement. The Court therefore 
declines to insert an additional ootice requirement 
when the legislature did not. CI, Van. 212 P.3d at 988 
(" ... there is no reason to assume that the Legislature 
intended those alleging claims under the statute to 
have to comply with the notice provision of the IrCA 
where the Legislature did not specifically require it."). 
See also id. at 988. n. 4 (noting a general limitations 
period applies unless the legislature has provided a 
specific limitations period for a specific statutory 
liability). 
Second. the statutory interpretation proffered by 
Defendants creates an arbitrary-and the Court be-
Iieves-unintended distinction between those pur-
suing statutory whisdeblower claims who are city 
employees as opposed to county or state employees. 
Again, the Court can think of no reason why the leg-
islature would have intended such a result when it 
created a special statutory remedy that applies so/ely 
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to public employees, and the statute itself does no1 
distinguish between public employees who work for a 
city, county, or the state. 
Ultimately the most rational application of Idaho 
Code § 50-219 is to exclude whistleblower claims 
from its notice requirements. This Court therefore 
finds that Idaho Code § 50-~ 19 does not apply to 
claims for damages under the Idaho Whistleblower 
Act, and it denies Defendants' motion to dismiss 
Brown's whistleblower claims for failure to comply 
with Idaho Code § 50-219's notice of claim require-
ment. 
ill The Court, however, reaches a different con-
clusion with respect to Idaho Code § 50-219's appli-
cation to Brown's contract claims. Brown argues that 
contract claims, brought pendent to whistleblower 
claims, should not be subject to the notice of claim 
requirement. But Brown fails to explain why or cite 
any authority to back up this assertion. There is 
nothing unique about a common law breach of con-
tract claims, and such claims were certainly in exis-
tence at the time the legislature enacted Idaho Code § 
50-219. The Court fmds no reason why run-or-the 
mill contract claims-whether pendent to a statutory 
whistleblower claim or not-should be excepted from 
Idaho Code § S0--2} 9's notice requirement. Therefore. 
the Court holds that Idaho Code § 50-219 applies to 
Brown's common law breach of contract claims. 
Beckstead. 216 P.3d at 144. 
2. Validity of Brown's Claims Against City Offi-
cials in Tbeir Persoual Capacities 
Defendants argue that Brown's claims against 
Wendelsdorf, Nancolas, and Jones in their personal 
capacities are either subject to the notice of claim 
requirement, or they must be dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) rC'luires 
only "a short and plain statement *1261 of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to rellef;' in order 
to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544. 555. 127 S.Ct 1955. 
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While a complaint attacked 
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need 
detailed fBctual allegations," it must set forth "more 
than labels and conclusions, and a fonnulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 
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555,127 $.0.1955. To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
cepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plaus-
ible on its face." [d. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 
I.!l Here, Brown has failed to allege facts suffi· 
cient to state a plausible claim for relief against 
Wendelsdorf, Nancolas, and Jones in their personal 
capacities. The Idaho Code provides a rebuttable 
presumption that "any act or omission of an employee 
within the time and at the place of Iris employment is 
within the course and scope of his employment and 
without malice or criminal intent" I.C, § 6-903(e). 
Under ldaho Code § 6-903(e) Wendelsdorf. Nancolas, 
8Ild Jones, as employees of the city wbo presumably 
acted within the time and at the place of employment, 
have thus acted within the course and scope of their 
employment, rather than in their personal capacities. 
Brown has not rebutted this presumption. 
Thus, with respect to Brown's whistleblower 
claims and breach of contract against Defendants 
WendeJsdorf, Nancolas, and Jones in their individual 
capacities, the Court grants Defendant's motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Because the Court finds that Brown 
has failed to stale a claim against the individual city 
defendants in their personal capacities, it will not 
address whether such claims are subject to the notice 
of claim requirement. The Court, however, will allow 
Brown leave to amend his complaint. Harris v. Am-
gen, Inc .. 573 F.3d 728, ?3? (9th Cir.20~) (noling 
that a dismissal without leave to amend is improper 
unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not 
be saved by any amendment."). 
3. Sum~len~y of Notice under Idaho Code § 56-219 
Having concluded that Idaho Code § 5Q--219 ap-
plies to Brown's breach of contract claims, the Court 
must consider whether Brown satisfied the statute's 
notice of claim requirement. Brown argues that he 
substantially complied with the notice requirements, 
either through the service of two demand letters, pro-
viding written notice of his whistleblower claim, or, as 
the state district court held, via the service of Brown's 
initial complaint. 
As a threshold matter, Brown argues that tlris 
Court cannot properly determine whether the demand 
letters complied with the notice requirements based 
solely on the pleadings. The Coun agrees that the 
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demand letters lie outside the pleadings and therefore 
cannot be properly considered on a motion to dismiss. 
Edwards 'Ii. Ellsworth, 10 F.SuPO.2d 1131, 1133 
(Dldaho 1997) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 
449,453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 512 V.S. 1219. J 14 
S.C!. 2704, 129 L,Ed.2d 832 (1994)). But federal 
courts have complete discretion to determine whether 
to accept the submission of any material beyond the 
pleadings that is offered in conjunction with It Rule 
12(b)(6) motion and re)yon it, thereby converting the 
motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
56.1d. 
In this case, the Court finds that converting De-
fendants' motion to dismiss to a motioD for summary 
judgment is appropriate. Moreover, it finds that formal 
notice before converting the motion is not re-
quired*t163 because both parties have had a full and 
fair opportunity to ventilate aU issues raised in De· 
fendants' motion. In re Rothery, 143 F.3d 546 (9th 
Cit. 1998}. The Court will therefore consider whether 
the demand letters satisfied the notice of claim re-
quirement. 
ill Here, there is no factual dispute about what 
the demand letters say. Thus, the only question is 
purely legal: whether Brown's demand letters meet the 
applicable notice requirements. The Court finds they 
do not. Under Idaho Code § 50-219 and the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, notice must be (1) in writing; (2) filed 
with the city clerk; (3) submitted within 180 days from 
the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered; and (4) contain statutorily-specified 
information regarding the plaintiffs residence and the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs 
injuries. See also Idaho Code § 6-907. Yet, Brown's 
demand letters do not meet the applicable notice re-
quirements because the letters do not include the sta· 
tutorily-specified information, such as Brown's ad-
dress, the amount of his alleged damages, or the nature 
of Iris damages. More importantly, neither of the let-
ters were addressed to or formally filed with Cald-
well's City clerk. tID Service of the demand letters 
therefore did not satisfy the notice of claim require-
ment. 
FN5. Idaho Supreme Court case law estab-
lishes that the City of Caldwell, through ser-
vice on the city clerk. must bave actual 
knowledge of an impending lawsuit. See e.g. 
Calkins v. City o[Fruitland. 97 Idaho 263. 
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543 P.2d 166 (1975). 
[Q] Nor, as previously indicated in this Court's 
decision, does Brown's initial complaint meet the 
applicable notice requirements. ldabo Code §§ 
~ and 6-906 require that notice be filed prior to 
and separate from the filing of a civil complaint. But-
ler. 281 F.3d at 1029: see also Madsen l'. Idaho Dept. 
giHeolth and We/tare. 116 [daho 758. 779 P.2d 433 
(]daho Ct.App.1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
frequently deemed the notice requirement a "manda-
tory condition precedent" to bringing suit. Banks v. 
Ur,jversilvQfldqho. 118ldaho 607. 798 P.2d452, 453 
U2.2.Q); McQuiJIell v. City o(Arnl11on, 113 Idl!bo 719 .. 
747 P.2d 741. 744 (1987), And, as Defendants point 
out. there is no Idaho case of record where the filing of 
a complaint has been deemed to satisfy the notice 
requirement. To the contrary, in Madsen. the ldaho 
Court of Appeals heLd that a pLaintiff must tile a notice 
with the city clerk before filing a complaint. 747 P.2d 
at 744. And this Court followed Madsen in reaching 
the same conclusion, BUller v. Elle. No. 
4:98~CV-046~BLW (D.ldaho March 24, 1999)-a 
decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, Butler. 281 
F.3d at 1029. A civil complaint cannot act as both the 
notice of a claim and civil lawsuit simultaneously. 
Brown's failure to file notice of bis contract claims 
prior to tiling his complaint dooms those claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that Idaho Code § 50-219'8 no-
tice requirement does not apply to Brown's state law 
claim for damages under the Idaho Whistleblower 
Act. But it does apply to Brown's contract claims for 
damages, and the Court further finds Brown failed to 
give proper notice under the statute. Therefore, the 
Court wi!] dismiss Count Two of Brown's Second 
Amended Complaint. In addition, all cLaims against 
Defendants WendelsdorI: Nancolas, and Jones in their 
individual capacities are dismissed. All other claims 
S\lMve. 
ORDER 
1T JS ORDERED: 
I. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part (Dkt. LO). 
*1264 2. As to the Defendant City of CaLdwell, 
Count Two of Brown's Second Amended Complaint 
is D1SMISSED. All other claims against the City 
Page 7 
survive. 
3. As to all claims against Defendants Wendelsdorf. 
Nancolas, and Jones in their individual capacities. 
the Court grants Defendant'S motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. but with leave to amend. If an amended 
complaint is not filed within 30 days from the date 
of this order. the dismissal will be final and with 
prejudice. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Protective Order (Diet. 
11) is DENIED as moot. 
D.Idaho,2011. 
Brown v. City of Caldwell 
769 F.Supp.2d 1256 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Verska v. Saint A1phonsus Regional Medical Center, - P.3d --- (2011) 
2011 WLS375192 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW 
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, September 2011 Term. 
Joseph M. VERSKA, M.D., and The Spine Institute of Idaho, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D.; and Donald Fox, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 37574-2010.Nov. 9, 2011. 
Synopsis 
Background: Physician and professional corporation that he created filed action against hospital and two medical staff 
members, asserting bad-faith claims conspiracy, interference with economic advantage, and defamation in connection with 
nonrenewal of politician's staff privileges. Physician filed motion to compel discovery of his peer review records, and 
defendants sought protective order. The District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. Deborah A. Bail, I" denied 
motion to compel and granted protective order. The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs a permissive appeal. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court. Eisman-'l, 1., held that: 
I statute making peer review records privileged appJied, by its terms, to present lawsuit, and Iherefore those records were not 
subject to discovery by physician; 
2 the Supreme Court does not have the authority to modifY an unambiguous statute on ground that it is palpably absurd or 
would produce absurd results when construed as written, abrogating State, Department of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 
Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299; Statewide Constr., Inc. v. Piefri, 150 Idaho 423, 247 P.3d 650; and 
3 physician's filing of lawsuit did not waive defendants' right to assert peer review privilege. 
Affirmed. 
J. Jones, J., med a concurring opinion. 
West Headnotes (19) 
Appeal and ErrOI'":';~'Grotlnds for Allowance or Refusal 
30Appeal and Error 
J()VIlTransfcT of Cause 
30VlI(B)Pc:lition or Prayer, Allowance, and Certificate or Affidavit 
30k363Grounds for Allowance or Refusal 
The Supreme Court wau Id grant a permissive appeal to physician from grant of a protective order as to peer review 
records that physician sought to discover in his action asserting claims including defamation and interference with 
economic advantage against hospital and two of its staff members in connection with nonrenewal of physician's 
staff privileges; order of district court involved a matter of first impression, the issues raised were controlHng 
questions of law, an immedia1e appeal would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation, and it would decrease 
-------------- . 
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In accepting or rejecting an appeal by certification, the Supreme Court considers a number of factors ill addition to 
the threshold questions of whether there is a controlling question of law and whether an immediate appeal would 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation; the Supreme Court also considers such factors as the impact of an 
immediate appeal upon the parties, the effect of the deJay of the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal, 
the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district court, and the case 
workload of the appellate courts. Appellate Rule 12. 
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17 Privileged Communications and Confidentiality,-,,'·Waiver 
) II HPrivileged Communications and Confidentiality 
311 HVIIOrher Privileges 
311 1lk419Peer Review Privilege 
31 } H'kt/.22MedicaJ or Health Care Peer Review 
31 I Hk422(2)Waiver 
Physician's tiling of a lawsuit against hospital and two members of its medical staff, asserting claims including 
defamation and interference with economic advantage in connection with nonrenewal of physician's staff privileges, 
did not waive defendants' right to assert peer review privilege as to records that physician sought to discover, 
although physician waived his right to assert the privilege by filing lawsuit. West's I.C.A. § 39-1 392e(t). 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and for Ada County. The Hon. Deborah 
A, Bail, District Judge. 
The order of the diSlrkt court is aifmned. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Raymond D. Powers; Powers Tolman, PLLC; Boise; argued for appellants. 
Brad Fisher; Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP; Seattle, Washington; argued for respondents. 
Opinion 
EISMANN, Justice. 
*/ This is a permissive appeal from an order of the district court holding that the statute making peer review records 
privileged applies. by its terms, to a lawsuit brought against a hospital claiming that the hospital acted in bad faith in refusing 
to renew a physician's privileges. We affirm the order of the district court. 
r. 
Factual Background 
Joseph Verska, M.D., (Physician) is an orthopedic spine surgeon licensed in the State of Idaho. On January 22, 1996, he was 
appointed to the medical staff of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) located in Boise. Thereafter, he was 
continually reappointed through June 30, 2008. 
As required by Idaho law, Hospital caused irs medical staff to organize in-hospitaJ medical staff committees to review the 
professional practices of members of the Hospital's medical staff for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality and for 
the improvement of the care of patients in the hospital. After a series of reviews of Physician's practice initiated in 2004 by 
Hospital and in 2006 and 2007 by its Medical Executive Committee, on July 9, 2008, Physician requested a hearing before a 
Fair Hearing Panel. After an evidentiary hearing in late October 2008, the panel made recommendations, which were rejected 
by Hospital. Since July 1,2008, Physician has not had privileges at Hospital. 
On July 23, 2009, Physician and The Spine Institute of Idaho, a professional corporation created by Physician, (Plaintiffs) 
filed this action against Hospital and physicians Christian O. Zimmerman and Donald Fox (herein collectively called 
"Defendants"). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants conspired to wrongfully harm them, intentionally and/or negligently 
interfered with their economic advantage, interfered with Physician's prospective contractual relations and business 
expectations, defamed them, and intentionally and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon Physician. Plaintiffs also 
alleged that Hospital and Dr. Fox breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that Hospital denied 
Physician fair procedure rights, breached its fiduciary duties, and violated his due process rights. In addition to damages, 
Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Hospital to restore Physician's privileges. 
1 During this litigation, Plaintiffs initiated discovery related to the process, activities, and decisions that led to Hospital's 
decision to deny Physician's application to be reappointed to the medical staff and to have his privileges renewed. Hospital 
objected on the ground that such information was protected by the peer review privilege. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to 
compel discovery, and Defendants sought a motion for a protective order. On February 5, 20ID, the district court entered an 
order denying the motion to compel and granting the protective order. The court determined, "I .C. § 39-1392b 
unambiguously protects aJl peer review records from discovery of any type and bars any testimony about those peer review 
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records." This Court granted Plaintiffs' request for a pennissive appeal of that order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule ]2. 
*22345 We grant such appeals only in the most exceptional cases. Aardema v, Us. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 
789.215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009). The factors we consider are as follows: 
In accepting or rejecting an appeal by certification under I.A. R. 12, this Court considers a number of factors in addition to 
the threshold questions of whether there is a controlling question of law and whether an immediate appeal would advance 
the orderly resolution of the 1i1igation. It was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an interlocutory 
order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved. The Court also 
considers such factors as the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties. the effect of the delay of the proceedings in 
the district court pending the appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the 
district court, and the case workload of the appellate courts. No Single factor is controlling in the Court's decision of 
acceptance or rejection of an appeal by certification. but the Court intends by Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional 
case and does not intend by the rule to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under l.A.R. II. 
Budell Y. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 655 P.2d 70 I, 703 (1983). In this case, the order ofthe district court involved II matter of first 
impression, the issues raised Were controlling questions oflaw, an immediate appeal would advance the orderly resolution of 
the litigation. and it would decrease the likelihood of a second appeal. Because of the nature of an interlocutory appeal, we 
address only the precise question that was presented to and decided by the trial court. Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 50 I, 
777 P.2d 722.723 (1989). 
II. 
Does Idaho Code Section 39-1392b Apply to This Case? 
6 A peer review privilege is created by Idaho Code section 39-1392b, which provides: 
Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be i:onfidential and privileged, and shall 
not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence. nor shall testimony 
relating thereto be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any administrative body, 
agency or person for any putpose whatsoever .... 
It is undisputed that the records sought by Plaintiffs are peer review records. The statute states that "all peer review records 
shall be confidential and privileged." It further provides that such records "shall not be directly or indirectly subject to 
subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence. nor shall testimony relating thereto be admitted in evidence." 
The privilege applies "in any action of any kind in any court." Thus, by its terms, the statute applies to thjs litigation. 
Plaintiffs contend that Hospital is a business; that it developed an in-house entity named the "Spine Medicine Institute of 
Idaho." which competes with Plaintiffs; that Hospital's actions in denying Physician privileges were motivated by the desire 
to remove him as a competitor; and that for public policy reasons the statute therefore should not apply. The statute does not 
create an exception for this type of litigation, and we cannot create such an exception under the rubric of public policy. The 
creation of such an exception is an issue within the province of the legislature. 
*37 The act creating the peer review privilege, I.e, §§ 39-1392 through 39-1392e, was enacted in 1973. Plaintiffs contend 
that the statement of purpose accompanying that legislation indicates that it was intended to apply only to medical 
malpractice actions. The statement of purpose was not er.acted into law. The statutes were. There is no wording in section 
39-1 392b that limits its scope to peer review records sought in a medical malpractice action. In that respect, the legislation is 
unambiguous. 
89 10 11 "The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning. The scope of the legislation can 
be broader than the primary purpose for enacting it" Viking Cansty., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Iry. Disl., 149 Idaho 187, 191-92, 
233 PJd 118, 122-23 (2010). "/fthe statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, 
not judicial." In re Estate alMilIer, 143 Idaho 565. 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). The interpretation ofa statute "must begin 
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with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must 
be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written." State v. Schwartz, 139 Ida.io 360, 362, 79 PJd 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted). "We have consistently held that 
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the 
purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City of Sam Yalley v. Sun Yalley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 
851 P.2d961,963(1993). 
12 Plaintiffs also contend that wording in subsections (a) through (e) of rdaho Code section 39-1392e indicate that the peer 
review statutes were intended only to apply to medical malpractice actions. Those subsections specifically apply in medical 
malpractice actions .1 Subsection (I) clearly is not limited to medical malpractke actions. For example, it applies to "any 
physician .. , whose conduct ... is the subject of investigation ... in the course of ... disciplinary proceeding or investigation of 
the sort contemplated by this act, [who] makes claim or brings suit on account of such health care organization activity." I.C. 
§ 39-1392e(l). Likewise, section 39-1392b, which creates the peer review privilege, is not, by its terms, limited to medical 
malpractice actions. The fact that a portion of a statute has a restricted application does not similarly restrict the entire act of 
wh ich that portion was a part. 
III. 
Does This Court Have the Authority To Modify an Unambiguous Statute If the Result of Applying It As Written is 
Palpably Absurd'! 
13 Plaintiffs quote from Federated Publications, Inc. v. Idaho Business Reviel'>'. Inc., 146 Idaho 207, 210.192 PJd 103[, 
1034 (2008). wherein we stated, "Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court must assume that the legislature meant what 
it wrote in the statute." RelYing upon that quote, they contend, "The literal wording of a statute cannot be honored if it creates 
unreasonable, absurd results .... " They then argue that applying Idaho Code section 39-1392b to bar their access to the peer 
review records would be an absurd result. 
"'if The language upon which Plaintiffs rely had its genesis in S(ale. Department a/ Law En/orcemem v. One 1955 Willys 
Jeep, 100 Idaho ISO, 595 P.2d 299 (1979). That case involved the timing of a hearing in contested asset forfeiture 
proceedings under the Unifonn Controlled Substances Act. A party contesting the asset forfeiture was required to file a 
verified answer. The statute in question stated, "If a verified answer is filed, the forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing 
before the court without a jury on a day not less than thirty (30) days therefrom; and the proceeding shall have priority over 
other civil cases." I.C. § 37-2744(d)(3)(D). 1n Willys Jeep. the party contesting the forfeiture filed a motion to dismiss the 
proceedings, contending that the hearing had not been held within thirty days of the filing of the verified answer as required 
by the statute. The magistrate court denied the motion to dismiss because the clear wording of the statute required the hearing 
to be at least thirty days after the verified answer was tiled, not within ninety days of filing the verified answer. The district 
court reversed, holding that the hearing must be held within thirty days of the filing of the verified answer in spite of the 
statute's literal language, stating that once the verified answer was tiled, the hearing was to be "not less than thirty (30) days 
therefrom." Wil/ys Jeep, 100 Idaho at I 5 I.. 595 P.2d at 300. In revershlg the district court on appeal, this Court stated: 
The most fundamental premise underlying judicial review of the legislature'S enactments is that, unless the result is 
palpably absurd, the courts must assume that the legislature meant what it said. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous 
the expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect. Worley HighwC/)l Diat. v. Kootenai County, 98 Idaho 925,576 
P.2d 206 (1978); Moon v. Investment Board. 97 rdaho 595, 548 P.2d B61 (1976); Herndon v. West, 87 fdaho 335,393 P.2d 
35 (l964). Referring to a virtually identical Arizona statute, the Arizona court stated that the purpose of the statute was to 
provide "the law enforcement agencies with 30 days in which to prepare prosecution of their case." Stale ex ref. Berger v. 
McCarthy, 113 Ariz. 161, 164,548 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1976). Likewise, the Idaho legislature may have intended to provide 
the state with a thirty day period in which to prepare its case. A literal reading of the statute is not necessarily irrational or 
absurd. Therefore, the statute must be interpreted as written. 
Id (footnote omitted). 
The Willys Jeep Court began its analysis by stating, "The most fundamental premise underlying judicial review of the 
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legisJarure's enactments is that, unless the result is palpably absurd, the courts must assume that the legislature meant what it 
said." Id at 153,595 P.2d at 302. It concluded its analysis by stating: "A literal reading of the statute is not necessarily 
irrational or absurd. Therefore, the statute must be interpreted as written." Ed at 154, 595 P.2d at 303. Because there was no 
contention that the statute was ambiguous, the Court was stating that it must interpret an unambiguous statute as written, 
unless the result of doing so is palpably Ilbsurd. The Court did not cite any authority for that stlltement. 
1<.'( None of the three cases cited-Worley Highway District, Moon, and Herndon--support that statement. In Worley 
Highway Districl, we said, " 'This Court has consistently adhered to the primary canon of statutory construction that where 
the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no 
occasion for construction.' " 98 Idaho at 928. 576 P.2d at 209 (quoting Stale v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 349, 362 P.2d 11)75, 
1076-77 (l961».ln Moo", we said. "where 11 statute or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks 
for itself and must be given the interpretation the language clearly implies,' " 97 Idaho at 596,548 P.2d at 862 (quoting State 
v, Jonasson, 78 Idaho 205, 2lO, 299 P.2d 755, 757 (1956». In Herndon, we said: "We must follow the law as written. Ifit is 
socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." 87 Idaho at 339, 393 P.2d at 37. 
In the Wil/ys Jeep case, the Court simply made II misstatement. If this Court were to conclude that an unambiguous statute 
was palpably absurd, how could we construe it to mean something that it did not say? Doing so would simply constitute 
revising the statute, but we do not have the authority to do that, The legislative power is vested in the senate and house of 
representatives, Idaho Const. art, III, § I. not in this Court. As we said in Berry v. Koehler. 84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010, 
1013 (J 962), "The wisdom. justice. policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone." 
We have recited the language from the Wi/Jys Jeep case or similar la'1guage numerous times, usually without even addressing 
whether we considered the unambiguous statute absurd as written. See Slate v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158.244 PJd 1244 
(2010); StateWide Constr., lne. v. Pietri, 150 Idaho 423, 247 P.3d 650 (2011); Viking Conslr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigalion 
Dist., 149 Idaho 187,233 P.3d 118 (2010); Stale v. Pina, 1491daho 140,233 P.3d 71 (2010); Kootenai HoJ'p. Dist. v. Bonner 
County Bd. o/Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 290.233 1>.3d 1212 (2010); Farberv. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 PJd 289 
(2009); Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho BUSiness Review, inc., 146 Idaho 207, 192 PJd 1031 (2008); State Dept. of Health 
and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 PJd 90S (2008); State v. Mlibita, 145 Idaho 925, 188 PJd 867 (2008); State 11. 
Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 187 P.3d 1227 (2008); in 1"6 Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677, 183 PJd 765 (2008); Mattoon v. Blades, 145 
Idaho 634, 181 PJd 1242 (200S): Stale v, Kimball, 145 ldaho 542, 18 I P Jd 468 (2008); State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825, 
172 P.3d 1100 (2007); Stale v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 5 I 0, 164 P.3d 790 (2007); In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 149 PJd 
840 (2006); Kirkland v. Slate, 143 Idaho 544, 149 P.3d 819 (2006); Employers Res. Mgmt. Co, v. Deparlmenl of ins., 143 
IdallO 179, 141 P.3d 1048 (2006); McNeal Y. ldal10 Pub. Uti/so Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 685, J32P.3d 442 (2006); Rahas v. Ver 
Mett, 141 Idaho 412, J II P.3d 97 (2005); Kootenai Med. Or. v, Bonner County Comm 'rr, 141 Idaho 7, J05 P.3d 667 (2004): 
State v. Thompson. 140 Idaho 796, 102 P.3d 1115 (2004); Garza v. Stale, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003); Dye! v. 
McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236 (2003); State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 PJd 719 (2003); Inama v. Boise 
COUrtty ex rei. Bd. o/Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 63 P.3d 450 (2003); State v. Jeppesen. 138 Idaho 71,57 P.3d 782 (2002); 
Ahles v, Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001); Stare v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701,979 P.2d 103 (1999); Srate v, KnOll, 132 
Idaho 476,974 P.2d 1!O5 (1999); Idaho Dep't o/Health and Welfare v. Jackman. 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (J998); City 0/ 
Sun Valley)l, Sun Va{(ey Co., [23 Idaho 665,851 P.2d 961 (1993); In re Application/or Permit No. 36-7200, 121 ldaho 819, 
828 P.2d 848 (1992); Sherwoodv. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 80S P.2d 452 (1991); George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 
118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); In re Miller, 110 Idaho 298,715 P.2d 968 (1986); and Parker v. Wallentine, t03 Idaho 
506,650 P.2d 648 (1982). 
*6 In several cases, we have responded to arguments that the wording of an unambiguous statute would produce an absurd 
result, but we have never agreed with such arguments, See Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Doe, l51 Idaho 300, 256 
P.3d 708 (201 I); Slate v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730 (2009); Sf. luxe:SO Reg'l Med. Clr., lid. v. Board ojComm 'rs, 
146 Idaho 753. 203 P.3d 683 (2009); Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 rdaho 829, 172 P.3d I J 04 (2007); State v. Yzaguirre, 144 
Idaho 471, !63 PJd 1183 (2007); Driver v. Sl Corp .. 139 Idaho 423,80 PJd 1024 (2003); Stale v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 
988 P.2d 685 (I999); and Moses v. Idaho State rax Comm 'n, 118 Idaho 676, 799 P.2d 964 (1990). 
14 15 16 Thus, we have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would 
produce absurd results when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do so. "The public policy of legislative 
enactments cannot be questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy 
so announced." State v. Village a/Garden City. 74 Idaho 513, 525,265 P.2d 328, 334 (1953). Indeed, the contention that we 
could revise an unambiguous starute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results is itself illogical. "A 
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Porter v. Board 0/ Trustees, 
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Preston School Dis!. No. 201. 141 rdaho 11, 14, 105 PJd 671, 674 (2004). An unambiguous statute would have only one 
reasonable interpretation. An alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make it ambiguous. In re Application 
lor Permit No. 36-7200, 121 rdaho 819, 823-24, 828 P.2d 848, 852-53 (1992). If the only reasonable interpretation were 
determined to have an absurd result, what other interpretation would be adopted? It would have to be an unreasonable one. 
We therefore disavow the wording in the Wi/lys Jeep case and similar wording in other cases and decline to address 
Plaintiffs' argument that (daho Code section 39-139Zb is patently absurd when construed as written. 
IV. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 39-1392e(f), Did the Filing or this Lawsuit Waive Defendants' Right to Assert the 
Peer Review Privilege? 
17 Plaintiffs contend that pursuant to Idaho Code section 39-1 J92e(t), the peer review privilege was waived in its entirety by 
the filing of this lawsuit. That statute provides: 
If any physician, emergency medical services personnel, patient, person, organization or entity whose conduct, care, chart, 
behavior, health or standards of ethics or professional practice is the subject of investigation, comment, testimony, 
dispositive order of any kind or other written or verbal utterance or publication or act of any such health care organization 
or any member or committee thereof in the course of research, study, disciplinary proceeding or investigation of the sort 
contemplated by this act, makes claim or brings suit on account of such health care organization activity, then, in the 
defense thereof, confidentiality and privilege shall be deemed waived by the making of such claim, and sueD health care 
organization and the members oftheir staffs and committees shall be allowed to use and resort to such otherwise protected 
information for the purpose of presenting proof of the facts surrounding such matter, and this provision shall apply whether 
such claim be for equitable or legal relief or for intentional or unintentional tort of any kind and whether pressed by a 
patient, physician. emergency medical services personnel, or any other person, but such waiver shall only be effective in 
connection with the disposition or litigation of such claim, and the court shall, in its discretion, enter appropriate orders 
protecting, and as fully as it reasonably can do so, preserving the confidentiality of such materials and information. 
*7 Specifically, Plaintiffs rely upon that portion of the statute providing as follows: 
If any physician ". whose conduct [or) care .,. is the subject of investigation ... makes claim or brblgs suit on account of 
such health care organization activity, then, in the defense, thereof, confidentiality Illtd privUege shall be deemed waived 
bJllhe making Of !iUC" claim, and such health care organization and the members of their staffs and committees shall be 
allowed to use and resort to such otherwise protected information for the purpose of presenting proof of the facts 
surrounding such matter .... (Emphasis theirs.) 
They argue that if the health care organization has the option of using otherwise privileged information when a physician 
brings a claim against if, then the physician bringing the lawsuit should also have that option. 
As stated above, Idaho Code section 39-1 392e(f) applies to this lawsuit. The waiver provision states that when a physician, 
who has been the subject of "investigation of the sort contemplated by this act, makes claim or brings suit on account of such 
health care organization activity, then, in the defense thereof, confidentiality and privilege shall be deemed waived by the 
making of such claim." The key language in this provision is: 
then, in Ihe defense (hereof, confidentiality and privilege shall be deemed waived by the making of such claim, and such 
health care orga/'li~ation and Ihe members of their stajJs and committees shall be allowed to use and resort to :mch 
otherwise protected in/ormatIon for the purpose 0/ presenting proof of 'he facts surrounding such matler .... (Emphasis 
added.) 
18 When determining the plain meaning of a statute, "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that 
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho I3J, 136,63 P.2d 664,666 (1936). If the 
bringing of an action by the physician who was investigated or disciplined waived the peer review privilege of the defendants 
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in that action, then the emphasized words above would be meaningless. In fact, to have the statute so state, it would be 
necessary to delete the emphasized words so that the wording would simply provide that if the physician investigated or 
disciplined "makes claim or brings suit on account of such heahh care organization activity, then confidentiality and privilege 
shall be deemed waived by the making of such claim," 
To give effect to all of the words in the statute when construing it, the physician investigated or disciplined, the health care 
organization, and the members of such organization's staff and committees all have the right to assert the peer review 
privilege, By bringing the lawsuit, the physician waives his or her right to assert the privilege. The health care organization 
a'1d the members of its staff and committees who are defendants in the lawsuit can then elect also to waive the privilege in 
order to defend the lawsuit. The statute further provides that "such waiver shall only be effective in connection with the 
disposition or litigation ofsuch claim. and the court shall, in its discretion, enter appropriate orders protecting, and as fully as 
it reasonably can do so, preserving the confidentiality of such materials and information ." I.e. § 39-1392e(f). By bringing 
the lawsuit, the physician does not waive the privilege for purposes unconnected with the lawsuit, nor does the health care 
organization or the members of its staff and committees do so if they elect to rely upon privileged information in defense of 
the lawsuit. 
*8 Finally, the statute provides that the right of the health care organization or the members of its staff or committees to use 
privileged infonnation in defense of the lawsuit, "shall apply whether such claim be for equitable or legal relief or for 
intentional or unintentional tort of any kind." I,C. § 39-1392e(f), That provision clearly shows that Idaho Code section 
39-1 392e(f) is not limited in its application to medi(:al malpractice actions. 
v. 
Can This Court Address the Scope of Idaho Code Section 39-1392e1 
19 Idaho Code section 39-1392c provides in part, "The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any health care 
organization or the receiving and use of such information and opinions shall not subject any health care organization or other 
person to any liability or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief." Plaintiffs ask us to address the scope of 
that statute, although they admit that the district court did not address it in its decision, 
We granted a permissive appeal only from the district court's "Order Re: Motion To CompellProtective Order" filed on 
February 11,20 I O. That order denied Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery and granted Defendants' motion for a protective 
order regarding that requested discovery. "Because there was not a ruling on that issue by the district court, we will not 
address it on appeaL" Brian and Christie, Inc, v. Leishman flee., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, ~-, 244 P.3d 166. 113 (20! 0). 
VI. 
Conclusion 
We affinn the order of the district court entered on February 1 1,2010, granting Defendants' motion for a protective order and 
denying Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. We award costs on appeal to respondents, 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justice HORTON and Justice Pro Tem TROUT concur. 
1. JONES, Justice, concurring in the result of Part 11, specially concurring in Part Ill, and concurring in Parts IV and V, 
( concur in the result reached by the Court in Part II-that I.C. § 39-1392b applies in this case--but would not necessarily 
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agree that the statute prohibits discovery in all instances where a physician alleges a peer review proceeding is being misused. 
I agree with the Court's conclusion in Part IJl that Lie Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous statute, 
but I do not necessarily believe that the Legislature has the last word with regard to the subject of evidentiary privileges. J 
concur in Part [V and Part V. 
The Court correctly concludes that the privilege contained in I.C. § 39-J392b applies to all types of peer review proceedings, 
including hospital credentialing and disciplinary proceedings. According to r.c. § 39-1392f, peer review includes activities 
of medical staff to improve "the care of patients in Ihe hospital," as well as the "quality and necesslty of care provided to 
patients." Plaintiffs' contention that the privilege only applies to medical malpractice claims is untenable. 
"9 As with any privilege, the peer review privilege must be st:rictly construed and applied. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Jaffee v. Redmond: 
'k'hen we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general 
duty (0 give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, 
being so many derogations from a positive general rule. Exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges 
may be justified, however, by a public good transcending the normarry predominant principle of utilizing all rational 
means for ascertaining truth. 
518 U.S. 1,9, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (quotation marks and cilations omitted). The Court continued, "Our 
cases make clear that an asserted privilege must also 'serv[e1 public ends: .. {d. at II. If the asserted privilege is being 
misused, such as 10 serve some interest not within the public policy ends for which it was intended, the privilege should [Jot 
apply. 
The Legislature made the following public policy statement with respect to the peer review privilege: 
To encourage research, discipline and medical study by certain helillth care organizations for the purposes of reducing 
morbidity and mortality. enforcing and improving the standards of medical practice in the state of Idaho, certain records of 
such health care organizations shall be confidential and privileged as set forth in this chapter. 
I.C. § 39-1392. The Legislature is not the only branch of Idaho's government that has adopted a public policy favoring the 
protection of peer review proceedings from public disclosure in order to facilitate the frank exchange of information. This 
Court has adopted its Own privilege designed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings of in-hospital medical 
committees. Rule 519 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence prevents the disclosure of confidential communications "made in 
connection with a proceeding for research, discipline, or medical study ... for the purpose of reducing morbidity and 
mortality, or improving the standards of medical practice for health care." I.R.E. 519(a)(4). The proceedings at issue in this 
case are clearly within the contemplated coverage of both the legislative enactment and the judicial rule. 
However, like any privilege, the party invoking the privilege must make an initial showing that the proceeding at hand is 
within the intended coverage of the privilege. The person challenging the privilege must then make a credible showing that 
the privilege does not apply. That may be done by showing that the person or entity claiming the privilege does not qualify 
under the lenns of the legislative enactment or judicial rule, but it may also be done by making a credible showing that the 
privilege is being misused. As stated in 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 537 (2011): 
Such statutorily created privilege will be narrowly construed by the courts. In construing the peer-review privilege granted 
to healthcare providers, a court must balance privilege against a plaintiff's right to due process and the judicial need for the 
fair administration of justice. The view has been followed that the broad privilege granted to a hospital by a state's peer 
review law extended to any and all matters related to the peeNeview process pursuant to which a physician's staff 
privileges were revoked, subject to the physician's right to conduct discovery for the limited purpose of investigating the 
committee members' good faith, malice, and reasonable knowledge OT believe in order to carry his burden in opposing 
their qualified immunity. 
"'/0 Public policy dictates that when peer review proceedings are being conducted in good faith, all documents and 
proceedings should be exempt from disclosure. However, if it can be shown by credible evidence by a physician aggrieved 
by the proceeding that it is not being conducted in good faith, such as for anti-competitive objectives, the privilege simply 
does not apply. The privilege is not intended to apply to bad faith proceedings. Rather, as the Legislature has stated in I.C. § 
39-lJ92, it is intended for "the purposes of reducing morbidity and mortality, enforcing and improving the standards of 
medical practice in the State of Idaho." Advancement of anti-competitive practices or other improper agendas does not serve 
. " . 
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such purposes. 
An analogy to the federal act pertaining to peer review, or "professional review actions," is apt. The Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 was enacted for the purpose of "encouraging good faith professional review activities." Pub.L. No. 
99--660, 100 Stat. 3743. The Act is codified beginning at 42 U.S,C. § 11101. The Act provides broad immunity from damage 
claims for persons and entities conducting professional review actions. 42 U,S.c. § IllI1(a). However, in order to obtain 
such immunity, the actions of II professional review body must meet all of the standards specified in 42 U,S,C. § 11112(a). 
That subsection provides: 
(a) In General-For purposes of the protection set forth in (42 U .S.c. § 11111(a) 1, a professional review action must be 
taken-
(I) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care, 
{2} after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, 
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as 
are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and 
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and 
after meeting [specified requirements for notice and hearing]. 
A professional review action shall be presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in 
[42 U.S.C. § 11111 (a) ] unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 
It seems to logically follow that, if a peer review panel's immunity from a damage claim is lost for failure to pursue a peer 
review action in the furtherance of quality health care, the immunity from disclosure of such pant:l's proceedings should also 
be lost for such a failure. Where a proceeding is being conducted, not for the purpose of improving the quality of health care, 
but, rather, for the purpose of eliminating competition, conducting a vendetta, or some other reason not embodied within the 
public policy supporting the privilege, it should be lost. 
Of interest is the fact that the Hospital's Fair Hearing Plan specifically adopts the provisions of the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act. Section 22 of Chapter XU of the Medical Staff Policy &: Plans states: "This fair Hearing Plan will be 
construed, and at all times will be consistent with, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and its implementing 
regulations (HCQ[A), and in the event of a conflict, HCQIA will control." 
* I J J would hold that the Plaintiffs could overcome the privilege with a credibJe showing that the Hospital was using the peer 
review proceedings for an improper purpose, such as the Plaintiffs allege. The problem for Plaintiffs is that they have not 
made a credible showing that such is the case. The Plaintiffs aUege that the peer review proceedings were merely a ruse to 
stifle competition by eliminating Dr. Verska as a competitor against the Hospital's in-house spinal surgery group. Plaintiffs 
have failed to present any credible evidence to support that contention. Nor has it been shown that the Hospital did not 
substantially comply with the standards adopted by the Hospital for its Fair Hearing Plan, specifically the HCQIA 
requirements. 
On the other hand, the record shows that the proceedings were instituted for valid reasons. It would not have been responsible 
for the Hospital to have ignored the fact that Dr. Verska had had his hospital privileges at St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Center curtailed. S1.:bsequent review of the doctor's charts indicated the need for further study. The fact that he had five cases 
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank could not have been properly disregarded by the Hospital. It certainly appears 
that the proceeding was initiated and pursued in "furtherance of quality health care." 
The Plainliffs allege that information was improperly disclosed by at least one peer review panel member involved in the 
proceedings. It is not clear whether the Plaintiffs asserted to the district court that the privilege had been waived by virtue of 
that facD Certainly a party asserting a privilege can waive it by voluntary disclosure, as we have provided in I.R.E. 510: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives 
the privilege if the person or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to 
disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a 
privileged communication. 
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Although LR.E. 510 deals specificaIly with waiver of privileges provided for in the Idaho Rules of Evidence, there is no 
reason why we should not apply it equally to legislatively-created privileges. However, the Plaintiffs have failed to raise this 
particular waiver issue on appeal. Presumably, they can do so on remand. 
Because the Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing that the privilege should not apply in this case, the district 
court correctly ruled with regard to the Plaintiffs' request to conduct discovery and this Court reached the correct conclusion 
in atlinning that holding. 
With regard to Part III of the- opinion, I agree that the Court cannot modify an unambiguous statute. Our job is to determine 
whether a legislatively-created privilege applies in a particular fact situation. However. I would observe that the Court has 
inherent constitutional powers to control court procedures, including the conduct of discovery, and to implement rules 
regarding the admissibility of evidence, including the power to establish privileges in furtherance of public policy objectives. 
Indeed, the Court has established a specific privilege entitled "Hospital, in-hospital medical staff committee and medical 
society privilege." I.R.E. 519. That privilege covers much of the same ground as the legislatively-enacted privilege. Oddly, 
neither party has cited l.R .E. 519 to the Court. Because I.e. § 39-1 392b does not appear to contlict with the Court's rule, 
application of that statute in this proceeding is not inappropriate. 
Idaho Code sections 39-1 392e(a)-(e), with the provisions upon which Plaintiffs rely highlighted, provide as follows: 
(a) In the event efa claim or civil action against a physician, emergency medical services personnel, a hospital or a skilled 
nursing facility arising out of a particular physician-patient. emergency medical services personnel-patient, hospital-patient 
relationship, or skilled nursing facility-patient, or which COncernS the sufficiency of the delivery of particular health care to Ii 
specific patient, any health care organization having information of the kind covered by section 39-1392b, Idaho Code, shall, 
when interrogated as hereinafter provided. advise any such claimant who is or was such a patient or who, in a 
representative capacity, acts on behalf of such patient or his heirs, as follows: 
(I) Whether it has conducted or has in progress an inquiry, proceeding Dr disciplinary matter regarding the quality or 
propriety of the health care involved, which concerns the subject patient while he was under the care or responsibility of a 
member of such health care organization or while he was a patient in such hospital or facility; and, if so, 
(2) Whether disposition of any kind resulted or will result therefrom: lind, ifso. 
(3) What the disposition was, or, jf nol yet detennined, approximately when it will be detennined. 
Such disclosure oi information shall be limited to the health care organization's actions in connection with the physician, 
emergency medical services personnel, hospital or skilled nursing facility against whom such claim is asserted. 
(b) Such a claimant shall likewise be entitled to inquire of such health care organization respecting the nat11es and addresses 
of persons who such health care organization knows to have direci knowledge of the provision oflhe health care in questior., 
such inquiry to be limited, however, to the particular patient and the particular times and occasions germane to the specific 
occurrences on which the claim is based; provided, names shall not he disclosed respecting persons who have gained 
secondary knowledge or formed opinions respecting the matter solely by participating as witnesses, officials, investigators or 
orherwise on, for, or in connection with such a health care organization committee, staff. governing board or the state board 
of medicine. 
(0) Such limited, conditional discovery and disclosure of information as provided above shall be allowed only in response to 
inquiries directed to such a health care organization, and then only if initially propounded by a claimant of the type above 
described. If the matter is in litigation, inquiry may be by custcmary means of discovery under t1e Idaho roles of civil 
procedure, or, if pending in a United States court, then under discovery as allowed by its applicable rules; provided, 
pendency oCthe claim in the United States court or before any other tribunal shall not operate to broaden the exception to the 
rules of privilege, confidentiality and immunity set down in this acl. 
(d) Such disclosures may be vo!untarily made without judicial order or formal discovery if all disciplined. accused or 
investigated physicians or emergency medical services personnel consent thereto, and if privileged or confidenlial 
information regarding any other patient, physician, emergency medical services personnel, or person will not be disclosed 
thereby. When the terms of this paragraph are complied with, such VOluntary disclosures may be made without civilliaoility 
therefor as if in due response to valid judicial process or order. 
(e) (f any claimant makes such inquiry of any such health care organization, he shall be deemed to have consented to like 
inquiry and disclosure rights for the benefit of all parties against whom he asserts such <:Iaim or brings such suit or 
action, and all other persons who are parties \0 such aclion, and thereafter all such persons and parties may invoke the 
provisions of this section, seeking and seCuring specific information as herein provided for the benefit of such claimant, to 
the same extent as the same is allowed to such claimant. 
2 Plaintiffs do claim on appeal I hat the privilege was waiVed, but their argument is premised upon I.C. § 39-IJ92b(f). The Court 
correctly disposes of that contention in Part IV of the Opinion. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
CITY OF MCCALL, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES 
For Plaintiff: Steven J. Millemann of Millemeann, Pittenger. McMahan & 
Pemberton, LLP 
For Defendant: Christopher H. Meyer of Givens Pursley, LLP 
PROCEEDINGS 
This Memorandum Decision addresses cross Motions for Summary Judgment on 
all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. 
BACKGROUND 
This is an inverse condemnation/takings case, The following facts are undisputed 
24 by the parties, 
25 On February 23, 2006, the City of McCall, hereinafter referred to as "the City" 
26 passed Ordinance 819, Which required developers of residential subdivisions to set 
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aside 20% of their planned units for "community housing", that is, restricted housing for 
2 low-income residents. An applicant could satisfy the ordinance by (1) constructing the 
3 community housing units on-site (2) constructing or converting units for community 
4 housing off-site (3) donating sufficient land to the City to construct the quota units of 
5 community housing or (4) pay an in-lieu fee to the City (or a combination thereof). 






On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as Alpine, filed their 
applications with the Planning and Zoning Commission seeking to develop a mixed use 
residential and commercial property (The "Alpine Village"). In order to comply with 
Ordinance 819, Alpine proposed to convert sixteen (16) mobile home spots on real 
property they already owned for community housing and construct another 6 units for 
12 
13 community housing onsite at Aspen Village. On October 3, 2006, The Planning and 
14 Zoning Commission preliminarily approved Alpine's applications with the condition that 
15 Alpine revise their community housing plan to provide for fourteen(14) off-site units, 






Meanwhile, Mountain Center Board of Realtors, Inc. had filed an action against 
the City of McCall in Valley County Case No. 2006-490-C, seeking the Court there to 
declare, inter alia, Ordinance 819 as facially unconstitutional (the "MCBR litigation"). 
On March 12, 2007, Alpine presented a revised community housing plan to the 
City Council wherein Alpine would elect to provide the off-site units by purchasing a 17-
22 
23 unit apartment complex known as "The Timbers" and converting the units into 
24 community housing condominiums. The McCall City Council approved the revised plan 
25 on March 22, 2007, Alpine closed on the purchase of The Timbers on April 16,2007, 
26 
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and the parties entered into a Development Agreement with Alpine for Alpine Village on 
2 
December 13, 2007. Specifically, Section 7.1 of the Development Agreement provided, 









Alpine Village's approved Community Housing Plan is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "S". Alpine Village waives and releases the City from any claims 
whatsoever regarding or stemming from the pending litigation between the 
Mountain Central Board of Realtors and the City (i.e. Mountain Central Board of 
Realtors, et al v. City of McCall, et al. Valley County Case Number CV-2006-490-
C) as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this Plan prior to 
the final disposition of such litigation. The Plan will be reviewed and modified, as 
necessary, to comply with the final disposition of the litigation as to any 
Community Housing Units which have not been sold prior to the final disposition 
of the litigation. 
On February 19, 2007, Fourth District Judge Thomas Neville ruled in the MCBR 
litigation that Ordinance 819, McCall City Code § 9.7.10., was an unconstitutional tax. 
12 Subsequent to that decision, the City entered into the First Amendment to Development 
13 
Agreement on July 24. 2008, wherein the City deleted Article VII of the original 
14 
development agreement and lifted the restrictions that Ordinance 819 had imposed 
15 
upon Alpine's property at Alpine Village. The City further lifted the community housing 
16 
restrictions on Alpine's property at The Timbers on May 21, 2009. 
17 
18 On November 15, 2010, Alpine sent a written demand letter to the City seeking 
19 payment of damages it had incurred in purchasing The Timbers in order to comply with 
20 now invalidated Ordinance 819. The City did not respond to Alpine's demand, and 
21 Alpine commenced suit against the City in this case on December 10, 2010. The City 
22 then removed this matter to federal court and sought dismissal of Alpine's claims. The 
23 
U.S. District Court remanded the action to this Court, on August, 2011, stating that 
24 
Alpine's federal claims were not yet ripe for determination, and as such, that the U.S. 
25 
District court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. 
26 
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After remand, the City filed a motion for summary judgment on September 19, 
2 2011, for all of Alpine's claims, contending (1) that Alpine's inverse condemnation claim 
3 was barred by I.C. § 50-219, I.C. § 6~906, and I.C. § 6-908, because Alpine did not file a 
4 timely notice of claim with the City within the 180·day timeline prescribed by I.C. § 6-
5 906; (2) that Alpine's inverse condemnation claim is barred by the four-year statute of 
6 limitation; (3) that Alpine's decision to purchase The Timbers was voluntary, thus 






barred by a two-year statute of limitations; (5) that Alpine's claims are barred by the 
Release in the Development Agreement; and finally (6) that Alpine's claims are barred 
by laches. 
Alpine, in their cross Motion for Summary Judgment, contends (1) that the City's 
13 imposition of Ordinance 819 on Alpine constituted a taking or inverse condemnation 
14 under Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and, if relief is denied under the 
15 state constitutional claim, then a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment to the 
16 United States Constitution has occurred; (2) that Alpine's inverse condemnation claim 
17 was timely under the four-year statute of limitation; (3) that Alpine's inverse 
18 
condemnation claim was not barred by Idaho Code § 50-219; (4) that Alpine's federal 
19 
claims were timely under the applicable statute of limitations; and (5) that the City's 
20 





STANDARD OF REVIEW 
24 Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
25 admiSSions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
26 
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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
2 matter of law." LR.e.p.56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial 
3 court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all 
4 reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's 
5 Ass'n. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343,346,796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The 
6 motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if 
7 reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963, 
B 
793 P.2d 195 (1990). 
9 
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
10 
rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527. 531, 
11 
12 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who 
13 resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court 
14 1' the exis1ence of controverted material facts thai require resolution at trial. Sparks v. st 
15 I Luke's Reg'/ Meci. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988). The 
16 resisting party may not rely on his pleadings or merely assert the existence of facts 
17 which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those facts 
18 
by deposition, affidavit. or otherwise. rd.; I.R.C.P. 56(e). Supporting and opposing 
19 
affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth such facts as would 
20 
be admissible in evidence. I.R.C.P.56(e). 
21 
22 
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
23 withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 
24 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat 
25 summary judgment when the Plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
26 
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existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of 
1 
2 proof at trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425,426,816 P.2d 982, 983 (1991), 
3 
4 DISCUSSION 
5 The Court will first address the notice of tort claim and statute of limitation issues 
6 before the Court. 
7 1. Application of I.C. § 50-219 to Alpine's State Inverse Condemnation Claim 
8 
I.C. § 50-219 provides that "All claims for damages against a city must be filed as 
9 
prescribed by chapter 9. title 6, Idaho Code." Idaho courts have interpreted this 
10 
provision to apply to all damages claims against cities. Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 
11 
12 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). Specifically preempted from this requirement, 
13 however, are federal claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 572-573. 31-32. 
14 Neither party has contended that I.C. § 50-219 applies to Alpine's §1983 claim or 
15 federal takings claim. In line with Sweitzer and the issues presented by the parties, the 
16 Court only considers the application of I.C. § 50-219 as to Alpine's state law inverse 
11 condemnation claim. Alpine concedes that I.C. § 50-219 applies to Alpine's state claim 
18 




The City argues that I.C. § 50-219 does bar the inverse condemnation claim, 
because it implicitly references I.C. §§ 6-906 and 6-90S. The City then cites two cases 
which interpret I.C. § 6-908 to be jurisdictional. In other words, failure to comply with 
22 
23 the notice of claim requirements therein is fatal to the claim, and the Court lacks any 
24 jurisdiction to further hear the claim. 
25 
26 
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Alpine argues that, while it did not timely file a notice of claim pursuant to I.C. § 
2 50-219 and I.C. § 6-906, Alpine asserts that I.C. § 6-908, as a jurisdictional requirement, 
3 does not apply to I.C. § 50-219 and that it is excused from compliance for constitutional 








under I.C. § 50-219, Alpine would be deprived of its right to Equal Protection, as the City 
has not enforced the notice of claim requirement on other claimants arising out of the 
MCBR decision. Finally, Alpine argues that the City should be estopped from asserting 
the 180-day notice of claim requirement as a bar to Alpine's claim. 
I.C. § 6-906 requires, in part, that all claims shall be presented to and filed with 
the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is 
12 
13 later. Furthermore, I.e. § 6-908 provides that no claim or action shall be allowed 
14 against a governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented and 
15 filed within the time limits prescribed by the ITCA. 
16 The explicit language of I.C. § 50-219 states that the manner of filing claims for 
17 damages against cities are "as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code." The plain 
18 




provisions in the Idaho Tort Claims Act, not just §6-90B. are to apply generally to claims 
under I.C. § 50-219. The courts in Idaho have also previously applied other provisions 
of the Idaho Tort Claims Act through I.C. § 50-219, e.g., Magnuson Properties 
22. 
23 Partnership v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 138 Idaho 66,169, 59 P.3d 971, 974 (2002) 
24 (stating that the ITCA. I.C. § 6-901 applied to I.C. §50-219 claim). In that case, the 
25 court there affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs damage claims against 
26 
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that Plaintiff because that Plaintiff had not complied w~th the notice requirements of I.C. 
2 § 50-219 and I.C. § 6-906. fd. at 170, 975. In that holding, the court there reasoned 
3 that, "Compliance with the notice requirement is a "mandatory condition precedent to 
4 bringing suit [against a city], the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how 
5 legitimate." Id. at 169·170,974-975. 
6 Alpine further argues in their reply brief that Sweitzer v. Dean stands for the 





that because I.C. § 50-219 referenced the tort claims act, then I.C. § 50-219 only 
governed tort claims against the City. Id. Rather than limit the application of the ITCA, 
the court in Sweitzer essentially held that the requirements/scope of I.C. § 50-219 was 












The plain meaning of the language contained in I.e. § 50-219 
clearly demonstrates that the legislature's intent was to incorporate the 
notice requirements contained in chapter 9, title 6 so as to make the filing 
procedures for all claims against a municipality uniform, standard and 
consistent. 
To hold that I.C. § 6-908 does not apply to claims filed against municipalities and 
that I.C. § 50-219 is merely procedural would create numerous case by case exceptions 
for untimely notices like the case argued by Alpine here. Alpine's position cuts against 
the legislature's intent to make the filing procedures for all claims against municipalities 
22 
23 
unifollTl, standard and consistent. Nor does Alpine's citation of the Verska v. Saint 
24 Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 2011 WL 5375192 (Idaho Sup. Ct. Nov 9, 2011) 
25 
26 
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support its position, as the Court's ruling follows the text of I.C. § 50-219. As such. the 
2 Court will decline to address Alpine's arguments on equal protection and estoppel. 
3 The 180 day period begins to run from "the date the claim arose or reasonably 
4 should have been discovered. whichever is later." I.C. § 6-906. The parties have not 
5 explicitly asserted which date should apply for purposes of starting the timeline under 
6 the ITCA. The parties have also not disputed that the November 15, 2010 demand 
7 letter is arguably the earliest notice that was given under I.C. § 6-906. Accordingly, for 
8 
the November 15, 2010 demand letter to be timely, the claim must have arisen or 
9 
reasonably should have been discovered no later than on or about May 19, 2010. 
10 
11 
Alpine contends, for purposes of statute of limitations on the state law claim that 
the cause of action accrued on December 13. 2007, when they entered into the 
12 
13 Development Agreement with the City. Based upon the record before the Court, 
14 Alpine's claim arose and reasonably should have been discovered no later than 
15 December 13, 2007. 
16 Alpine has not shown to the Court any specific statutory provision that would 
17 exempt their state law claim from the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
18 
Therefore, the Court finds that Alpine's failure to timely comply with the notice 
19 
requirements of I.C. § 50-219, I.C. § 6-906, and I.C. § 6-908 bars Alpine's state law 
20 
claim of inverse condemnation. The Court further declines to address the statute of 
21 
limitations issues on the substantive merits of state law claim as those inquiries are 
22 
23 rendered moot. 
24 Accordingly. the Court GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment as 10 
25 Alpine's Second Claim for Relief and DENIES Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment 
26 
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as to Alpine's Second Claim for Relief. 
2 2. Statute of Limitations Issues on Remaining Federal Claims 
3 Federal law dictates which statute of limitations are applicable to federal claims 
4 and section 1983 claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-








The City contends in their Motion for Summary Judgment that both Alpine's 
remaining federal claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in I.e. § 5-
219(4), that the statute began to accrue no later than December 13, 2007, and that 
Alpine's remaining claims are therefore time-barred. 
Alpine responds by stating that while the section 1983 action is subject to I.C. § 
5-219(4), the direct takings claim under the U.S. Constitution is subject to the four-year 
13 statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-224. Moreover, Alpine contends that even if the two-
14 year period applies to both, both claims are timely. In support of this argument, Alpine 
15 cites Leva/d, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert. 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993), which 
16 provides that "a Plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 action in federal court until the 
17 state denies just compensation. A claim under section 1983 is not ripe-and a cause of 
18 





Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hil" which held that in order for a § 
1983 claim to be ripe, and thus for the statute of limitations to run, the state remedies 
requirement of Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of 
23 Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985) must be met. 353 F.3d 651, 655-
24 658 (9th Cir. 2003). The parties seem to agree that the first requirement of Williamson 
25 for ripeness has been met. The second issue is the application of the second 
26 





requirement of Williamson. which held that a taking is not complete until compensation 
for a deprivation has been sought and denied. Id. (citing Williamson, supra). Therefore, 
the second prong of the Williamson County ripeness analysis requires the petitioners to 
seek state remedies unless doing so would be futile. Id. As a result, Alpine claims that. 
5 because this instant action is pending on their state inverse condemnation claim, 
6 Alpine's federal claims will not ripen unless and until this Court denies relief on the state 
7 
inverse condemnation, and thus, the statute of limitations has not even begun to run. 
8 
The City, anticipating Alpine's point, argues that Levald and Hacienda only apply 
9 






County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), which held that Williamson did not bar a 
section 1983 takings claim from being presented simultaneously with a state law inverse 
condemnation claim in state court. The City reasons under San Remo that if a section 
1983 claim is allowed to be brought in state court, it must be ripe for review, and 
15 therefore, the statute of limitations must have been running and started running at the 
16 same time as the state law inverse condemnation claim. 
17 
Alpine, in their reply brief, cites BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise for the 
18 






Court from hearing Alpine's federal claims. Alpine is correct to the extent that I.C. § 50-
219, in itself, does not bar the federal claims. However, the court in BHA did not 
discuss or consider the application of I.C. § 5-219(4). The holding in BHA was limited to 
the direct effect of I.C. § 50-219 on federal claims, and does give any guidance on the 
24 statute of limitations issue. 
25 
26 
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While the Idaho Supreme Court has espoused that a Plaintiff may bring a direct 
2 action for a taking under the 5th Amendment in addition to a section 1983 action, it did 
3 so in the context of whether the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act barred 
4 a Plaintiff's federal claims after the Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim under the 
5 . Idaho constitution was barred (which issue the parties here do not contest). BHA 
6 Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168. 175 n.2, 108 P.3d 315. 322 n.2. 





section 1983 action and a direct takings action under the same statute of limitations and 
resulting rules. 353 F.3d at 654-658. Accordingly, the Court finds that the two-year 
statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) applies to both Alpine's Third Cause of Action 
and the remaining federal constitutional claim under Alpine's First Cause of Action. 
12 
13 Alpine in this case is claiming that their challenge is a facial challenge however 
14 the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that this is an as-applied challenge. This 
15 was an action worked out between the Alpine and the City providing for the restriction of 
16 housing on two pieces of property. Moreover, the first requirement of Williamson 






property, not an erstwhile judicial decision generally declaring an ordinance 
unconstitutional on other grounds. The Court finds that the case brought before it is an 
as-applied takings challenge and thus subject to the first prong of Williamson County. 
The Court will find that the precedent set forth in Williamson County and as 
23 adopted in KMST, is applicable to the facts of this case. Williamson County dealt with 
24 the failure to seek a variance and the court ruled that the case was not ripe for that 
25 reason. In this case, Alpine failed to coniest the Development Agreement. In this case, 
26 
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Alpine was required to raise their objections with the local government in a timely and 
2 meaningful way in order to set up their claim that the exaction was involuntary. Alpine 
3 did not lodge an objection with the City over its denial of converting Alpine's motor home 
4 lots to community housing. In this case, Alpine proposed. executed and carried out a 
5 development agreement. Thus, the Court will find there is no final decision as spelled 
6 out in Williamson County. Wjfliamson Counfy went on to hold that where a regulatory 
7 taking is alleged against the state or local government agency, the property owner must 
8 






before litigating the federal claim. In this case, Alpine failed to seek judicial review of 
the dedsion by the City. The only process that Alpine can point to is where it sought 
release of the housing restrictions on the Timbers Property, which the City granted. 
From the Court's review of Williamson County, this is a strict requirement for a federal 
14 takings claim. Alpine has failed to complete this two-step procedure and therefore their 
15 federal claims are barred as unripe. 
16 Because the City released the restrictions from Alpine's property and because 
17 Alpine's state law remedies are barred by I.C. § 50-219, Alpine never exercised and will 
18 





result, Alpine's federal claims will never ripen in this case. See generalfy Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Is/and, 337 F,3d 87 (1 st Cir. 2003). 
Even if the Court were to find that the challenge before it is a facial challenge and 
23 not subject to the first requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, Alpine's claim 
24 ripened no later than on or around June 11, 2008 and is thus time-barred by I.C. § 5-
25 '219(4). 
26 
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2 
The Court admittedly notes that, in general, the paired holdings in San Remo and 
Williamson create a procedural nightmare when considering the accrual of federal 
3 takings causes of action for statute of limitations purposes in state courts. However, 
4 I the Court has found no controlling legal authority for the City's argument that the 
5 principles in LevaJd and Hacienda are inapplicable and is constrained by those cases to 
6 hold that I.C. § 5-219(4) does not begin to run until Alpine seeks state remedies and is 





Nevertheless, the undisputed facts of this particular case do not support Alpine's 
assertion that the statute has not yet begun to run. As discussed above, Alpine did not 
file a timely notice of claim with the City within 180 days after its state inverse 
12 condemnation claim arose on December 13, 2007. That failUre barred Alpine's Second 
13 Claim for Relief and, more importantly, deprived this Court of any jurisdiction to hear 
14 and grant relief for Alpine's state remedies. As a result, I.C. § 50-219, I.C. § 6-906, and 
15 I.C. § 6-908 functioned as the state's denial of compensation or made Alpine's future 
16 efforts to obtain compensation under state remedies futile. By operation of those 
17 statutes, the bar on Alpine's state claims went into effect 181 judicial days after 
18 
December 13, 2007, that is, on or around June 11, 2008. Thus, the Court finds that 
19 
Alpine's remaining federal claims ripened and that I.C. § 5-219(4} began to run on or 
20 
around June 11, 2008. 
21 
22 
In order for Alpine's remaining federal claims to be timely filed, Alpine must have 
23 commenced their action no later than on or around June 11,2010. I.e. § 5-219(4). It is 
24 undisputed and the record reflects that this action was not commenced until December 
25 10, 2010. Alpine's remaining federal claims are therefore untimely filed and barred by 
26 





I.C. § 5-219(4). As such, the Court declines to address the further arguments and 
issues on Alpine's First and Third Claims for relief. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
4 Alpine's First and Third Claims for Relief and DENIES Alpine's Motion for Summary 























The Court GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of 
Plaintiffs' claims for relief and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to all 
of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. Counsel for the Defendant shall prepare a judgment 
dismisSing the case with prejudice and setting forth the IRep Rule 54 (b) certification. 
DATED this -.L£ day of December, 201~~. _ 
MiCHAELMCLAUGHU 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2010-S19C 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and, following briefing 
and oral argument, this Court having granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denied the Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment in its Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's 





NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff on all 
counts of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint; and 
2. That all ofPlaintifi"s claims against the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice . 
....--
DATED this 2- day of 
MICHAEL R. MCLAU 
District Court Judge 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in 
accordance with Rule 54(b), l.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this -.f.... day of h ,20 t 2-, 
./// / //.~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
an Idaho Corporation. 
CASE NO. CV·2010-519C 
Plaintiff! Appellant, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
Filing Fee: $86.00 
CITY OF MCCALL, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant/Res ondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF MCCALL AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEYS, CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER, OF OrVENS PURSLEY LLP, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
ORIGINAL 
NOT1CE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1 538 
1. The above named Appellant, Alpine Village Company, appeals against the above· 
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 16th 
day of Decernber, 201 ], and the Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 12th day of 
January, 2012, by the Honorable Judge Michael McLaughlin presiding. 
2. Appellant Alpine Village Company has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court,. and the Decision- and Judgment described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 ] (a)( 1), tA.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement ofIssues on Appeal: 
(a) Whether the District court erred as a matter oflaw in granting Respondent 
City of McCall's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(b) Whether the District court erred as a matter of law in denying Appellant 
Alpine Village Company's Motion for Summary Judgment; and, 
(c) Whether Appellant Alpine Village Company is entitled to an award of 
attorneys fees on appeal. 
4. An order sealing the record has not been entered. 
5. A Reporter's Transcript of the hearing conducted by the District Court on November 
17,2011 on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment in both hard copy and electronic 
fonnat is requested_ 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.: 
(a) City's Motion for Summary Judgment., dated September 16, 2010; 
(b) City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
September 16, 2010; 
(c) Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated September 16, 2010; 
(d) Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson In Support of Motion for Swnmary 
Judgment, dated October 4, 2011 : 
(e) Exhibits A, B, and C to Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson, dated October 
4,2011 ; 
(f) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 7, 2011; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 2 
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(g) Memorandum in Support of Alpine Village Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
October 7, 2011; 
(h) Affidavit of Deanna Schnider, dated October 7, 2011, together with exhibits 
1 and 2 thereto; 
(i) Affidavit of Steven J. Millemann dated October 7, 20] 1, together \\lith 
Exhibits 1-29 thereto; 
0) Atlidavit of William F. Nichols in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated October 25, 2010, together with Exhibits A and B thereto; 
(k) City's Reply Briefin Support ofIts Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Response Brief in Opposition to Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 26,2011; 
(1) Alpine Village's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Detendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated November 14, 
2011 ; 
(m) (Defendant's) Notice of Supplemental Authority, dated November 15,2011; 
and, 
(n) Plaintiff's Notice ofSuppJemental Authority, dated November 16,2011. 
7. The appellant requests the following docmnents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and set to the Supreme Court-none. 
8. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Mia J. Martorelli, CSR #750 
Ada County Courthouse, Administration Department 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(b)(1) that the Clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c)(l) that the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)( 1) that the appellate filing fee has been paid 
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(e) that service has been made on aU parties required to be served pursuant to 
tA.R. 20 
DATED this 12th day ofJanuary, 2012. 
MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN & 
PEMBERTON, LLP 
BY: ~~.-!.~~:E!:.=======:---­
N J. MILLEMANN 
eys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing Notice of Appeal addressed to the follo\\-ing in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Respondent City of McCall 
Mia J. MartoreJli, CSR #750 
Ada County Courthouse, Administration Department 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 4 
MILLEMANN. PITTENGER, McMAHAN & 
PEMBERTON, LLP 
J. MILLEMANN 
Atto eys for Plaintiff! Appellant 
---- .-------------------------
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Ja.n.18. 2012 12:04PM No. 1034 P. 2 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, CLERK 
By D PERRY Deputy 
JAN 18 2012 
CaseNO' ___ ~-Inst No.~_ 
Filed A.M tot : 3, q ;; 
STEVEN J. MlLLEMANN. 1SB NO. 2601 
GREGORY C. PIITENGER, ISB NO. 1828 
MlLLEMANN. PITTENGER, McMAHA..""1 & PEMBERTON, LLP 
AITORNEYS AT LAW' 
706 NORTH FIRST STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 1066 
McCALL, IDAHO 83638 
TELEPHONE: (208) 634~7641 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDA1:l0; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, CASE NO. CV-10IO-519C 
an Idaho COIpoxation. 
AMEND:ED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiffl Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF MCCALL, 
a municipal COrporatiODt 
Tcr. THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF MCCALL AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEYS, CHRISTOPHER .H. :MEYER,. OF GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, AND mE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY OlVEN THAT: 
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.Jan.l8. 201212:04PM No. 1034 P. 3 
1. The above-named Appellant. Alpine Village Company, appeals against the above-
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, entered in the above-enutled action Ob. the 16!h 
day of December. 2011, and the Judgment entered in the above -entitled action on the 1211\ day of 
January, 2012. by the Honorable Judge Michael McLaughlin presiding. 
2. Appellant Alpine Village Company has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, and the Decision and Judgment described in paragraph 1 above arc appealable orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l), tA.R. 
3. Pre1iminazy Statement of lssues on Appeal: 
(a) \Vhether the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting Respondent 
City of McCall's Motion for Sum.mary Judgment; 
(b) Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in denying Appellant 
Alpine Village Company's Motion for S\lI11lllary Judgment; and. 
( c) Whether Appellant Alpine Village Company is entitled to an award of 
attorneys fees on appeal. 
4. An order sea1ing the record has not been entered. 
5. A Reporter's Transcript of the hearing conducted by the Distriot Court on November 
17> 2011 On the pllIties' Cross Motions fot Summary Judgment :in both hard copy and electronic 
format is requested. 
6. The Appellant ~uests the follovring documems to be included in the Clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically inclUded under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) City's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated September 16, 201 I; 
(h) City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summazy Judgment, dated 
September 16, 2011; 
(c) Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt ill Support of Motion for Sumxnary 
Judgment, dated Septembel16) 20ll; 
(d) Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson In Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. dated October 4. 2011; 
(e) Exhibits A, B. and C to Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson, dated October 
4,2011; 
(f) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. dated October 7,2011; 
AMENDED NOTICl OF APPEAL-l 
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Jan. 18. 2012 12:04PM No. '034 P. 4 
(g) Memorandum in Support of Alpine Village Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dated October 7. 2011; 
(h) Affidavit of Deanna Schrrider, dated October 1. 2011. together with Exhibits 
1 and 2 thereto; 
(1) AffidaVIt of Steven J. Millemann dated October 7.2011, together with 
Exhibics 1-29 thereto; 
G) Affidavit of William F. Nichols in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated October 25, 2011 together with Exhibits A and B thereto; 
(k) City's Reply Bridin Support of Its Motion for Sununary Judgment and 
Response Brlefin Opposition to Alpine's Motion for Sununary Judgment, dated October 
26,2011, 
(1) Alpine Village's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment aDd in Opposition. to Defendant's Motion for Summat)' Judgment, dated 
November 14,2011; 
(m) (Defendant's) Notice of Supplemeh1al Authority, dated November 15, 2011; 
and, 
(n) Plaintiff's Notice of Supplemental Authority, dated November 16,2011. 
7 The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as Exhibits to be copied and set to the Supreme Court: None. 
8. 1 certify: 
(a) that a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript bas been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Mia J. Martwelli. CSR #750 
Ada County Courthouse, Administration Department 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(b )(1) that the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
(c)(l) that the estimated fee for the preparation of the Cleric's record has been paid; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - J 
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(d)(l) that the appellate filing fee has been paid; and. 
(e) that service has been made on all parties required to bo served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2012. 




eys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day ofJanuary, 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Notice of Appeal addressed to the following in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 8370]·2720 
Attorneys for Respondent City of McCall 
Mia 1. Martorelli, CSR #750 
Ada County Courthouse, Administration Department 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- 4 
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Alpine Village COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
vs. 
City of McCall, 







ARCHIE N. BANBURY, CLERK 
By D PERRY Deputy 
FEB 08 2012 
Case No. ____ lnst No. __ _ 
Filed A.M ____ PM 
Received from Mia Martorelli, Official Court Reporter, 
of the above-entitled action, and lodged with me this 
~~~day of February, 2012. 
Archie N. Banbury 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Date: 2/23/2012 
Time: 03:43 PM 
Judicial District Court - Valley County 
ROA Report 
User: PERRY 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-2010-0000519-C Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
Alpine Village Company vs. City Of Mccall 













New Case Filed - Other Claims Michael McLaughlin 
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, Michael McLaughlin 
or the other A listings below Paid by: Alpine Village Company (plaintiff) 
Receipt number: 0006530 Dated: 12/10/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) 
For: Alpine Village Company (plaintiff) 
Plaintiff: Alpine Village Company Appearance Steven J. Millemann Michael McLaughlin 
Complaint Filed Michael McLaughlin 
Summons Issued Michael McLaughlin 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Michael McLaughlin 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: White Peterson Receipt number: 0006597 Dated: 
12/16/2010 Amount: $7.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: White Peterson Michael McLaughlin 
Receipt number: 0006597 Dated: 12/16/2010 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued 
Verified Amended Complaint Filed 
Affidavit Of Gregory C. Pittenger 
Summons Issued 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/2312011 to City Of Mccall; 






Affidavit Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
Summons: Document Returned Served on 5/23/2011 to City Of Mccall; Michael McLaughlin 
Assigned to Private Server. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Notice Of Appearance--NO FILING FEE PD. Michael McLaughlin 
Defendant: City Of Mccall, Appearance Christopher H. Meyer 
Notice to Adverse Party of Removal to Federal Court 
Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Mccall" Defendant; Alpine Village 
Company, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/22/2011 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
District of Idaho--Civil Docket 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 09/22/2011 04:00 PM) 
Notice of Procedures For Telephonic Appearances Regarding CourtCall 
Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To File Second Amended 
Complaint 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 09/22/2011 04:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 


















Time: 03:43 PM 
Page 2 of 3 
Fo udicial District Court - Valley County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-20 1 0-0000519-C Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
User: PERRY 
Alpine Village Company vs. City Of Mccall 



















Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Complaint 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion For Leave to File Second Amended 
Complaint 





Amended Notice of Telephonic Status Conference Under I.R.C.P. 16(a) & Michael McLaughlin 
16(b) 
Second Amended Complaint Filed 
City's Motion To Enlarge Page Limitation 
City's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Order Granting City of McCall's Motion to Enlarge Page Limitations 
City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/17/2011 02:30 PM) Tentative Set 
Answer to Second Amended Complaint 
Notice of Hearing 
Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 












Memorandum in Support of Alpine Village's Motion for Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
and In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Steven J Millemann 
Affidavit of Deanna Schnider 
Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Motion To Enlarge Page Limitation 
Certificate Of Service 








Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Enlarge Page Limitation Michael McLaughlin 
Affidavit of William F. Nichols in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
City's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion For Summary Judgment and Michael McLaughlin 
Response Brief in Opposition to Alpine's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Stipulation to Modify Briefing Schedule Michael McLaughlin 
Order Modifying Briefing Schedule Michael McLaughlin 
Alpine Village's Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment And in OppOSition To Defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Plaintiff's Motion To Enlarge Page Limitation 
Certificate Of Service 






Time: 03:43 PM 
icial District Court - Valley County 
ROAReport 
User: PERRY 
Page 3 of 3 Case: CV-2010-0000519-C Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
Alpine Village Company vs. City Of Mccall 

















Plaintiffs Notice of Supplemental Authority Michael McLaughlin 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 11/17/2011 Michael McLaughlin 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Oral Argument 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Order Granting Alpine Village's Motion to Enlarge Page Limitation 
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment 
Judgment 






Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Michael McLaughlin 
by: Millemann, Steven J. (attorney for Alpine Village Company) Receipt 
number: 0000265 Dated: 1/17/2012 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Alpine 
Village Company (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 266 Dated 1/17/2012 for 285.00) - Estimated Michael McLaughlin 
Appeal record and transcript 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action Michael McLaughlin 
Amended Notice Of Appeal Michael McLaughlin 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
Transcript Letter 
City's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees With Supporting 
Statement 
Affidavit of William F Nichols 
Affidavit of Martin C Hendrickson 
Affidavit of Christopher H Meyer 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 536 Dated 2/2/2012 for 616.25) - Appeal 
Record preparation. 











Motion To Disallow Attorney Fees Michael McLaughlin 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Disallow Attorney Fees Michael McLaughlin 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 76 dated 2/15/2012 amount 100.00) Michael McLaughlin 
- partial for Appeal Record cost 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 77 dated 2/15/2012 amount 185.00) Michael McLaughlin 
City's Response Brief In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Disallow Michael McLaughlin 
Attorney Fees 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 108 dated 2/23/2012 amount Michael McLaughlin 
616.25) - Appeal Record 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
SUPREME COURT NO.39580-2012 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Case No. CV-2010-519*C 
-vs-
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CITY OF MCCALL, 
Defendant and Respondent 
I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Valley, do hereby certify that the following is a list 
of the exhibits (none) and the Affidavits listed below being sent 
as Exhibits, which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or 
retained as indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(dated October 4, 2011) 
2 AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN MILLEMANN 




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of March, 2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
SUPREME COURT NO.39580-2012 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Case No. CV-2010-519*C 
-vs-
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CITY OF MCCALL, 
Defendant and Respondent 
I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Valley, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction and contains true and 
correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to 
be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of 
Cross-Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be included. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the above entitled 
cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record 
as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this 23 rd day of February, 2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff! Appellant, 
-vs-
CITY OF MCCALL, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 
) 
) Dist. Court No. CV -20 1O-S19-C 
) 






I, ARCHIE N. BANBURY, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley, do hereby certity that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's 
Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Steven J. Mil1emann 
Millemann, Pittenger, Mcmahan & Pemberton, LLC 
P.O. Box] 066 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Givens Pursley LLC 
P. O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 Mccall, ID 83638 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this 23 rd day of February, 20]2. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY~ln.jl~, 
Deputy I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
552 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff7 Appellant, 
-vs-
CITY OF MCCALL, 
a municipal corporation, 
DefendantlRespondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 39580-2012 
) 
) Dist. Court No. CV-2010-519-C 
) 






TO: Steven J. Millemann, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Christopher C. Meyer, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED: 
That the Appeal Record and Transcript in the above entitled cause has been lodged with the District 
Court and copies sent to counsel~ that objections to the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, including 
any requests for corrections, deletions, or additions, must be filed with the District Court together with a 
Notice of Hearing within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Notice. 
DATED this 23 rd day of February, 2012. 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
553 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifY that on this 23 rd day of February, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to the following: 
Steven J. Millemann 
Millemann, Pittenger, Mcmahan & Pemberton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1066 
Mccall, ID 83638 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Givens Pursley LLC 
P. O. Box 2720 
Boise, 10 83701 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY, 
Clerk of the District Court 
554 
